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[Excerpt] The World of Work Report 2012 provides a comprehensive analysis of recent labour market and 
social trends, assesses risks of social unrest and presents employment projections for the next five 
years. The report emphasizes that while employment has begun to recover slowly, job quality is 
deteriorating and there is a growing sense of unfairness. Moreover, given the pressure on governments to 
rein in expenditure, policy efforts have focused on structural reforms to boost employment creation. 
However, if policy instruments are not carefully designed, they could exacerbate the employment situation 
and aggravate further equity concerns, with potentially long-lasting adverse consequences for both the 
economy and society. 
The report addresses the following questions: 
• To what extent has the slow recovery aggravated social conditions, including falling incomes, deepening 
poverty and worsening inequality? 
• Have countries gone too far, too fast with fiscal consolidation? How should they support recovery while 
meeting fiscal goals in the medium term? 
• What can be expected from recent labour market reforms? 
• How can investment be boosted so as to ensure a long-lasting recovery in both the economy and jobs? 
• What have been the barriers to implementing a more job-centred and equity-enhancing policy approach? 
Why has the business-as-usual scenario maintained its centrality despite the increasing risk of social 
unrest? 
This report calls for a carefully designed policy approach that takes into consideration the urgent need to 
create quality jobs while at the same time laying the ground for a more productive, fairer economy and 
labour market. 
Keywords 
labor market, employment, projections, social trends. economic growth, development 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
International Institute for Labour Studies. (2012). World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better 
economy. Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Organization. 
Required Publishers Statement 
Reproduced by special agreement of the publisher. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/216 

World of Work Report 2012

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES
World of Work Report 2012
Better jobs for a better economy
Published by the International Institute for Labour Studies
The International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) was established in 1960 as an autonomous facility 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to further policy research, public debate and the sharing 
of knowledge on emerging labour and social issues of concern to the ILO and its constituents – labour, 
business and government.
World of work report 2010 : Better jobs for a better economy/International Labour Office.  
– Geneva: ILO, 2012
International Labour Office
employment / unemployment / crisis / social unrest / debt / austerity / employment protection /  
developed countries / developing countries 
First published 2012 by  
International Labour Office 
CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland 
www.ilo.org
Co-published in South Asia by 
Academic Foundation, 
4772/23 Bharat Road, (23 Ansari Road), Darya Ganj, 
New Delhi – 110002, India 
www.academicfoundation.com
Copyright © International Labour Organization (International Institute for Labour Studies) 
2012.
Short excerpts from this publication may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the 
source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to the Director, 
International Institute for Labour Studies, P.O. Box 6, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland.
ISBN 978-92-9251-009-1 (print) 
ISBN 978-92-9251-010-7 (web pdf)
ISSN 2049-9272 (print) 
ISSN 2049-9280 (web)
Graphic design in Switzerland  ALI
Photocomposed in Switzerland  WEI
Printed in Switzerland ATA
The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions of this volume 
rests solely with their authors, and their publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Inter-
national Institute for Labour Studies of the opinions expressed.
Copies can be ordered from: ILO Publications, International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, 
Switzerland. For on-line orders, see www.ilo.org/publns
ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data
v 
Who are the authors of World of Work Report 2012?
 
The report has been prepared by staff of the International Institute for 
Labour Studies, with inputs from other ILO colleagues, and is published 
under the responsibility of the Institute’s Director. Chapter authors are: 
c Editorial: Raymond Torres 
c Uma Rani, Federico Curci and Pelin Sekerler Richiardi (Chapter 1) 
c Sandrine Cazes (Employment Sector), Sameer Khatiwada and 
Miguel Angel Malo (Universidad de Salamanca) (Chapter 2) 
c Verónica Escudero and Elva López Mourelo (Chapter 3) 
c Marva Corley-Coulibaly and Daniel Samaan (Chapter 4)
Raymond Torres edited and coordinated the Report. Steven Tobin pro-
vided contributions to Chapters 2 and 3. Matthieu Charpe and Stefan 
Kühn developed simulations of different policy options, based on the 
Global Economic Linkages (GEL) model.
We are grateful to the ILO Director-General for his stimulating guidance. 
Excellent feedback on earlier versions of the report was provided by the 
Institute’s Expert Group, which includes: Werner Eichhorst, Richard 
Freeman, Maria Jepsen, Johannes Jütting, Frédéric Lerais, Isabel Ortiz, 
Marcio Pochmann, Alakh Sharma, Nikolai Staehler, Dannielle Venn and 
Robert P. Vos. 
Our thanks to ILO colleagues in the Social Dialogue Sector who provided 
very helpful comments especially Michel Binon, Susan Hayter, Mélanie 
Jeanroy, Angelika Muller and Corinne Vargha. In addition, we are 
grateful to the Trends Unit of the ILO Employment Sector for providing 
the global unemployment projections.
The International Institute for Labour Studies was established  
by the International Labour Organization in 1960 as an autonomous centre  
for advanced studies in the social and labour field.

vii
The employment situation is deteriorating in Europe  
and is no longer improving in many other countries … 
Over the past year, labour markets have been affected by the slowdown in global 
growth. This is all the more problematic because labour markets had not fully 
recovered from the global crisis that erupted in 2008: there is still a deficit of 
around 50 million jobs in comparison to the pre-crisis situation (Chapter 1). It is 
unlikely that the world economy will grow at a sufficient pace over the next couple 
of years to both close the existing jobs deficit and provide employment for the over 
80 million people expected to enter the labour market during this period.
The trends are especially worrying in Europe, where the unemployment rate 
has increased in nearly two-thirds of these countries since 2010; but labour market 
recovery has also stalled in other advanced economies, such as Japan and the 
United States. Elsewhere, employment gains have weakened in terms of the needs 
of a growing, better educated working-age population, as in China. And jobs def-
icits remain acute in much of the Arab region and Africa. 
… as a result, the global jobs crisis has entered a new,  
more structural phase. 
This is not a normal employment slowdown. Four years into the global crisis, 
labour market imbalances are becoming more structural, and therefore more diffi-
cult to eradicate. Certain groups, such as the long-term unemployed, are at risk of 
exclusion from the labour market. This means that they would be unable to obtain 
new employment even if there were a strong recovery. 
In addition, for a growing proportion of workers who do have a job, employ-
ment has become more unstable or precarious. In advanced economies, involuntary 
part-time employment and temporary employment have increased in two-thirds 
and more than half of these economies, respectively. The share of informal employ-
ment remains high, standing at more than 40 per cent in two-thirds of emerging 
Editorial
How to move out  
of the austerity trap?
Raymond Torres 
Director
International Institute for Labour Studies
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and developing countries for which data are available. Women and youth are dis-
proportionately affected by unemployment and job precariousness. In particular, 
youth unemployment rates have increased in about 80 per cent of advanced econ-
omies and in two-thirds of developing economies.
Job instability is, above all, a human tragedy for workers and their families; 
but it also entails a waste of productive capacity, as skills tend to be lost as a result 
of excessive rotation between jobs and long periods of unemployment or inactivity. 
More job instability therefore means weaker productivity gains in the future and 
less room for prospering and moving up the career ladder. 
The jobs deficit is going hand-in-hand with a prolonged investment def-
icit – another sign that the crisis has entered a new phase. The amount of unin-
vested cash in the accounts of large firms has reached unprecedented levels 
(Chapter 4) while, in the case of advanced economies, small firms continue to have 
difficulty accessing credit that would allow them to invest and create jobs. Impor-
tantly, the Report finds that investment has become more volatile, and that this 
has exacerbated job precariousness in advanced economies as well as in emerging 
and developing ones. 
Finally, society is becoming increasingly anxious about the lack of decent jobs. 
In 57 out of 106 countries, the Social Unrest Index, developed for the purposes of 
this Report, increased in 2011 compared to 2010. Europe, the Middle East, North 
Africa and sub-Saharan Africa show the most heightened risk of social unrest. On 
average, Latin America – where there has been a degree of employment recovery 
and, in a few cases, improvements in job quality – has experienced a decline in the 
risk of social unrest. 
The worsening situation reflects the austerity trap  
in advanced economies, primarily in Europe … 
Since 2010, and despite the job-friendly statements in successive G20 meetings 
and other global forums, the policy strategy has shifted its focus away from job 
creation and improvement and concentrated instead on cutting fiscal deficits at 
all costs. In European countries, cutting fiscal deficits has been deemed essential 
for calming financial markets. But even in countries which have not suffered from 
the effects of the crisis this remedy is being applied for pre-emptive reasons – fiscal 
deficits are being reduced to avert any negative reactions from financial markets. 
This approach was intended to pave the way for greater investment and growth, 
along with lower fiscal deficits. 
In addition, as part of the policy shift, the majority of advanced economies 
have relaxed employment regulations and weakened labour market institutions 
(Chapter 2), and more deregulation measures have been announced. These steps 
are being taken in the hope that financial markets will react positively, thereby 
boosting confidence, growth and job creation. 
However, these expectations have not been met. In countries that have 
pursued austerity and deregulation to the greatest extent, principally those in 
Southern Europe, economic and employment growth have continued to deterio-
rate. The measures also failed to stabilize fiscal positions in many instances. The 
fundamental reason for these failures is that these policies – implemented in a con-
text of limited demand prospects and with the added complication of a banking 
system in the throes of its “deleveraging” process – are unable to stimulate pri-
vate investment. The austerity trap has sprung. Austerity has, in fact, resulted in 
weaker economic growth, increased volatility and a worsening of banks’ balance 
ix
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sheets leading to a further contraction of credit, lower investment and, conse-
quently, more job losses. Ironically, this has adversely affected government budgets, 
thus increasing the demands for further austerity. It is a fact that there has been 
little improvement in fiscal deficits in countries actively pursuing austerity policies 
(Chapter 3). 
With regard to deregulation policies, the Report finds that they will fail to 
boost growth and employment in the short term – the key time horizon in a crisis 
situation. Indeed, the employment effects of labour market reforms depend heavily 
on the business cycle. In the face of a recession, less stringent regulation may lead 
to more redundancies without supporting job creation. Likewise, the weakening 
of collective bargaining is likely to provoke a downward spiral of wages, thereby 
delaying recovery further. 
In general, the Report confirms findings from earlier studies that show there 
is no clear link between labour market reforms and employment levels. Interest-
ingly, within the range in which the majority of countries lie, adequate employ-
ment regulations tend to be positively associated with employment. Beyond that, 
badly designed regulations may adversely affect labour market performance. In 
these cases, there are grounds for considering reforms as part of social dialogue and 
in conjunction with social protection measures. This policy has been successfully 
pursued in the recent past in countries such as Austria and Brazil. 
… but spreading to other countries. 
Many emerging and developing countries pursued a strategy of boosting domestic 
demand in order to compensate for weaker prospects for exporting to advanced 
economies. There are signs that in some of these countries, such as India, Latin 
America, South Africa and, more recently, China, wages have grown to catch up 
with productivity. Public investment and social protection have also been rein-
forced and regional integration has proved helpful. 
Nevertheless, even in these countries, labour markets and real investment 
are not immune to the global economic weakening. Volatile capital f lows has 
also aggravated the instability of the real economy and the possibility for creating 
better jobs. 
It is therefore crucial to pursue further the present approach of boosting 
domestic demand, complementing it with better enforcement of core labour stand-
ards and measures to avoid destabilizing capital flows. 
An alternative approach exists … 
It is possible to move away from the austerity trap. Last year’s World of Work Report 
offered a three-pronged approach, which remains valid today. First, labour market 
institutions should be strengthened so that wages grow in line with productivity, 
starting in surplus economies. In the current situation, consideration could be 
given to a careful and coordinated increase in the minimum wage.  Further efforts 
to implement core labour standards would also be helpful, especially in emerging 
and developing countries where gaps exist. Ratifying ILO core Conventions in all 
G20 countries would give a positive signal in this respect. 
Second, it is critical to restore credit conditions and create a more favourable 
business environment for small enterprises. The issue is particularly pressing in the 
Euro-zone countries, where the policy of the Central Bank to provide liquidity to 
banks has failed to boost credit to the real economy. There may also be a case for 
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higher taxation of firms that do not reinvest profits, and/or lower taxation of firms 
that emphasize investment and job creation.
Third, it is possible to promote employment while meeting fiscal goals. The 
Report shows that a fiscally neutral change in the composition of expenditures 
and revenues would create between 1.8 and 2.1 million jobs within 1 to 2 years. 
In the case of emerging and developing countries, efforts should be centred on 
public investment and social protection to reduce poverty and income inequality 
and to stimulate aggregate demand. For advanced economies, the focus should be 
on ensuring that unemployed people, especially youth, receive adequate support 
to find new jobs. 
More fundamentally, it is high time for a move towards a growth- and job-
orientated strategy. This would help to coordinate policies and avert further conta-
gion caused by fiscal austerity. In Europe, the strategy could include a coordinated 
approach to solving the debt crisis, for which innovative funding mechanisms and 
improved utilization of European Structural Funds – properly reformed in order 
to better tackle present job deficits — would be instrumental. 
… which requires embracing the perception that job-friendly policies  
have a positive effect on the economy and that the voice of finance  
should not drive policy-making. 
The current policy approach reflects the premise that growth follows austerity and 
that, in turn, jobs follow growth. According to this view, the main thrust of efforts 
to date has therefore focused on cutting deficits and restoring global growth to 
positive territory with the view that, soon thereafter, job creation would follow. As 
a consequence, more direct efforts to stimulate job creation and boost the incomes 
of those most vulnerable to the crisis have been of secondary importance.
Since there are now indications that these premises have proved counterpro-
ductive, it is vital to demonstrate that an alternative, job-centred approach out-
lined above exists. It is also imperative to nurture this alternative approach with 
concrete examples of policies that work, in which ILO has played a key role via 
the adoption of the Global Jobs Pact and could play a greater role as a forum for 
policy analysis. 
Another factor at work has been the imbalance between the voice of the real 
economy and that of the financial sector. Both are important, but both need to 
be heard. To remedy this, consideration could first be given to the creation of 
national employment and social observatories. This step could help to identify an 
upper bound to the level of unemployment beyond which new measures will be 
needed – in much the same way as for inflation or fiscal targets. The task could 
be facilitated by the establishment of independent and authoritative observatories 
to monitor and forecast trends in the labour market, which could be charged with 
providing independent evaluations of the employment impact of policy proposals. 
Their remit would be to forewarn governments against the adoption or continua-
tion of policies that are unlikely to achieve the unemployment goals.
Second, there is a strong case for establishing consultative national forums, 
where economic and social policies are discussed by government and the social 
partners. Although outcomes will not be binding, such consultations can provide 
important feedback to governments on the current state of the labour market and 
outlook for unemployment. The forum could also play a central role in collabo-
rating and consulting with the national observatory or agency created to monitor 
and assess labour market developments and policy impacts. 
xi
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Finally, national efforts to shift to policies that will ensure higher levels of 
employment will be greatly facilitated by reforms in the governance of the global 
economy. The key objective of this reform is to provide a high and stable level 
of effective demand in the global economy. This will entail: (i) ensuring effective 
global coordination of economic policies to eliminate “beggar-my-neighbour” 
policies that lead to global imbalances and restrict potential global growth; 
(ii) removing the constant threat to global economic stability from volatile and 
unregulated cross-border financial flows; and (iii) developing coordinated macro-
economic policies for dealing with future global economic crises.
In short, this Report calls for countries to put in place the necessary condi-
tions for a dramatic shift in the current policy approach. It highlights the need 
for an approach that recognizes the importance of placing jobs at the top of the 
policy agenda and the need for coherence among macroeconomic, employment 
and social policies. This requires a significant change in domestic and global gov-
ernance, which is a complex task. Though the task is demanding, even progressive 
steps in this direction will be rewarded with better job prospects and a more effi-
cient economy.
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1Main findings
c Global employment has not yet recovered from the global crisis that erupted in 
2008. The global employment rate, at 60.3 per cent in 2011, is 0.9 percentage 
points lower than before the crisis. This means that around 50 million jobs are 
missing relative to the pre-crisis situation. 
c There are marked cross-country differences in recent employment trends. 
Employment rates have recovered much faster in emerging and developing 
economies, especially the latter where as a group they have surpassed the pre-
crisis levels. By contrast, employment rates remain subdued in many advanced 
economies and in Northern Africa. 
c Despite the cross-country differences, there are general issues which have to be 
addressed in order to ensure a sustainable job recovery in all countries. First, in the 
majority of countries, some groups, such as youth and the long-term unemployed, 
face considerable difficulties in obtaining employment. Youth unemployment 
rates have increased in about 80 per cent of advanced economies and in two-
thirds of the developing economies. On average, more than 36 per cent of job-
seekers in advanced economies have been without work for more than one year. 
c Second, in many countries where employment growth has resumed, jobs tend to 
be provided on a short-term basis. Involuntary part-time work and temporary 
employment are on the increase in the majority of countries where employ-
ment growth has resumed. Involuntary part-time employment and temporary 
employment have increased in, respectively, two-thirds of advanced economies 
and more than half of these economies. The share of informal employment 
remains high, standing at more than 40 per cent in two-thirds of emerging 
and developing countries for which data are available. There are, however, 
Employment,  
job quality and  
social implications  
of the global crisis *
* Thanks to the Trends Unit of the Employment Sector for providing the global unemployment
projections and Sameer Khatiwada (Institute) for the social unrest graph.
2World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
some exceptions to these general patterns; in particular, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, Thailand and Uruguay have 
increased their employment rates without compromising on job quality.
c Third, the crisis has led to an increase in poverty rates in half of advanced 
economies and one-third of developing economies. Similarly, inequality has 
increased in approximately one-half of advanced economies and one-quarter of 
emerging and developing economies. Inequalities have also widened in terms 
of access to education, food, land and credit. 
c Fourth, in 57 out of 106 countries, the Social Unrest Index increased in 2011 
compared to 2010. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa 
show the most heightened risk of social unrest. In several countries in Asia and 
Latin America – where there has been employment recovery and, in some cases, 
improved job quality – have experienced a decline in the risk of social unrest 
between 2010 and 2011. 
c Projections indicate that, on present trends, employment in advanced economies 
will not reach pre-crisis levels until late 2016. The current economic slowdown 
has also affected employment prospects in emerging and developing economies. 
Introduction
Four years on from the onset of the global crisis, the employment rate for the global 
labour market is still below the pre-crisis peak (ILO, 2012). Recent trends suggest 
that the labour market recovery has been weak in many of the advanced econ-
omies. Employment growth in developing economies has shown a corresponding 
decline as economic growth has slowed down. The decline in demand from the 
Eurozone area has potential consequences that may spill over into other regions 
through trade and financial linkages, if there is no boost in internal demand in 
developing economies (UNDESA, 2012). 
Beyond these general trends, this chapter provides an in-depth examination of 
the profound impact, which the prolonged period of economic turbulence has had 
on labour markets. The chapter examines its impact on employment, long-term 
unemployment and labour market inactivity (section A), as well as job quality (sec-
tion B) and poverty and income inequality trends (section C). Finally, the chapter 
presents employment projections and introduces the rest of the report (section D). 
A. Employment trends 
In the past year, the employment recovery has been slower in advanced economies 
(0.1 per cent) than in developing economies (2.2 per cent). The recovery is mar-
ginal in advanced economies compared to the crisis period (2007–10) during 
which it declined by 1.7 per cent. Developing economies, in contrast, experienced 
a slowdown in their employment growth by more than one percentage point com-
pared to the crisis period (3.8 per cent). 
Labour markets have not recovered from the global crisis …
Despite an improvement in the past year, labour markets have not recovered from 
the global crisis and there is an overall decline in employment growth in advanced 
31. Employment, job quality and social implications of the global crisis
economies by 1.6 per cent for the period 2007–11. For countries with available 
information, employment rates have increased since 2007 only in six (Austria, 
Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, Malta and Poland) of the 36 advanced economies 
(16 per cent) and in 60 per cent (17 out of 29 countries) of the developing econ-
omies (see Figure 1.1 panels A and B). Some of the developing countries in the 
Latin American region (Chile, Colombia and Uruguay) were able to increase their 
employment rates by more than three percentage points, while in others the rate 
remained below the 2007 peak. In the developing economies, the growth spurt 
driven by domestic demand on both the consumption and investment side and 
rising real wages have actually helped many of these economies to register increases 
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Figure 1.1 Employment rates in the third quarters of 2007 and 2011 (percentages)
Panel B. Emerging and developing economies
Note: For Argentina, Israel and Sri Lanka the data refers to Q2 and for Morocco and Uruguay the data refers to Q1.
World refers to global employment rates estimated for the baseline scenario from ILO, 2012.
Source: IILS estimates based on Eurostat, OECD employment database and national sources.
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in employment. Among the advanced economies, Germany was able to increase 
employment, largely due to the Kurzarbeit 1 scheme. 
… there is a widespread deterioration in youth unemployment … 
In addition to unsatisfactory employment outcomes, in the majority of advanced 
economies labour markets have deteriorated since 2007 in terms of unemployment 
and inactivity. Unemployment has been particularly widespread among vulnerable 
groups, especially youth (aged 15-24). Youth unemployment rates have increased 
in about 80 per cent of the advanced and two-thirds of the developing economies 
with available information. In addition, in half of the advanced economies youth 
unemployment is higher than 15 per cent. Although there was a temporary respite 
in the unemployment rate among adults in 2011, the situation did not improve for 
the unemployed youth (ILO, 2012). In the Middle East and North African region, 
youth unemployment was four times greater than adult unemployment (ILO, 2012), 
and the rates were as high as 25 per cent. Although some countries that improved 
their employment situation, mainly Austria and Germany, were also able to reduce 
their youth unemployment rates, in some others it escalated to 45 per cent in coun-
tries such as Spain and Greece. In particular, the youth unemployment rate in Spain 
has increased by 28 percentage points (from 18 to 45.8 per cent) since 2007.
Across age groups, the long-term unemployment rate has increased by more 
than five percentage points among adults in advanced economies. The long-term un-
employment rate has seen its greatest increase among youth since 2007 (Figure 1.2 
panel C) and inactivity rates have also increased among youth (Figure 1.2 panel D). 
This has huge economic costs in terms of loss of skills and motivation, and could 
lead to human capital depreciation. There may also be accompanying social impli-
cations in terms of increased social strife, riots, illness, and so forth. 
… long-term unemployment continues to increase in advanced economies … 
Globally, long-term unemployment rates have increased much more in advanced 
economies compared to developing economies (Figure 1.2 panel A). In half of the 
advanced economies, more than 40 per cent of the unemployed are long-term, 
that is unemployed for more than 12 months. The long-term unemployment rate 
has increased most significantly in Denmark, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom 
and the United States since 2007. The presence of a large proportion of long-
term unemployed could result in huge economic and social costs. In some of the 
countries where the long-term unemployment rate declined, such as the Czech 
Republic, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia, inactivity rates 
actually increased. This could imply that many of the long-term unemployed are 
already exiting the labour market. Countries such as Australia and Germany had 
a comparatively small increase in long-term unemployment. 
In comparison, in the majority of the developing economies with available 
information there is a decline in both long-term unemployment rates and inac-
tivity rates (see Figure 1.2 panels A and B). This could be seen as a result of labour 
moving into informal employment to secure access to an income, given the absence 
of unemployment benefits in these economies.
1. Kurzarbeit refers to “short-work” or “reduced working hours” in Germany wherein companies 
enter into an agreement to avoid lay-offs of their employees to reduce the working hours of all or most 
of their employees, with the government taking up the responsibility of some employees’ lost income.
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… and there is a major slowdown under way. 
As observed earlier most countries have not recovered from the global crisis and 
short-term trends indicate a further slowdown in the labour market recovery. For 
the time being, employment rates have continued to improve in several Latin 
American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, as well as in Indonesia, 
the Russian Federation and Turkey. In other countries for which recent statistics 
exist, employment rates have tended to stagnate or have “double-dipped”, such as 
in the China, EU, India and Saudi Arabia.
B. Job quality
As discussed in the preceding section, advanced economies are still far below their 
2007 peak and unemployment rates have continued to increase in almost all the 
countries in the group. However, there is little empirical evidence about the quality 
of jobs that have been created since the crisis. This section addresses the issue of job 
quality, which is a multi-dimensional concept including different attributes and 
dimensions of work and employment. In the literature these different dimensions 
of job quality are identified as labour compensation, power relations, contractual 
Panel A. Long-term unemployment rates Panel B. Inactivity rates
Panel B. Long-term unemployment rates by age-group Panel D. Inactivity rates by age-group
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status and stability of employment, working time, etc. (see Muñoz de Bustillo and 
de Pedraza (2010) for details of the different perspectives).2 All these aspects of 
employment quality have a potential impact on the well-being of the workers and 
their career development. The issue of job quality is addressed below by taking into 
account only three dimensions: first, the contractual status and stability of employ-
ment; second, the willingness to continue in a particular employment status; and 
third, labour compensation – that is, wages. All three dimensions combined actu-
ally reflect the quality of employment. 
The first dimension of job quality considers the contractual status and sta-
bility of employment, that is standard and non-standard jobs in advanced econ-
omies or formal and informal employment in developing economies. Non-standard 
jobs comprise part-time or temporary employment or self-employed own account. 
Informal employment comprises workers in small enterprises of fewer than five 
workers, self-employed own-account workers, unpaid family helpers and workers 
with no proper contract in the formal sector. This indicator determines the quality 
of jobs created, whether they are standard or non-standard, formal or informal.
The second dimension examines the willingness of part-time or temporary 
workers to remain in their job, and this analysis is largely confined to advanced 
economies. Eurostat data provides information to differentiate between volun-
tary and involuntary part-time or temporary work. Involuntary work is defined 
as those workers who are engaged in these forms of employment because they 
cannot find either full-time or permanent jobs. As the workers are in these forms 
of employment not out of their choice but due to compulsion, so they are referred 
as “precarious workers”.3 The third dimension examines the wages of the workers 
in assessing job quality for a sample of advanced and developing economies. 
Non-standard employment has tended to increase or has remained high … 
Since the onset of the global crisis, part-time employment has increased in two-
thirds of the advanced countries (Figure 1.3 panel A), and temporary employment 
has increased in one-half of the countries (Figure 1.3 panel B). The increase in non-
standard forms of employment is a phenomenon, which was already widely known 
before the current crisis (Houseman and Osawa, 2003). The World of Work Report 
2008 (ILO, 2008) showed that the incidence of part-time and temporary employ-
ment has increased over the past two decades. In many countries, much of the 
slow recovery in employment has been accompanied by an increase in part-time or 
temporary employment between 2007 and 2010. This is despite the fact that much 
of the employment loss in the beginning of the crisis was the result of dismissal 
of temporary and part-time workers. For example, Spain, along with Poland con-
tinues to have the highest proportion of temporary employment in Europe (20 per 
cent), despite significant losses of temporary employment during the crisis. 
A proportion of the increase in non-standard employment in advanced econ-
omies could be of a precarious nature – that is, involuntary part-time and temporary 
2. Appendix B presents an analysis of the determinants of non-standard employment.
3. Precarious work has the following characteristics in the literature: low wages (at or below minimum 
wage, if it exists), uncertainty and insecurity (in terms of hours of work, earnings, multiple possible 
employers, tasks to perform or duration of the employment relation), lack of protection (from 
termination of employment, of access to social protection and standard non-wage employment benefits: 
sick leave, domestic leave or parental leave), no explicit or implicit contract, or lack of or limited access 
to exercise, union and work rights (Kalleberg, 2009; Tucker, 2002). However, due to lack of data on 
these various dimensions we restrict our analysis only to ‘involuntary’ part-time and temporary workers.
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employment. The share of involuntary part-time and temporary employment 
increased in the majority of the advanced countries (Figure 1.4 panels A and B). 
In 2007, the share of involuntary part-time and temporary employees accounted 
for more than 22 and 60 per cent of part-time and temporary employees, respec-
tively and these shares have increased to 26 and 62 per cent in 2010 for the EU 
as a whole. The creation of precarious employment has also led to a decline in un-
employment rate in some of the countries.
Precarious employment (both involuntary part-time and temporary) declined 
in Austria, Belgium and Germany, while in Eastern and Southern European coun-
tries it increased during the crisis (Figure 1.4 panel A and B). In Greece, Italy and 
Spain involuntary part-time employment is relatively high, approximately 50 per 
cent in 2010; and involuntary temporary employment topped the 80 per cent level 
in Greece, Portugal and Spain. A comparison of involuntary part-time and temp-
orary employment before the crisis (taken as an average between 2001 and 2007) 
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and in 2010, shows that the increase in involuntary part-time and temporary 
employment has been larger than the increase in unemployed and permanent jobs 
since the crisis. This clearly shows that during the crisis more precarious employ-
ment was created.
… and informal employment remaining significant in most developing 
countries for which data exist. 
The incidence of informal employment remains high, at over 40 per cent of non-
agricultural employment in two-thirds of the countries for which data is avail-
able (Figure 1.5). In about 60 per cent of the countries, informal employment 
has remained stable or has marginally declined since the beginning of the crisis. 
Informal employment provides a refuge for the underemployed and also presents 
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Figure 1.4 Incidence of precarious employment, advanced economies, 2007 and 2010
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Note: Grey bar denotes countries where employment rates increased.
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possibilities for raising families out of poverty. There is some evidence that time-
related underemployment4 reduced marginally in some of the Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uru-
guay) (ECLAC, 2012). Similarly, in the Asian region, the implementation of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India has reduced underem-
ployment while boosting employment opportunities and wages in rural areas (Rani 
and Belser, forthcoming). In Sri Lanka, underemployment has declined by 2.1 per-
centage points between 2006 and 2010 (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2011). 
Wages paid to temporary workers are comparatively low…
The wages paid to workers in non-standard employment are comparatively low. 
The World of Work Report 2008 (ILO, 2008) showed that, in European coun-
tries, workers on fixed-term contracts are paid less than permanent employees. 
An analysis of temporary contracts in nine countries (advanced and developing), 
shows that temporary workers are paid about 40 per cent less than permanent 
workers in a number of countries.5 Earlier empirical evidence also shows that fixed-
term jobs pay less than permanent ones even after controlling for other individual 
characteristics (Stancanelli, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial, 2005). 
During the present crisis this tendency has become widespread in many countries. 
The phenomenon was also observed in many developing countries where data was 
4. The time-related underemployment definition is from ECLAC. It is defined as involuntarily 
working less than the normal duration of work determined for a given activity.
5. The countries where wages are 40 per cent lower are Germany, Mexico, South Africa and Spain, 
and the analysis is based on Tijdens et al (2010) wage indicator dataset. Please contact the authors for 
more details about the analysis. 
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Figure 1.5 Informal employment in developing economies
 (percentage of total non-agricultural employment)
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change
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Note: For Pakistan, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine the ﬁgures represent only employment in the informal sector (it excludes 
workers with no proper contracts in the formal sector) and for all other countries the ﬁgures are estimates of informal employment.
Grey bar denotes countries where employment rates increased.
Source: The estimates for Latin American countries are from Panorama Laboral (2011); data for Zambia, South Africa, Turkey, 
Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Sri Lanka and Thailand were compiled by the ILO Statistics Department and 
are published in Vanek et al. (forthcoming). Data for India, Indonesia and Pakistan are estimates by IILS from national sources.
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available, where informal jobs were paid at less than 40 per cent of the rate for 
formal jobs, and the wage gaps were widening further (ILO, 2008). 
… and new jobs created tend to entail relatively low wages. 
An examination of the nature of jobs created between 2007 and 2010 in the 20 
countries for which data exist shows, first, that the majority of new jobs are remu-
nerated at a rate below average wages. This is particularly the case in Argentina, 
Mexico, Netherlands, South Africa and Spain. Second, the analysis shows that 
new low-paid jobs are less stable than is the case with new highly-paid jobs. Again 
there are cross-country differences, such as in Sweden and Netherlands most of 
the new jobs are in lower quintiles and these are concentrated in agriculture, con-
struction, wholesale and retail trade, accommodation and food, while the jobs in 
the upper quintiles are concentrated in information, real estate and financial sec-
tors. In comparison, in the Russian Federation the new jobs are equally distributed 
across the quintiles and jobs in manufacturing and construction sectors are preva-
lent in all quintiles. The new jobs in lower quintiles are predominantly in accom-
modation and food, and in the upper quintiles they are concentrated in mining, 
finance, real estate, information and communication and professional and scien-
tific sectors.
An attempt is also made to analyse the new jobs created between 2007 and 
2010 in order to account for permanent and temporary contracts. It emerges that 
the distribution of permanent contracts between wage quintiles is more homoge-
nous compared to the temporary jobs, which are unevenly distributed towards the 
lower wage quintiles (see Figure 1.6). 
There is significant cross-country heterogeneity  
in the quantity and quality of new jobs created.
In order to deepen the preceding analysis of the nature of new jobs created, coun-
tries have been grouped into four categories, depending on their aggregate employ-
ment record since 2007 and whether the incidence of non-standard employment 
increased or not since 2007 (see Figure 1.7). For the purpose of the analysis, non-
standard employment includes temporary employment or precarious workers 
(involuntary part-time and temporary employment) for advanced countries and 
informal employment for developing countries.
Category 1 consists of countries where employment rates have increased since 
2007 and the incidence of non-standard employment has decreased (see Figure 1.7, 
category 1). This group comprises Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Indo-
nesia, Peru, Poland, Thailand, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Category 2 consists of countries where employment rates increased com-
pared to 2007 levels and the incidence of non-standard employment increased 
(see Figure 1.7, category 2). This group comprises Colombia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Turkey and Ukraine.
Category 3 consists of countries where employment rates decreased compared 
to 2007 levels and the incidence of non-standard employment also decreased (see 
Figure 1.7, category 3). This shows that the impact of the crisis on job quality can 
actually be mixed, as it is usually the worst jobs that are lost first, resulting in an 
improvement in overall job quality through the composition effect. This group 
consists of Argentina, Denmark, Ecuador, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Republic 
11
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of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa 
and Sri Lanka. However, countries in this category are relatively heterogeneous in 
terms of institutions. Netherlands and Denmark have the highest share of part-
time work, and their strong reliance on this type of employment has helped them 
to curtail the growth in temporary employment. In contrast, in Spain job quality 
was improved through the destruction of temporary jobs. Spain also presents the 
highest rate of transition from temporary jobs to unemployment in 2009.
Category 4 consists of countries where employment rates decreased com-
pared to 2007 levels and the incidence of non-standard employment increased 
(see Figure 1.7, category 4). This category has the largest number of countries and 
comprises the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mexico, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
The analysis shows that countries such as Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, 
Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, Thailand and Uruguay have increased their 
employment rates without compromising on job quality, in terms of reducing the 
share of non-standard employment. In countries such as Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Portugal and Romania, the employment situation did not improve 
and temporary and precarious employment actually increased.
10
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C. Impact of the crisis on poverty and income inequality 
The social impact of the current global crisis has been manifold, as rising un-
employment and falling incomes further deepen poverty and worsen inequality in 
certain countries. In many of the developing countries, the informal sector labour 
force has expanded with the entry of the unemployed from the formal sector, 
resulting in sharp declines in the earnings of workers. The situation is similar in 
the advanced economies, where the rise in temporary employment and precarious 
workers also leads to a decline in incomes. This section analyses the impact of the 
crisis on poverty and income inequality. 
Poverty rates have increased since the start of the crisis in advanced 
economies, and have tended to decrease in developing countries … 
In the past decade, global poverty rates, measured as the share of the population 
living below $1.25 per day, declined by 17 percentage points from 42 per cent 
in 1990 to 25 per cent in 2005 (World Bank, 2011).6 However, increasing food 
and fuel prices and the 2008 global crisis reversed these positive trends in sev-
eral regions of the world. The poverty threshold, which is the minimum level of 
income deemed adequate to sustain a basic standard of living, is defined differ-
ently for advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, the poverty 
threshold is a relative measure and is calculated as the percentage of the population 
living on an income below 60 per cent of the median income. In developing econ-
omies, it is an absolute measure calculated as the percentage of the population 
living on incomes below the national poverty rates.
In about three-quarters of the developing economies there was a decline 
in national poverty rates between pre-crisis and crisis periods, which was most 
marked in the Latin American region followed by the Asian countries and Uganda 
and Rwanda in the African region (Figure 1.8 panel A). In advanced economies, 
poverty rates declined or remained the same in half of the countries between 2007 
and 2010 (see Figure 1.8 panel B). As the poverty line used in Europe is a rela-
tive one, the decrease in poverty rates might stem from a disproportional decline 
in overall income instead of an improvement in poverty. Poverty rates have also 
declined in some of the East European countries that joined the EU recently. In 
these countries, the poverty rates were relatively high and joining the EU seems to 
have had a positive impact on their poverty level.
However, if poverty thresholds are calculated using an absolute measure then 
the situation might be different. For example, in Latvia relative poverty rates do 
not show any significant change in poverty between 2007 and 2010. Though, if 
an absolute poverty line, such as a minimum subsistence basket, is used then the 
poverty rate increases by 16 percentage points between 2008 and 2009 (Kūla et 
al., 2011). The situation in Greece and Portugal7 seems to be similar wherein GDP 
per capita decreased in these countries while relative poverty rates did not change 
6. This indicator is one of the two indicators used in developing countries to measure poverty (the 
other one is the share of population living below $2 a day) and indicates extreme poverty, according to 
the World Bank. These estimates are provided to present an overall picture of global poverty. However, 
as each country’s national poverty rate is more relevant (since this takes into account economic and 
social conditions specific to that country), this is the rate considered for developing countries. In the 
case of advanced countries, 60 per cent of the median income is used as the poverty rate. 
7. Using an absolute measure it was found that poverty rates increased by two percentage points 
between pre-crisis and crisis periods (Callan et al., 2011). 
13
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during this crisis. This is surprising given that both these countries observed a 
decline in minimum wages by 20 and 25 per cent respectively, which should have 
led to a decline in purchasing power and also increase in poverty. 
One of the obstacles to reducing poverty is its intergenerational transmission 
from parents to children, which increases the long-term probability that the poor 
will remain in poverty. One of the reasons why certain groups are trapped in pov-
erty is due to low pay.8 “Historically poverty was associated with joblessness” (Luci-
fora and Salverda, 2009); however, today an increasing number of those who are 
8. Low pay is defined by the ILO as “the proportion of workers whose hourly wages [are] less than 
two-thirds of the median wage across all jobs” (ILO, 2010a).
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working are also poor. Available data show that the incidence of low pay has risen 
in a number of countries: the comparison between 1995–2000 and 2007–2009 
periods (averages) shows that this increase was more than 4 per cent in Germany 
and Argentina, 6 per cent in Luxembourg, almost 8 per cent in Honduras and 
more than 12 per cent in Panama (ILO, 2010a). The issue of low pay and the 
working poor is crucial for implementing policies which aim to address poverty.
In addition to the issue of low pay, unemployment among young graduates 
could also lead to intergenerational poverty. There is some evidence from earlier 
crises that youth unemployment persists even long after growth resumes (ILO, 
2010b). This often implies a lower probability of finding a job in the future. For 
example, in Belgium it was found that the probability of young graduates finding a 
job after a 21-month period of unemployment decreases from 60 per cent to 16 per 
cent for men and from 47 per cent to 13 per cent for women (Cockx and Pic-
chio, 2011). Unemployment at graduation also has a significant negative impact on 
future earnings. For instance, in Sweden those who were unemployed after gradu-
ation were earning 30 per cent less after five years than graduates who had a job 
at graduation (Gartell, 2009), while in the United States Mroz and Savage (2006) 
found that a six-month spell of unemployment at the age of 22 would lower future 
earnings by 8 per cent. 
… and a similar pattern can be observed for income inequalities. 
The increase in the number of unemployed, the decrease in earnings and the slow-
down in growth has raised concerns about income inequalities. Using the Gini 
coefficient as an indicator for inequality, in more than half of the advanced econ-
omies and three-quarters of the developing economies inequality actually declined 
(see Figure 1.9 panels A and B). However, the level of income inequality in devel-
oping economies is markedly higher than in advanced economies.
The decline in income inequality in many of these countries must be inter-
preted carefully. There is evidence that the Gini coefficient can be a misleading 
concept in terms of income inequality, especially with respect to income redistri-
butions that are on one side of the median. In fact, in such a case, the Gini coef-
ficient would decrease and polarization would increase (Seshanna and Decornez, 
2003). An analysis of income shares for 44 developing countries with available 
information shows that the income share among the richest 20 per cent of the 
population (Q5) is almost 50 per cent and among the poorest 20 per cent of the 
population is 5 per cent (see Figure 1.10). 
Non-income dimensions of inequality are on the rise. 
Additionally, there are non-income dimensions of inequality that are not reflected 
in the Gini coefficients. These dimensions of global inequality include inequalities 
in health, access to education, employment, gender, etc., which, apart from exacer-
bating poverty, also lead to greater marginalization within society. Some of these 
dimensions are explored here.
Inequality related to health is an important non-economic component of in-
equality, which has been increasing both in advanced and in developing econ-
omies. In developing and less-developed economies, access to health care is quite 
restricted and health insurance coverage is not universal, therefore the financial 
burden of health care often falls on the private households, which cannot afford 
such costs. In the aftermath of the recent food and fuel crisis, poor households 
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Figure 1.9 Income inequality, pre-crisis and crisis
Panel B. Emerging and developing economies
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in Bangladesh and Jamaica “reported finding it harder to manage the costs of 
accessing health services”, which led to “self-diagnosis and resort to folk remedies” 
(Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 2009). In Pakistan, it was reported that 
among households in the poorest quintile “the number of households unable to 
afford healthcare increased from 6 per cent to 30 per cent” (Sanogo, 2009). The 
crisis has also led to a slowdown in foreign aid for health programmes in many 
countries. For example development assistance for health stagnated or decreased 
(France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal among others) and in 
many of them there were marginal increases with some exceptions such as Norway 
and United Kingdom between 2008 and 2009 (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation, 2010, 2011). Some of the sub-Saharan countries, such as Botswana, 
South Africa and Tanzania, have also announced cuts in government budgets for 
HIV/AIDS, and the impact on vulnerable groups could be phenomenal. 
In Europe, the situation was exacerbated in some countries, such as Greece, 
after the crisis. Many Greeks lost their access to health care through employment, 
which pushed many from private sector health care into state health institutions.9 
At the same time, austerity measures led to 40 per cent cuts in public hospital 
budgets, which in turn created problems of understaffing and shortages of med-
ical supplies. This led to a rise in the number of those who reported unmet med-
ical needs and “bad health” between 2007 and 2009. There was increase in the 
use of street clinics run by NGOs from 3-4 per cent to 30 per cent worsening the 
situation for the vulnerable groups (Kentikelenis et al., 2011). The United States 
provides another example of rising problems related to health care after the crisis: 
many households “are close to financial ruin owing to health costs incurred after 
the loss of employer-provided health insurance” (UNDESA, 2010). 
Inequality in access to education perpetuates income inequality and further 
“limits the impact of economic growth on poverty reduction” (Ahmad, 2003). 
This could also have implications for other outcomes, such as employment, wages, 
health (UNDESA, 2005). Access to education helps in acquiring skills, which 
enhance the capacity to take advantage of job opportunities, and improve per-
sonal bargaining power in the labour market (Ahmad, 2003). However, access to 
education is quite unequal in different countries throughout the world. In some 
African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal), the percentage of those 
aged 25 and older without any education stands at more than 60 per cent, with 
lack of education much higher among poor households. The situation worsens in 
times of crisis when the financial burden on poor households increases, leading 
to a rise in drop-out rates among children (UNESCO, 2011). A number of coun-
tries (Bangladesh, Kenya and Zambia) have observed significant school drop-
outs after the crisis, due to unaffordable school costs, children entering the 
labour market to augment household income, and lack of adequate food (IDS, 
2009). The World Bank and IMF estimate that “350,000 more students will fail 
to complete primary school” in 2015 due to the recent crisis (World Bank and 
IMF, 2010).
Inequality in access to food is the most alarming of all inequalities. In 2009, the 
number of undernourished reached a peak of 1.023 billion (FAO, 2011). In times 
of economic crisis, inequalities become even more glaring as the poor, whose share 
of food expenditure is more than 60 per cent of their total income, cannot afford 
to purchase food at the increased prices and tend to reduce both their consump-
tion and the variety of food they consume. In some countries, such as Bangladesh, 
9. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/10/greece-economic-crisis-health
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Kenya and Jamaica, people reported a reduction in the consumption of vegetables, 
cheese, milk and meat and there was a tendency to buy cheaper and lower quality 
products (IDS, 2009). 
Related to the issue of access to food is the issue of access to land, which is 
quite skewed in developing economies. For example, the Gini coefficient for land 
was 0.80 in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela in the 2000s (Torche and Spilerman, 2008).10 Land has become increas-
ingly concentrated in the hands of a few landowners and landlessness has been 
increasing over the past decades in a number of countries (Bangladesh, Cam-
bodia, the Philippines and Thailand). Moreover, the cultivated land per capita has 
declined in a number of countries: for example, in Eastern and Southern Africa 
the average cultivated area today accounts to less than 0.3 hectares per capita 
(International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2010). The landless 
and those who have very small parcels of land are usually net food buyers who are 
more vulnerable to shocks, and were most severely affected during the recent food 
crisis (IFAD, 2010). 
Huge inequalities exist in access to credit and, historically, those with better 
credit worthiness have been able to access credit much more easily than others. 
According to IFAD, “basic formal financial services reach only ten per cent of 
rural communities”.11 Availability of credit has become highly restricted in the 
developing world after the crisis. In Africa, real growth of credit to the private 
sector declined substantially between 2007 and 2009 (Brixiová and Ndikumana, 
2010). Moreover, defaults in payments to microcredit institutions are on the rise 
in many regions (such as Central Asia) reducing micro-entrepreneurs’ profits and 
increasing the difficulty of accessing liquidity (International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), 2009). 
Access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has decreased 
considerably in several European countries. For example, in Estonia and Latvia 
firms in 2009 were “15 per cent more likely to be credit constrained than in 
2005”, largely due to credit rationing (McCann, 2011). Greece also observed a 
decline in credit growth to the private sector in 2010, which turned negative at the 
beginning of 2011 (OECD, 2011). SMEs in Europe reported 6 percentage points 
increase in rejection of their bank loan application (18 per cent) while “bank loan 
application success (72 per cent) and rejection rates (5 per cent) remained stable 
for large firms” (European Central Bank (ECB), 2010). In 2011, the situation of 
large firms compared to SMEs remained more favourable, with 50 per cent of 
the large firms reporting that there were no obstacles to receiving financing. The 
number of SMEs reporting that there were no obstacles to receiving financing in 
2011 was only 8 per cent in Greece, 15 per cent in Portugal, 16 per cent in Spain 
and 18 per cent in Ireland, while it was 64 per cent in Finland, 58 per cent in 
Germany and 56 per cent in Austria (ECB, 2011). In 2011, “The highest net per-
centages of SMEs reporting deterioration in the availability of bank loans were … 
in Greece, Ireland and Portugal (42 per cent, 35 per cent and 31 per cent respec-
tively)” (ECB, 2011). 
10. The Gini coefficient for land does not include the landless. 
11. See http://www.ifad.org/ruralfinance
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D. Better jobs for a better economy
The short-term employment outlook continues to deteriorate  
in advanced economies … 
As observed in section A, employment rates have increased in less than 20 per 
cent of the advanced economies and 60 per cent of the developing economies. The 
impact of the economic slowdown on employment creation will be significant. 
Further, global unemployment has started to rise again since late 2011, reversing 
earlier employment gains. For 2012, around 202 million people are expected to 
be unemployed, reflecting the downward scenario indicated in the ILO (2012). 
The unemployment rate will further increase to 6.1 per cent of the global labour 
force this year and increase to 6.2 per cent in 2013. The number of jobseekers will 
continue to swell, and is expected to reach 210 million people by 2016, despite a 
gradual but limited decline in the unemployment rate.
In the advanced economies, the employment level is not expected to recover 
to pre-crisis levels till late 2016 (Figure 1.11, panel A). Given the current employ-
ment rate, which is still under the 2007 peak, the employment recovery will take 
more than five years even if the current output growth continues to grow at the 
same rate (Figure 1.11, panel B). 
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… and improves in emerging and developing economies, though unevenly.
The sluggish employment growth in the advanced economies is having an impact 
on the emerging economies, which are slowing down. Many of the countries in 
this group have experienced an improvement in the employment rate, but the rates 
are still lower than the 2007 peak and there is no recovery to date (Figure 1.12). 
There was an initial increase in the employment rate, which had a considerable 
potential for recovery in 2011, but the current economic slowdown has delayed 
recovery prospects. In the short-run, the impact of the current slowdown could 
continue for a year before employment rates starts to pick up. 
The developing economies continue to experience an increase in employment, 
although some countries in the region are facing an economic slowdown. The 
employment rate, which recovered between 2008 and 2009 and started to grow, 
has actually slowed down (Figure 1.13). The projections show that the employment 
rate would be flat till 2013 before it slowly starts to pick up.
Changes in the risk of social unrest reflect the diverging employment trends.
The labour markets in most economies have not recovered from the global crisis. 
Moreover, the major economic slowdown is further affecting the labour market 
recovery. Further, the recovery in the labour market has largely been of a pre-
carious kind, with increase in temporary, involuntary part-time and temporary 
employment and informal employment. The crisis has also led to an increase in 
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poverty rates and inequality in half of advanced economies and one-third of devel-
oping economies. These trends could further lead to reduced social cohesion.
A global annual survey shows a heightened sense of socio-economic insecurity 
in most parts of the world. Out of 106 countries with available information, 54 per 
cent of the countries reported increase in the score of the Social Unrest Index in 
2011 compared to 2010 (the higher the score, the higher the estimated risk).12,13,14 
The two regions of the world that show the most heightened risk of unrest are 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa but there are also im-
portant increases in Advanced economies and also in Central and Eastern Europe 
(figure 1.14). Interestingly, countries in Asia and Latin America – where there has 
been employment recovery – have experienced a decline in the risk of social unrest 
between 2010 and 2011. 
This report examines alternatives to fiscal austerity  
and ill-conceived labour market reforms. 
As the preceding sections demonstrate, the labour market situation requires a 
change in the policy approach – away from ill-conceived labour market reforms 
and fiscal austerity. Indeed, by boosting job quality, countries will be rewarded 
with a strong employment performance and a more solid basis for growth and 
development. 
Chapter 2 examines this change from the point of view of labour market 
institutions. It documents recent reforms in employment regulations and col-
lective bargaining and assesses the employment effects of these measures. The 
12. Social unrest index was constructed using the following variables and corresponding 
weights: percentage of respondents reporting lack of confidence in their national government 
(0.35); percentage of respondents reporting that their standard of living was getting worse (0.2); 
percentage of respondents reporting dissatisfaction with freedom in their country (0.2); percentage 
of respondents reporting that their national economy was getting worse (0.2); and percentage of 
respondents with access to internet (0.05). The weights were loosely based on other indexes for social 
and political unrest. See also World of Work Report 2011: Making markets work for jobs (ILO, 2011). 
13. Comparing levels across countries should be made with some caution. Indeed, given the nature of 
the index, it is more meaningful to compare changes within regions and countries. Looking at within 
country/region changes can provide valuable insight into how perceptions of people have changed.
14. In 2011, 54 per cent of the countries analyzed reported lower confidence in their national 
government compared to 2010. 
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chapter also provides examples of countries which, instead of deregulating labour 
markets, reinforced labour market institutions while also improving their design. 
Chapter 3 shows that a fiscally-neutral change in the expenditure and revenue 
composition would be efficient in boosting decent work prospects. Since 2010, 
there has been an increased tendency among advanced economies to focus on aus-
terity measures – mainly centred on continued reductions in social spending and 
downward pressure on public investment. The chapter shows that these measures 
have to a large extent been counterproductive, in terms of both employment and 
fiscal goals. 
Finally, Chapter 4 presents new analysis on the links between investment and 
employment. It makes an important connection between the volatility of invest-
ment on the one hand – partly the product of an uncertain financial and economic 
environment – and job quality on the other. The implications for an alternative 
policy approach are also drawn, including with respect to the role of credit policy 
for small businesses and aggregate demand. 
22
World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
Appendix A 
Country groupings by income level
Country  Income-level group 1
Afghanistan (AFG) Low income
Albania (ALB) Upper-middle income
Algeria (DZA) Upper-middle income
Argentina (ARG) Upper-middle income
Armenia (ARM) Lower-middle income
Australia (AUS) High income
Austria (AUT) High income
Azerbaijan (AZE) Upper-middle income
Bahamas (BHS) High income
Barbados (BRB) High income
Belarus (BLR) Upper-middle income
Belgium (BEL) High income
Bolivia (BOL) Lower-middle income
Brazil (BRA) Upper-middle income
Bulgaria (BGR) Upper-middle income
Cambodia (KHM) Low income
Canada (CAN) High income
Chile (CHL) Upper-middle income
China (CHN) Upper-middle income
Colombia (COL) Upper-middle income
Costa Rica (CRC) Upper-middle income
Croatia (HRV) High income
Cyprus (CYP) High income
Czech Republic (CZE) High income
Denmark (DNK) High income
Dominica (DMA) Upper-middle income
Dominican Republic (DOM) Upper-middle income
Ecuador (ECU) Upper-middle income
Egypt, Arab Rep. of (EGY) Lower-middle income
El Salvador (SLV) Lower-middle income
Estonia (EST) High income
Finland (FIN) High income
France (FRA) High income
Georgia (GEO) Lower-middle income
Germany (DEU) High income
Greece (GRC) High income
Guatemala (GTM) Lower-middle income
Honduras (HND) Lower-middle income
Hong Kong SAR (HKG) High income
Hungary (HUN) High income
Iceland (IS) High income
India (IND) Lower-middle income
Indonesia (IDN) Lower-middle income
Iran (IRN) Upper-middle income
Ireland (IRL) High income
Israel (ISR) High income
Italy (ITA) High income
Jamaica (JAM) Upper-middle income
Japan (JPN) High income
Kazakhstan (KAZ) Upper-middle income
Korea, Republic of (KOR) High income
Country  Income-level group 1
Kyrgyzstan (KGZ) Low income
Latvia (LVA) Upper-middle income
Lithuania (LTU) Upper-middle income
Luxembourg (LUX) High income
Macao SAR (MAC) High income
Macedonia, FYR (MKD) Upper-middle income
Malaysia (MYS) Upper-middle income
Malta (MLT) High income
Mauritius (MUS) Upper-middle income
Mexico (MEX) Upper-middle income
Rep. of Moldova (MDA) Lower-middle income
Mongolia (MNG) Lower-middle income
Montenegro (MNE) Upper-middle income
Morocco (MAR) Lower-middle income
Netherlands (NLD) High income
New Zealand (NZL) High income
Niger (NER) Low income
Norway (NOR) High income
Pakistan (PAK) Lower-middle income
Panama (PAN) Upper-middle income
Paraguay (PRY) Lower-middle income
Peru (PER) Upper-middle income
Philippines (PHL) Lower-middle income
Poland (POL) High income
Portugal (PRT) High income
Romania (ROU) Upper-middle income
Russian Federation (RUS) Upper-middle income
Serbia (SCG) Upper-middle income
Singapore (SGP) High income
Slovakia (SVK) High income
Slovenia (SVN) High income
South Africa (ZAF) Upper-middle income
Spain (ESP) High income
Sri Lanka (LKA) Lower-middle income
Sweden (SWE) High income
Switzerland (CHE) High income
Taiwan, China (TWN) High income
Tajikistan (TJK) Low income
Thailand (THA) Upper-middle income
Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) High income
Tunisia (TUN) Upper-middle income
Turkey (TUR) Upper-middle income
Ukraine (UKR) Lower-middle income
United Kingdom (GBR) High income
United States (USA) High income
Uruguay (URY) Upper-middle income
Uzbekistan (UZB) Lower-middle income
Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (VEN)
Upper-middle income
Viet Nam (VNM) Lower-middle income
1 Income groups are based on gross national income (GNI) per capita according to the World Bank country classification, available 
at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups. High-income countries are countries 
with a GNI per capita of US$12,276 or more; upper-middle income countries are countries with a GNI per capita of US$3,976 
to US$12,275; lower-middle income countries are countries with a GNI per capita of US$1,006 to US$3,975; and low-income 
countries are countries with a GNI per capita of US$1,005 or less.
The advanced economies are categorized as high-income countries, emerging economies are categorized as upper-middle income 
economies and developing economies are categorized as lower-middle income economies.
23
1. Employment, job quality and social implications of the global crisis
Appendix B 
Determinants of non-standard employment: 
An empirical analysis 
Section B of this chapter discusses about the non-standard employment. The fac-
tors that could explain the rise in non-standard employment in advanced econ-
omies is analysed in this appendix. The determinants of non-standard forms of 
employment are classified in terms of micro- and macroeconomic factors in the 
literature. The microeconomic factors refer to the individual characteristics of the 
worker: that is, sex, age, nationality, education and family, work–life balance, past 
unemployment experiences, working conditions and labour demand character-
istics, such as establishment size, sector and demand uncertainty. A number of 
empirical studies actually use these different microeconomic variables to explain 
the rise in non-standard work (Farber, 1999; Booth et al., 2000; Gagliarducci, 
2005; Salladarre and Hlaimi, 2007). The macroeconomic factors considered in 
the literature to explain the rise in non-standard work largely concern the role of 
labour market reforms (Dolado et al., 2002; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Kahn, 
2010). D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) also consider the role of growth rate and un-
employment rate, as well as including the microeconomic and labour market insti-
tution variables in their analysis. 
The empirical analysis is undertaken to explain the rise in non-standard 
forms of employment for each of the categories – namely, part-time employment, 
temporary employment and self-employed own-account workers. Both the micro- 
and macroeconomic variables are considered to explain the rise in non-standard 
employment, which is similar to the methods employed by D’Addio and Rosholm, 
200515. The analysis is undertaken for the year 2010 for 20 advanced economies 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Feder-
ation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). The data 
used for this analysis is from the European Social Survey (ESS).16 The variables 
included in the analysis are listed and described in table 1B.1. 
The dependent variable in the model is a binary variable: whether a worker 
is “part-time”, “temporary” or “self-employed own-account” and takes the value 1, 
otherwise 0. The vector of independent variable, xt, includes the variables listed 
in table 1B.1. The conditional probability of yt, given the vector of regressor xt, is 
given by:
where φ is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution 
and θ = (β’, σ 2)’ is the parameter to estimate, which includes β and σ– that is, the 
15. We did not conduct a cluster analysis of the different employment contracts, as was done by 
D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005, and we have included both micro- and macroeconomic variables in our 
analysis.
16. The data refers to ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Data file 
edition 1.0. The Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway is the distributor of ESS data 
and the data archive.
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coefficient attached to every independent variable and its variance. The conditional 
probability can be written compactly as: 17
The regression is estimated using a probit model, which is specified as follows:
Where NS is the non-standard employment variable considered (either the fact of 
being a part-time, temporary or self-employed own-account worker), MICRO is 
17. Taking the log form, the Probit model to estimate using maximum likelihood has the following 
specification:  
Table 1B.1 Definitions and sources of variables used in the regression analysis
Variable Definition Source
Microeconomic variables
Part-time worker Worker with less than 30 hours of work per week in main job (overtime 
excluded)
ESS 2010
Temporary worker Worker with limited duration employment contract ESS 2010
Self-employment  
own account
Self-employed worker with no employees ESS 2010
Age ESS 2010
Gender ESS 2010
Education (below BA) Worker with highest level of education below International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from 
lower tier tertiary
ESS 2010
Education (above BA) Worker with masters or doctoral degrees, ISCED 5A medium or long ESS 2010
Micro-firm Firm with fewer than ten employees ESS 2010
Small and medium enterprises Small and medium-sized enterprises with ten and 100 employees ESS 2010
Public sector Workers employed by central or local government, other public sectors (such 
as education and health) or a state-owned enterprise
ESS 2010
Past unemployment Workers who have experienced any period of unemployment and work-seeking 
within the past 5 years
ESS 2010
Work–life balance Workers with a satisfaction level of between 6 and 10 (on a scale of 1 to 10) in 
terms of the balance between time spent on their job and time spent on other 
aspects of life
ESS 2010
Macroeconomic variables
Unemployment rate People who are currently not working but are willing and able to work for 
pay, currently available to work, and have actively searched for work, as 
a percentage of labour force
IMF, World Economic  
Outlook 2011
Growth rate Growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) at constant price, in per cent IMF, World Economic  
Outlook 2011
Trade openness Ratio between trade (sum of export and imports) and GDP OECD
Trade balance Ratio between trade balance (difference between exports and imports) and GDP OECD
Labour productivity Real GDP per employed person OECD
Employment protection 
legislation 
Summary indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation, 
2008 values
OECD
Union coverage Employees covered by wage-bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage 
and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as 
a percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are 
excluded from the right to bargain, 2008 values
ICTWSS database
Incidence of part-time Proportion of part-time workers to total employment Eurostat
Incidence of temporary Proportion of temporary employees to total employment Eurostat
Incidence of self-employed 
own account
Proportion of self-employed own–account workers to total employment Eurostat
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the kth variable for the set of microeconomic characteristics, MACRO is the lth 
variable for the set of macroeconomic characteristics, LD is the mth variable for 
labour demand factors and LMI is the nth variable for labour market institutions. 
The subscript i refer to the different individuals and εi is the error term.
In particular, the three different non-standard employment statuses are 
regressed on a set of variables: microeconomic (age, sex, education, size of the 
firm and public sector), macroeconomic (unemployment rate and growth rate), 
labour demand (trade openness, trade balance and labour productivity) and labour 
market institutions (employment protection legislation, union coverage and inci-
dence of the non-standard form of work). The variables referring to the size of the 
firm and working in the public sector are not taken into account when the self-
employed own-account category is considered as a dependent variable. The analysis 
is undertaken for the age groups 15–64 years.
The results show that labour-supply factors, such as work–life balance, influ-
ence the increase in part-time work but do not affect temporary and self-employ-
ment (see table 1B.2). Labour demand and macroeconomic factors seem to be 
important determinants for the increase in part-time and temporary work, but 
do not influence self-employment. The greater flexibility required by firms to 
face a more globalized market with higher demand uncertainty seems to con-
tribute to the increase in non-standard forms of employment. Trade openness 
(defined as the sum of the exports and imports over GDP) leads to an increase 
in part-time and temporary work, while countries with a positive trade balances 
could have lower levels of part-time and temporary work. It is also likely that 
part-time and temporary works are pro-cyclical, increasing when the economy 
expands and declining during downturns and recessions. It is probable that 
countries with higher productivity will have a higher share of part-time or temp-
orary work. 
Microeconomic factors could also influence the growth in non-standard 
work. There is a higher probability for youth to be hired as temporary workers 
and for old male workers to be self-employed. Women have a higher probability 
of being employed part-time and in small enterprises. There is a higher probability 
that those who are unemployed will be part of non-standard work; a circumstance 
Table 1B.2 Summary of the estimation of the determinants of non-standard employment
Part-time Temporary Self-employment own account
Microeconomic factors Age NS – +
Male – NS +
Education NS NS NS
Size of the firm – NS NI
Past unemployment + + +
Micro-labour supply Work–life balance + NS NS
Macroeconomic factors Unemployment rate NS NS NS
Growth rate + + NS
Macro-labour demand Trade openness + + NS
Trade balance – – NS
Labour productivity + + NS
Labour market institutions Employment protection legislation + NS NS
Union coverage – – NS
Note: Estimated using probit model using the methodology, the variables and the list of countries detailed earlier. +: positive 
marginal effect of the variable; –: negative marginal effect of the variable; NS: statistically non-significant; NI: variable not included 
in the estimation. Reference categories are female, graduate and above and larger firms.
Source: IILS estimates.
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which has been documented by Farber (1999). For the unemployed, non-standard 
work is used as a stepping-stone in the transition to standard employment.
Several researchers have hypothesized that the increase in non-standard 
employment (especially temporary work) was mainly due to the labour market 
reforms implemented during the 1980s and the 1990s (Dolado et al., 2002; Blan-
chard and Landier, 2002). The results show that, in countries which have higher 
union coverage, the probability of being employed in part-time or temporary 
employment actually declines.18 However, it is difficult to ascertain from this ana-
18. Employees covered by wage-bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners 
in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as a percentage.
Table 1B.3 Marginal effects of the determinants of non-standard employment
  Part-time Temporary Self-employment  
own account
Part-time  
and temporary
Non-standard
Age 0.00607 –0.0192*** 0.0178*** –0.00712** –0.00377
0.0037 0.00395 0.00374 0.00335 0.0032
Male –0.925*** –0.0321 0.237*** –0.525*** –0.406***
0.0804 0.0797 0.086 0.0686 0.0661
Education (below BA) 0.00193 –0.0349 –0.176 –0.0968 –0.156
0.119 0.123 0.132 0.111 0.104
Education (above BA) 0.195 –0.129 –0.0663 –0.0763 –0.0728
0.152 0.156 0.16 0.135 0.127
Micro-firm 0.608*** 0.0273   0.524*** 0.834***
0.105 0.106   0.093 0.0882
Small and medium 
enterprises 
0.390*** –0.00608   0.201** 0.200**
0.1 0.0912   0.0803 0.0785
Public sector 0.145 0.113   0.0825 0.0211
0.0921 0.0945   0.0814 0.0814
Past unemployment 0.164** 0.900*** 0.236** 0.682*** 0.620***
0.0825 0.0801 0.0917 0.0713 0.0691
Work–life balance 0.498*** –0.0479 0.0614 0.178*** 0.153**
–0.0793 –0.0738 –0.0867 –0.0664 –0.0643
Unemployment rate 0.00856 0.0134 0.00661 0.00504 0.00906
0.0148 0.0123 0.0161 0.0117 0.0138
Growth rate 0.0946*** 0.109** –0.00421 0.107*** 0.0384
0.0327 0.0443 0.0432 0.0378 0.0333
Trade openness 0.00293** 0.00836*** –0.00191 0.00692*** –0.00142
0.00127 0.00299 0.00153 0.00264 0.00409
Trade balance –0.0340*** –0.0556*** 0.0189 –0.0623*** 0.0141
0.0113 0.0188 0.0169 0.0175 0.0395
Labour productivity 0.0159*** 0.0182** 0.00442 0.0175*** 0.00114
0.00337 0.00773 0.00542 0.00646 0.00746
Employment protection 
legislation
0.527*** 0.272 0.145 0.333** 0.471**
0.153 0.171 0.225 0.141 0.205
Union coverage –0.0193*** –0.0152*** –0.00447 –0.0205*** –0.0107***
0.00344 0.00577 0.00503 0.00448 0.00396
Incidence of part-time 0.0331***     0.0184*** 0.0217***
0.00499     0.00478 0.00508
Incidence of temporary   0.102***   0.0686*** 0.00383
  0.0192   0.0175 0.0344
Incidence of self- 
employed own account
    0.0445*   0.0637*
    0.0247   0.0353
Constant –3.979*** –3.811*** –2.936*** –3.169*** –2.074***
0.599 1.076 1.013 0.884 0.747
Observations 3,480 2,993 3,501 3,091 3,297
Note: Standard errors under the marginal effects; Significance levels: *** significant at 1 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; * 
significant at 10 per cent. 
Source: IILS estimates.
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Table 1B.4  Robustness tests of the estimation of the determinants  
of non-standard employment
Logit Bivariate probit
Part-time Temporary Part-time Temporary
Age 0.0111 –0.0345*** 0.00802** –0.0192***
0.00675 0.00703 0.00403 0.00394
Male –1.694*** –0.0511 –0.915*** –0.0342
0.151 0.139 0.088 0.0793
Education (below BA) –0.00957 –0.0598 –0.0919 –0.0381
0.211 0.215 0.132 0.123
Education (above BA) 0.317 –0.246 0.119 –0.135
0.272 0.274 0.167 0.156
Micro-firm 1.067*** 0.014 0.670*** 0.028
0.19 0.186 0.116 0.106
Small and medium 
enterprises 
0.690*** –0.0486 0.364*** –0.00509
0.183 0.162 0.102 0.0911
Public sector 0.242 0.206 0.143 0.108
0.161 0.166 0.0949 0.0939
Past unemployment 0.297** 1.585*** 0.145 0.904***
0.15 0.144 0.0899 0.08
Work–life balance 0.891*** –0.114 0.482*** –0.0485
0.146 0.129 0.0867 0.0736
Unemployment rate 0.0109 0.0229 0.00488 0.0133
0.0273 0.0216 0.0161 0.0123
Growth rate 0.171*** 0.181** 0.0952*** 0.112**
0.0582 0.081 0.0345 0.0445
Trade openness 0.00514** 0.0141*** 0.00291** 0.00873***
0.00227 0.00547 0.00134 0.00299
Trade balance –0.0620*** –0.0917*** –0.0298** –0.0576***
0.0204 0.0338 0.0122 0.0187
Labour productivity 0.0291*** 0.0306** 0.0130*** 0.0190**
0.00609 0.0143 0.00355 0.00773
Employment protection 
legislation
1.006*** 0.45 0.579*** 0.288*
0.268 0.317 0.165 0.172
Union coverage –0.0351*** –0.0251** –0.0176*** –0.0159***
0.00604 0.0107 0.00366 0.00578
Incidence of part-time 0.0598***   0.0348***  
0.0089   0.00528  
Incidence of temporary   0.180***   0.104***
  0.0349   0.0192
Incidence of self- 
employed own account
–7.163*** –6.508*** –4.015*** –3.939***
1.083 1.997 0.629 1.08
Constant –3.979*** –3.811*** –2.936*** –3.169***
0.599 1.076 1.013 0.884
Observations 3,480 2,993 2,993 2,993
Note: Standard errors under the marginal effects; Significance levels: *** significant at 1 per cent; ** 
significant at 5 per cent; * significant at 10 per cent.
Source: IILS estimates.
lysis that the overall level of employment protection legislation is one of the deter-
minants of the increase in temporary employment. 
The marginal effects of the probit estimates are presented in table 1B.3. The 
results are presented separately for part-time work, temporary employment, self-
employed own account, part-time and temporary employment, and total non-
standard employment. To test the robustness of our results we undertook the 
analysis using logit and bivariate probit models and found the results to be robust 
and consistent. Table 1B.4 presents the marginal effects from logit and bivariate 
probit models. Such models have also been used by other researchers (D’Addio and 
Rosholm, 2005; Salladarre and Hlaimi, 2007). 
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Appendix C 
The impact of crises on employment:  
An empirical analysis
Section D of this chapter provided employment projections from 2012 to 2017, 
which are based upon the following countries that experienced a crisis, that is 
economic recession in the past and for which there is sufficient historical time 
series data:
c High-income countries: Econometric analysis for this group is based on 22 coun-
tries, 26 crises19 and 737 observations. For projections the countries in this group 
include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
c Upper-middle-income countries: Based on 26 countries and 33 crises20, 211 obser-
vations were taken into account in the econometric analysis. The countries 
included for projections are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, South Africa, Thai-
land, Turkey and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
c Lower-middle-income countries: Based on 17 countries and 21 crises21, 115 obser-
vations were taken into account in the econometric analysis. The countries 
included for projections are Arab Rep. of Egypt, Indonesia, Republic of Mol-
dova, Morocco, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Ukraine. 
These projections draw on output–employment elasticities, which have been esti-
mated using econometric analysis based on employment impact of the recovery 
phase during past crises. The projections are constructed by applying the 
19. The following crises were taken into account in the analysis of this group: Australia, 1989–92; 
Canada, 1983–85; Czech Republic, 1996–2000; Denmark, 1987–92; Estonia, 1998; Finland, 
1991–95; France, 1994–95; Germany, late 1970s; Hungary, 1991–95; Iceland, 1975; Iceland, 1989; 
Israel, 1977; Israel, 1985; Italy, 1981; Italy, 1990–95; Japan, 1997–2001; Republic of Korea, 1997–
98; New Zealand, 1987–90; Norway, 1991–93; Portugal, 1983; Slovakia, 1998–2000; Spain, 1977–
81; Sweden, 1991; United Kingdom, 1974–76; United Kingdom, 1980s–1990s; and the United 
States, 1988. The crises of all groups have been identified on the basis of Laeven and Valencia, 2010 
and 2008.
20. The following crises were taken into account in the analysis of this group: Algeria, 1990–94; 
Argentina, 1989–91; Argentina, 1995; Argentina, 2001–03; Belarus, 1995; Brazil, 1994–98; 
Bulgaria, 1996–97; Chile, 1981–85; Colombia, 1982; Colombia, 1998–2000; Costa Rica, 1987–91; 
Costa Rica, 1994–95; Dominican Republic, 2003–04; Jamaica, 1996–98; Kazakhstan, 1999; Latvia, 
1995–96; Lithuania, 1995–96; Macedonia, 1993–95; Malaysia, 1997–99; Mauritius, 1996; Mexico, 
1994–96; Panama, 1988–89; Poland, 1992–94; Romania, 1990–92; Russian Federation, 1998; 
Serbia, 2000; Suriname, 1990; Turkey, 1982–84; Turkey, 2000; Uruguay, 1981–85; Uruguay,  
2002–05; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1994–98 and 2002.
21. The following crises were taken into account in the analysis of this group: Albania, 1994; Arab 
Rep. of Egypt, 1990; Armenia, 1994; Bolivia, 1986; Bolivia, 1994; China, 1998; Ecuador, 1982–86; 
El Salvador, 1989–90; Georgia, 1999; Honduras, 1990; India, 1993; Indonesia, 1997–2001; Republic 
of Moldova, 1999; Nicaragua, 1990–93; Nicaragua, 2000–01; Paraguay, 2002; Philippines, 1983–
86; Philippines, 1997–2000; Sri Lanka, 1989–91; Thailand, 1983; Thailand, 1997–2000.
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employment elasticity of each group to the GDP growth projections from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast (projections from 2012 onwards) at 
a country level.22 In this sense, all statistically significant partial elasticities esti-
mated with the inclusion of lagged GDP growth rates were taken into account and 
applied to the GDP growth rate of their corresponding period by country. 
The elasticities of employment growth (e Lit) to GDP changes are calculated by 
means of Okun’s Law panel regressions (following the methodology developed in 
Escudero, 2009) for the three groups of countries listed above. The following equa-
tion was estimated independently for each of the three country groups:
where Lit corresponds to the annual (or quarterly for high-income countries) 
growth rate of employment and ∆Yit is the explanatory variable, measured by 
the annual (or quarterly for high-income countries) growth rate of GDP of the 
countries analysed. One or more lags of the growth rate of GDP are included in 
the estimations, depending on which group of countries is analysed. An over-
view of the different variables used and their sources and definitions is given in 
table 1C.1. 
To construct the panel, data on employment growth around the years of 
crises were collected and centred in t0. This crisis-specific central time period 
corresponds to the year when the country experienced the lowest GDP annual/
quarterly growth rate. In this way, a panel was constructed with an average of 
26 observations for employment growth around the recovery phase of past crises 
(t – 8 to t + 25) for high-income countries and nine observations for employ-
ment growth around the recovery phase of past crises (t – 2 to t + 6) for upper-
middle- and lower-middle-income countries. Table 1C.2 presents the econometric 
estimates reporting these elasticities.
To take into account the peculiarities of the data set, regressions have been 
re-run to account for heteroscedasticity. To ensure that one or some of the countries 
22. Country-specific annual forecasts from EIU were converted into quarterly rates using the 
“effective periodic rate” calculation and were then used to establish future quarterly growth rates of 
employment for the high-income countries group. 
Table 1C.1 Definitions and sources of variables used in the regression analysis
Variable Definition Source
GDP annual growth rate Annual growth rate of real GDP, 
in national currency
IILS calculations based on the 
IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO), April 2012 and IMF 
Forecast
GDP quarterly growth rate Quarterly growth rate of real 
GDP, in national currency
IMF, IFS database and OECD, 
World Economic Outlook (WEO), 
April 2012. 
Employment growth for  
high-income countries 
Quarterly growth rate of total 
employment
OECD, Economic Outlook  
No. 87
Employment growth for 
upper-middle-income 
countries 
Annual growth rate of total 
employment 
ILO, Laborsta database
Employment growth for lower-
middle-income countries 
Annual growth rate of total 
employment 
IMF, IFS database 
Frequency of financial crises Time frames of financial crises 
in the countries analysed
Authors’ estimates based on 
Laeven and Valencia, 2010  
and 2008.
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did not influence the results, reduced regressions were also estimated by excluding 
the countries analysed one at a time. Moreover, table 1C.3 presents GLS estimates 
and controls for autocorrelated error terms. As can be seen in all panels of table 
1C.3, all coefficients remain highly significant, and the absolute sizes of the esti-
mated effects change relatively little between different estimation methods. 
Table 1C.2 Regression results 1,2 
High income Upper middle income Lower middle income
GDP (annual growth rate) 0.0238 0.2785 0.0481
(3.39)** (5.69)** (0.61)
Lag 1 of GDP 0.0311 0.2624
(4.16)** (3.45)**
Lag 2 of GDP 0.0347
(4.52)**
Lag 3 of GDP 0.0289
(3.75)**
Lag 4 of GDP 0.0124
(1.68)*
Lag 5 of GDP 0.0126
(1.88)*
Constant
 
0.0123 0.4126 0.3731
(0.37) (1.51) (0.81)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 737 211 115
Number of crisis episodes 26 33 21
1 Estimated based on ordinary least squares. All regressions are controlled for country-fixed effects. Absolute 
value of t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per cent.
2 For details of the countries included in each group see Appendix A.
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Table 1C.3 Alternative estimators 1,2
Panel A. High-income countries
Baseline equation
(heteroscedasticity)
 GLS GLS 
 (heteroscedasticity)
GLS 
 (autocorrelated errors)
GDP (annual growth rate) 0.0238 0.0291 0.0658 0.0571
(3.39)** (4.05)** (6.31)** (6.17)**
Lag 1 of GDP 0.0311 0.0397 0.0839 0.0840
(4.16)** (5.27)** (8.29)** (8.28)**
Lag 2 of GDP 0.0347 0.0455 0.0724 0.0756
(4.52)** (5.98)** (7.21)** (7.26)**
Lag 3 of GDP 0.0289 0.0399 0.0669 0.0673
(3.75)** (5.28)** (6.72)** (6.48)**
Lag 4 of GDP 0.0124 0.0207 0.0407 0.0427
(1.68)* (2.82)** (4.09)** (4.19)**
Lag 5 of GDP 0.0126 0.0167 0.0223 0.0235
(1.88)* (2.42)* (2.21)** (2.56)**
Constant 0.0123 –0.0233 –0.1517 –0.1529
(0.37) (–0.69) (–6.96) (–4.99)
Observations 737 737 737 737
Number of crisis episodes 26 26 26 26
Panel B. Upper-middle-income countries
Baseline equation
(heteroscedasticity)
 GLS GLS 
 (heteroscedasticity)
GLS 
 (autocorrelated errors)
GDP (annual growth rate) 0.2785 0.3140 0.3063 0.3025
(5.69)** (6.70)** (9.21)** (8.95)**
Constant 0.4126 0.3165 0.4423 0.4303
(1.51) (1.11) (2.24)* (1.98)*
Observations 211 211 211 211
Number of crisis episodes 33 33 33 33
Panel C. Lower-middle-income countries
Baseline equation
(heteroscedasticity)
 GLS
GDP (annual growth rate) 0.0481 0.0138
(0.61) (0.18)
Lag 1 of GDP 0.2624 0.2536
(3.45)** (3.20)**
Constant 0.3731 0.2829
(0.81) (0.60)
Observations 115 115
Number of crisis episodes 21 21
Note: 1 All regressions are controlled for country-fixed effects. Absolute value of t-statistics (z-statistics in the tests for autocorrelation) 
is provided in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per cent. 2 For detail of the countries 
included in each group see Appendix A.
Source: IILS estimates.
32
World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
References
Ahmad, A. 2003. Inequality in the access to education and poverty in Bangladesh 
(Department of Economics, Lund University). Available at: http://www.nek.lu.se/
publications/workpap/Papers/WP03_5.pdf [14 Apr. 2012].
Amuedo-Dorantes, C.; Serrano-Padial, R. 2005. “Fixed-term employment and its 
poverty implications: Evidence from Spain”, in Focus, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 42-51.
Blanchard, O.; Landier, A. 2002. “The perverse effects of partial labour market reform: 
Fixed-term contracts in France”, in Economic Journal, Vol. 112, No. 480, pp. F214–
F244. Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v112y2002i480pf214-f244.
html [14 Apr. 2012]..
Booth, A.L.; Francesconi, M.; Frank, J. 2000. “Temporary jobs: Stepping stones or 
dead ends?”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 205, Oct. (Bonn, Institute for the Study 
of Labor (IZA)). Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp205.html 
[14 Apr. 2012].
Brixiová, Z.; Ndikumana, L. 2010. “Supporting Africa’s Post-crisis growth: The role 
of macroeconomic policies”, Working Paper Research No. 117 (Tunis, African 
Development Bank). Available at: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Project-related-Procurement/WORKING%20117%20word%20
document_ASS_.pdf [14 Apr. 2012].
Callan, T.; Leventi C.; Levy H., Matsaganis M.; Paulus A.; Sutherland H. 2011. The 
Distributional Effects of Austerity Measures: a Comparison of Six EU Countries. 
European Commission; Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion; Social 
Situation Observatory. Available at: http://www.socialsituation.eu/research-notes/
SSO2011%20RN2%20Austerity%20measures_final.pdf [5 March 2012].
Cockx, B; Picchio, M. 2011. “Scarring effects of remaining unemployed for long-term 
unemployed school-leavers”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 5937 (Bonn, Institute for 
the Study of Labor (IZA)).
D’Addio, A.C.; Rosholm, M. 2005. “Temporary employment in Europe: Characteristics, 
determinants and outcomes”, in Brussels Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 1–2, 
pp. 13–42.
Dolado, J.J.; Garcia-Serrano, C.; Jimeno, J.F. 2002. “Drawing lessons from the boom 
of temporary jobs in Spain”, in Economic Journal, Vol. 112, No. 721, pp.270-295. 
Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v112y2002i721pf270-f295.html 
[14 Apr. 2012].
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 2012. 
Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Santiago, Chile, United Nations).
Escudero, V. 2009. “Effects of the Crisis on the Financial Sector: Trends and Policy 
Issue”, Discussion Paper No. 197 (Geneva, International Institute for Labour 
Studies, ILO).
European Central Bank (ECB). 2010. Survey on the access to finance of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in the euro area: Second half of 2009. Available at: http://
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/accesstofinancesmallmediumsizedenterprises201002en.
pdf [14 Apr. 2012].
—. 2011. Survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the euro area: April 
to September 2011. Available at: http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
accesstofinancesmallmediumsizedenterprises201112en.pdf [14 Apr. 2012].
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). 2011. The State of Food and Agriculture. 
Rome: FAO. http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i2050e/i2050e.pdf [14 Apr. 2012].
Farber, H.S. 1999. “Alternative and art-time employment arrangements as a response to 
job loss”, in Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 142–169.
Gagliarducci, S. 2005. “The dynamics of repeated temporary jobs”, in Labour Economics, 
Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 429–448.
Gartell, M. 2009. “Unemployment and subsequent earnings for Swedish college graduates: 
A study of scarring effects”, Finland, Institute for Futures Studies, Working Paper 
No. 2. Available at: http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2009/wp09-10.pdf
Houseman, S.; Osawa, M. 2003. Nonstandard work in developed economies: Causes and 
consequences (Michigan, W.E. John Institute for Employment Research).
33
1. Employment, job quality and social implications of the global crisis
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2010. Rural Poverty Report 2011 
(Rome). Available at: http://www.ifad.org/rpr2011/report/e/rpr2011.pdf [15 Apr. 2012].
International Labour Office (ILO). 2008. World of Work Report: Income inequalities in 
the age of financial globalization (Geneva)
—. 2010a. Global Wage Report: Wage policies in time of crisis (Geneva).
—. 2010b. World of Work Report 2010: From one crisis to the next? (Geneva).
—. 2011. World of Work Report 2011: Making markets work for jobs (Geneva).
—. 2012. Global Employment Trends: Preventing a deeper jobs crisis (Geneva).
—. 2012b. Men and Women in Informal Economy: A statistical picture (Geneva).
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). 2010. Financial Global Health, 
Development Assistance and Country Spending in Economic Uncertainty (Seattle, 
WA). Available at: http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/sites/default/files/
policy_report/2010/Report_Overview_%20FGH_2010_051111.pdf [20 Apr. 2012].
—. 2011. Financing Global Health, Continued Growth as MDG Deadline Approaches 
(Seattle, WA). Available at: http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/sites/
default/files/policy_report/2011/FGH_2011_overview_IHME.pdf [20 Apr. 2012].
Institute of Development Studies (IDS). 2009. Accounts of crisis: Poor people’s experiences 
of the food, fuel and financial crises in five countries. Available at: http://www.ids.
ac.uk/files/dmfile/AccountsofCrisisFINAL.pdf [15 Apr. 2012].
Kahn, L.M. 2010. “Employment protection reforms, employment and the incidence of 
temporary jobs in Europe: 1996–2001”, in Labour Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1–15.
Kalleberg, A.L. 2009. “Precarious work, insecure workers: Employment relations in 
transition”, in American Sociological Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 1–22. 
Kentikelenis, A.; Karanikolos, M; Papanicolas, I.; Basu, S.; McKee, M.; Stuckler, D. 
2011. “Health effects of financial crisis: Omens of a Greek tragedy”, in The Lancet, 
Vol. 378, No. 9801, pp. 1457–1458. 
Kūla, E.; Lāce, T.; Vaskis, E.; Veretjanovs, V. 2011. Poverty situation and changes in social 
assistance system in Latvia due to crisis, Improving the efficiency of social protection, 
Portugal: Peer Review in Social Protection, European Commission. Available at: 
http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/peer-reviews/2011/improving-the-
efficiency-of-social-protection [15 Apr. 2012].
Laeven, L.; Valencia, F. 2008. “Systemic banking crises: A new database”. Working Paper 
No. 224 (Washington, DC, IMF).
——. 2010. “Resolution of banking crises: The good, the bad, and the ugly”. Working 
Paper No. 164 (Washington, DC, IMF).
Lucifora, C.; Salverda, W. 2009. “Low pay”, in The Oxford handbook of economic 
inequality, W. Salverda, B. Nolan and T. Smeeding (eds) (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press), pp. 257–283.
McCann, F. 2011. “Access to credit amongst SMEs: Pre and post-crisis evidence from 
Eastern Europe”, in Economic Letters, Issue 3. Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/a/
cbi/ecolet/y2011v2011i3.html [15 Apr. 2012].
Ministry of Finance and Planning. 2011. “Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey: Annual 
report 2010” (Colombo, Department of Census and Statistics).
Mroz, T.A.; Savage, T.H. 2006. “The long-term effects of youth unemployment”, in 
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 259–293.
Muñoz de Bustillo, R.; Pedraza, P. de 2010. “Determinants of job insecurity in five European 
countries”, in Economic Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 16, No. 1, pp. 5-20.
Panorama Laboral. 2011. América Latina y el Caribe. (Lima, OIT). 
(OECD). 2011. OECD Economic Survey, Greece. (Paris).
Rani, U.; Belser, P. (Forthcoming). “The effectiveness of minimum wages in developing 
countries: The case of India”, in International Journal of Labour Research.
Salladarre, F.; Hlaimi, B. 2007. “Analysis of the determinants of temporary employment 
in 19 European countries”, Working Paper, HAL. Available at: http://ideas.repec.
org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-00174817.html [15 Apr. 2012].
Sanogo, I. 2009. “The global food price crisis and household hunger a review of recent 
food security assessments”, in Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Vol. 42. Available 
at: http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-42/the-global-
food-price-crisis-and-household-hunger-a-review-of-recent-food-security-assessments 
[15 Apr. 2012].
34
World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
Seshanna, S.; Decornez, S. 2003. “Income polarization and inequality across countries: 
An empirical study”, in Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 335-358.
Stancanelli, E.G.F. 2002. “Do temporary jobs pay? Wages and career perspectives of 
temporary workers”, in Labour, Vol. 16, No.4, pp. 667–705.
Tijdens, K.; van Zijl, S.; Hughie-Williams, M.; van Klaveren, M.; Steinmetz, S. 2010. 
“Codebook and explanatory note on the wageindicator dataset”. Working Paper 
10-102 (Amsterdam, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced labour studies).
Torche, F.; Spilerman, S. 2008. “Household wealth in Latin America”, in Personal wealth 
from a global perspective, J.B. Davies (ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press for 
UNU-WIDER).
Tucker, D. 2002. “‘Precarious’ non-standard employment: A review of literature” 
(Wellington, Department of Labour, Government of New Zealand).
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). 2005. 
Report on the World Social Situation: The inequality predicament (New York, 
United Nations). Available at: http://www.sustainable-design.ie/sustain/un2005_
ReportWorldSocialSystem.pdf [15 Apr. 2012].
—. 2010. Report on the World Social Situation: Rethinking poverty (New York, United 
Nations).
—. 2012. World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012: Global Economic Outlook (New 
York, United Nations).
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
2011. The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education, EFA Global Monitoring 
Report (Paris, UNESCO Publishing). Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0019/001907/190743e.pdf [15 Apr. 2012].
Vanek, J.; Chen, M.; Hussmanns, R.; Heintz, J.; Carre, F. (Forthcoming). Men and 
Women in Informal Economy: A statistical picture (Geneva, ILO)
World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators (Washington, DC).
World Bank; International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2010. Global Monitoring Report: The 
MDGs after the crisis (Washington, DC). Available at: http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/05/11/000333037_2010
0511001700/Rendered/INDEX/544380PUB0EPI01BOX0349416B01PUBLIC1.
txt. [15 Apr. 2012].
35
Main findings
c Countries faced with the twin challenges of low employment growth 
(Chapter 1) and limited fiscal space (Chapter 3), have turned increasingly 
towards labour market reform as a tool for reassuring financial markets and in 
the hope of boosting economic growth. Indeed, the most recent evidence gath-
ered in this chapter indicates that, in the post-crisis period, reforms that pro-
mote lighter employment protection regulations and decentralized collective 
bargaining have gathered momentum: 
C Between 2008 and March 2012, 40  countries out of 131 have altered 
their employment protection regulations for permanent employees, mainly 
by modifying the regulation of severance payments and notice periods. 
Overall, 60 per cent of these reforms have relaxed employment protec-
tion regulations for permanent employees. This trend is particularly visible 
among advanced economies, where 76 per cent of the reforms have relaxed 
employment protection regulations for permanent employees. 
C During the same period, 25 countries out of 131 have modified their legis-
lation on collective dismissals for economic reasons –  in 60 per cent of 
the cases (15 countries) facilitating the process or reducing the require-
ments for collective dismissals. In particular, in Central and South-Eastern 
Europe, 83 per cent of the reforms have relaxed the regulation of collective 
dismissals.
C In 26 out of the 40 countries for which information is available, the propor-
tion of workers covered by a collective agreement declined between 2000 
and 2009. In some cases, the trend decline has accelerated since the start of 
the global crisis.
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c Empirical evidence gathered for the purposes of this chapter confirms the find-
ings from earlier studies, that there is no clear link between employment pro-
tection legislation and employment levels. First, from low levels of employment 
protection regulation to an average level of regulation, employment levels tend 
to be positively associated with more stringent regulations. Beyond that, badly 
designed regulations may adversely affect employment. In these cases, there 
are grounds for considering a reform of regulations along with better protec-
tion via the welfare system (see Chapter 3). Second, the highest employment 
rates are found in either decentralized (but coordinated by social partners) sys-
tems of collective bargaining or centralized and coordinated bargaining sys-
tems. The recent trend towards decentralized collective bargaining, sometimes 
carried out without sufficient social dialogue or coordination, may therefore 
affect employment performance. Third, the employment effects of labour 
market reforms depend heavily on the business cycle. In the face of a recession, 
lighter regulations may aggravate the employment situation in the short term. 
Finally, country circumstances play a crucial role, notably as regards the extent 
to which regulations are applied effectively and in a predictable manner. 
c In short, while there are grounds for modifying inadequate provisions, some of 
the recent labour market reforms may reduce job stability and exacerbate ine-
qualities while failing to boost employment levels. And, in countries in recession, 
the weakening of regulations and institutions may leave the labour market with 
no protection floor or a very low one – thereby hampering overall job recovery 
prospects. The policy debate should therefore focus on the efficient design of 
regulations and institutions, rather than on “less regulation versus more regula-
tion”. This chapter provides recent examples of such efficient regulation. 
Introduction 
As Chapter 1 documented, job creation remains tepid at best and job quality has 
deteriorated. Labour market reforms are therefore seen by some as a way to spur 
job creation and growth. This is particularly the case in the European economies 
which continue to languish in the aftermath of the global crisis. Others, how-
ever, warn that labour market reforms need to be carefully designed, otherwise 
they risk creating worse labour market and macroeconomic outcomes in the short 
term while exacerbating structural problems, such as labour market duality, in 
the medium to long term. In view of the variety of opinions on these issues, the 
purpose of this chapter is (i) to document recent labour market reforms, notably 
in the areas of employment protection regulations and collective bargaining, and 
examine in which direction they have moved since the start of the global crisis 
and (ii) to assess the effects of these reforms in terms of employment levels and 
investment. 
Section A provides a brief overview of the literature on employment protec-
tion regulations and collective bargaining and describes recent changes in these 
policies and institutions covering over 130 countries. Section B assesses the labour 
market impacts of the changes in regulations and institutions documented in sec-
tion A. Section C draws policy lessons from the findings and provides examples 
of “efficient regulation”, i.e. collectively negotiated levels of protection that will 
ensure job quality and satisfaction without preventing economic efficiency and 
employment growth. 
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A.  Labour market institutions:  
Overview of the literature and recent trends
Employment protection can be achieved through either legislation or collective bar-
gaining. In particular, legislation is designed to give employees protection against 
unfair dismissal as well as against f luctuations in earned income, which nor-
mally occur at the time of individual or collective job loss. Collective bargaining 
involves a process of negotiation between employers and/or their organizations 
and workers’ organizations over employment relations and wages and working 
conditions. Depending on the structure and coverage of collective bargaining, it 
can also be a means of regulating the labour market. Moreover, these measures 
combined with effective labour policies (such as unemployment insurance, min-
imum wage legislation and training provisions and so forth) ensure labour market 
security – a more comprehensive understanding of protection that goes beyond 
one job or employer. Together, these labour policies and institutions facilitate tran-
sition from unemployment into employment, while providing protection to those 
who are already in employment. This chapter will examine only issues related to 
employment protection legislation and collective bargaining institutions. 
A review of over 100 studies shows that reforms of employment regulations 
and collective bargaining have had diverse labour market impacts.
The empirical evidence on the effects of employment protection legislation can be 
divided into the following three categories: (i) cross-country studies using aggregate 
data; (ii) cross-country studies using disaggregate data; and (iii) within-country 
studies using disaggregate data (Figure 2.1). Most commonly found empirical evi-
dence is of the first type but in recent years there has been a notable shift towards 
using disaggregated data and increasing reliance on within-country evidence. Irre-
spective of the methodology used, there is a general consensus that the stringency 
of labour legislation affects labour market outcomes but that the magnitude and 
direction of the impact on employment and unemployment are rather mixed.1
With respect to collective bargaining, there has been a trend towards deregu-
lation and decentralization. This is despite the empirical evidence in Europe (and 
elsewhere) that illustrates that bargaining facilitates the adaptability of enter-
prises to macroeconomic shocks while saving jobs. Moreover, the discussion on 
the design of collective bargaining has moved away from the virtues of centrali-
zation and coordinated structures to the virtues of firm-level bargaining. Impor-
tantly, the period of decentralization and deregulation is also associated with a 
general increase in wage inequality. 
Given their importance to labour market outcomes, it is not surprising that 
many changes to employment regulations and collective bargaining have been 
implemented since the start of the global crisis. However, in order to under-
stand these changes, it is important to bear in mind that the responses of indi-
vidual countries were very much a consequence of the initial conditions faced by 
those countries – with respect to both their institutional circumstances and the 
1. This is partly due to the fact that internationally comparable measures of employment protection 
legislation have numerous problems: for example, they are de jure indicators, based on the provision 
of legislation in place, such as labour codes, employment protection Acts and other types of laws. 
Yet, there are several important indications that asymmetries across countries (and over time) in the 
degree of enforcement of labour legislation maybe more marked than differences in regulations per se. 
For more detail, see Bertola et al., 2000.
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magnitude of the impact of the crisis. For example, in countries where collective 
bargaining was relatively strong (measured by coverage rate and union density), 
the response to the crisis included extensive consultations with social partners. In 
addition, given that the severity of the crisis varied between countries, so too did 
the nature and depth of country responses. Furthermore, the debt overhang exac-
erbated the response in many troubled economies. 
Since the start of the global crisis many changes have been towards lighter 
employment regulations …
Against the backdrop of weak job creation, poor growth prospects and constrained 
fiscal space, there has been an increasing trend towards making modifications to 
employment protection legislation as part of broader labour market reforms. In 
fact, approximately 40 countries out of 131 (equal to 31 per cent) have changed 
their employment protection legislation for permanent employees (Figure 2.2).2 
This trend is particularly prominent in the EU-27, where changes in employ-
ment protection for permanent workers occurred in 19 out of 27 countries (see 
Appendix B for some country examples). 
Furthermore, the changes to legislation for permanent employees have 
focused primarily (in 60 per cent of the cases of countries that made changes to 
their legislation) on lowering overall protection. This is particularly the case in 
advanced economies, where 76 per cent (13 countries) of the interventions have 
reduced employment protection for permanent employees (Figure 2.2, panel A). 
These reforms have generally taken the form of increasing probationary periods, 
expanding the grounds for justified dismissal, reducing severance payments and 
notice periods and weakening the remedies in the case of unfair dismissals. Besides 
the advanced economies, 60  per cent of the  countries in Central and South-
Eastern Europe that adopted any change in their legislation (6 out of 10 coun-
tries) reduced protection for permanent workers. The story is similar for countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and the 
Middle East and North Africa also reduced protection – half of all the countries 
that put in place any change to their labour legislation.  
2. Change in employment protection legislation refers to either negative change (reduction in 
protection), positive change (strengthening of protection) or a neutral situation (where changes were 
made but these did not affect the overall character of the legislation either way). This characterization 
is used by the ILO to construct its databases on employment protection legislation (EPLex). 
Figure 2.1 Main ﬁndings of over 100 studies on the labour market effects
 of employment protection legislation
Note: The summary is based on over 100 studies conducted since 1990. 
Source: Cazes et al. (forthcoming).
Cross-country studies
using aggregate data
Cross-country studies
using disaggregate data
Within-country studies
using mostly disaggregate data
● Mixed and rather small effects 
on aggregate levels of 
employment/unemployment
● Negative effects on vulnerable 
groups, especially youth
● Hump-shaped relationship 
between EPL and growth
● Mixed effects on aggregate levels 
of employment/unemployment
● Reduced employee turnover
(job creation/destruction)
● Negative effects on productivity
● Weak/negative connection 
between EPL and perceived 
job security
● Mixed and rather small effects 
on aggregate levels of 
employment/unemployment
● Reduced employee turnover 
(job creation/destruction)
● Negative effects on productivity
● Increased worker absenteeism
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Meanwhile, 23 countries out of 131 (18 per cent) have modified their legis-
lation for fixed-term contracts (also known as temporary contracts) – out of these, 
15 countries (65 per cent) reduced employment protection for fixed-term employees 
by increasing the maximum length of fixed-term contracts, increasing the number 
of reasons for their conclusion and reducing the level of protection ascribed to 
them (Figure 2.2, panel B). In particular, in Central and South-Eastern Europe, 
all the interventions on fixed-term employment have reduced employment protec-
tion. Meanwhile, in the case of advanced economies, less than half of all countries 
with any legislative change reduced protection for temporary workers.  
Furthermore, 25 countries out of 131 (19 per cent) have made changes to the 
legislation governing collective dismissals for economic reasons. In 60 per cent of 
Region  Permanent contracts Temporary contracts Collective dismissals
Countries 
with available 
information
Percentage 
of countries 
with any 
change
Percentage 
of countries 
with negative 
changes out
of the ones
that changed
legislation
Percentage 
of countries 
with any 
change
Percentage 
of countries
with negative
changes out 
of the ones 
that changed 
legislation
Percentage  
of countries 
with any  
change
Percentage 
of countries 
with negative 
changes out 
of the ones 
that changed
legislation
Advanced economies 35 49 76 26 44 29 50
Central and South 
Eastern Europe and CIS
20 50 60 40 100 30 83
East Asia, South East 
Asia and the Pacific
10 30 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
South Asia 7 14 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
19 11 50 0 N/A 0 N/A
Middle East  
and North Africa
9 22 50 11 0 33 0
Sub-Saharan Africa 31 16 60 13 75 19 83
Total 131 31 60 18 65 19 60
45
30
15
75
60
0
90
Advanced
economies 
Central
and South
Eastern Europe
and CIS
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Latin America
and
the Caribbean
Middle East
and
North Africa
East Asia,
South East
Asia and
the Paciﬁc
76
60 60
50 50
0
Note: Changes in employment protection legislation refer to all changes – whether resulting from legislation, case law 
or collective bargaining. “Countries with negative changes” refers to reductions in the stringency of employment 
regulations for permanent and temporary employment (e.g. notice periods, severance payments, valid grounds 
for dismissal, probationary periods, maximum length of ﬁxed-term contracts) as well as for collective dismissals
(e.g. deﬁnition of collective dismissal, consultation with workers’ representatives and public administration).
* Cut-off date is March 2012. 
Source: IILS based on EIRO, ILO EPLex database and national sources. 
Figure 2.2 A global overview of changes in employment protection legislation, 2008–2012*
Panel A. Out of all the countries with changes in employment protection legislation
for permanent contracts, the percentage of those that reduced protection
Panel B. Summary of all changes
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these cases (15 countries), the new legislation facilitates the use of collective dis-
missals, for example, by reducing the administrative procedures to be followed or 
increasing the numerical benchmark above which a dismissal is considered col-
lective. In Central and South-Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa the changes 
in the legislation of collective dismissals have relaxed the regulation in 83 per cent 
of the cases. 
In order to quantify these changes, employment protection legislation indi-
cators based on the OECD methodology3 were updated for the year 2010/11 for 
43 countries. Changes which took place between the pre-crisis (2007/08) and post-
crisis (2010/11) period could be identified, not only for the overall “indicator” 
(Figure 2.3), but also for each of the three components capturing respectively: 
(i) the legislation for individual permanent contracts; (ii) the legislation for temp-
orary contracts; and (iii) the legislation applying to collective dismissals. The ana-
lysis confirms the shift towards less protection among the 43 countries and that it 
was particularly pronounced in Southern and Eastern Europe. In contrast, the ana-
lysis also shows some countries reinforced their employment protection (mostly key 
emerging economies, but also Denmark, Japan and the Republic of Korea).
… as well as decentralization and deregulation of collective bargaining.
Leading up to the global crisis, industrial relations were already under strain, but 
the process of decentralization and deregulation has been hastened by the crisis. In 
some instances, collective bargaining has been regarded as an impediment to the 
correct functioning of the economy and social partnership viewed as an obstacle to 
implementing austerity and anti-crisis measures. These reforms have promoted the 
decentralization and/or the deregulation of collective bargaining – for example, by 
introducing opt-out clauses to sectoral agreements or giving greater legal validity 
to firm-level bargaining (see Appendix B for some country examples). This trend 
3. See www.oecd.org/employment/protection for more information.
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Notes: An increase in the value of the “index” denotes that legislation is more stringent and a reduction in the value of 
the “index” indicates less stringent legislation. 
Source: ILO estimates based on OECD methodology (www.oecd.org/employment/protection) and ILO EPLex database.
Figure 2.3 Change in the “employment protection legislation index” between 2007/08 and 2010/11
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is particularly evident in those countries where the presence of established col-
lective bargaining institutions has provided room for deregulation. In particular, 
in 60 per cent of countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe that introduced 
changes to their industrial relations, there has been a move towards deregulation 
and decentralization of collective bargaining (for example, Hungary, Lithuania 
and Romania). In many cases, reforms have reduced workers’ representation rights 
by generally increasing the requirements for creating a trade union or limiting the 
ability to call a strike. 
Meanwhile, 26 out of the 40 countries where the data on bargaining cov-
erage is available have shown a decline in the coverage rate between 2000/01 and 
2008/09 (Figure 2.4). Some of the decline is attributable to the broader trend that 
was already taking place before the crisis, while in many others the decline was 
accelerated by the financial and economic crisis.
B.  Assessing the labour market effects of changes 
in employment protection regulations and 
collective bargaining 
Empirically, less protection has generally not meant higher employment …
Previous studies that found a rather ambiguous impact of employment protection 
legislation on aggregate employment rate may be due to the fact that most research has 
taken a cross-country approach and concentrated on the link between labour legis-
lation and aggregate stock data, such as the effects on employment or unemployment 
levels. Another possible explanation may be provided by the lack of a satisfactory 
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Note: The 2000/01 data for Bulgaria, Brazil, Cyprus, Indonesia,  Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Portugal, Republic of Korea and 
South Africa refers to either 2002 or 2003. Similarly, the 2008/09 data for Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland and New Zealand 
refers to 2007 data. Deﬁnition of coverage: employees covered by wage-bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary 
earners with the right to bargain. The ﬁgures are adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the 
right to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees by the total 
number of dependent workers in employment, see Traxler 1994). Cross-country comparisons of the data should be made with some 
caution, especially as regards emerging and developing countries given the size of the informal sector in many of these countries. 
Source: ICTWSS database. 
Figure 2.4 Proportion of workers covered by collective agreements
 (change between 2000/01 and 2008/09 in percentage points)
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indicator for employment protection legislation, particularly for temporary employ-
ment (fixed-term contracts).4 However, empirical work exploring the effect of labour 
legislation based on disaggregated information (by gender or age as well as within-
country studies) finds some impact of legislation on particular groups.5 Indeed, the 
simulations conducted for this chapter suggest that there is a non-linear relationship 
between employment protection legislation and employment rate. 
Allowing for a linear relationship between “employment protection legis-
lation index” and employment rate – as most previous studies have done – sug-
gests that going from the lowest value for the index (the United States) to the 
highest value (Portugal), the employment rate decreases from 62 per cent to 55 per 
cent (Figure 2.5). In other words, less protection means more jobs. However, this 
relationship or assumption is misleading. In fact, when simulations allow for a 
non-linear relationship between “employment protection legislation index” and 
employment, the negative impact of employment protection legislation on employ-
ment begins only around 2.1 (on the OECD range). Below 2.1, as the value of the 
index increases, employment rate also increases – in particular, it increases from 
43 per cent to 63 per cent between the “employment protection legislation index” 
scores of 0.2 and 2.1 (Figure 2.5). This simple exercise shows that the impact of 
labour legislation on aggregate employment rate is far from being a linear nega-
tive relationship. In fact, at very low levels of employment protection, increases in 
protection are associated with higher employment rates. This is mainly due to the 
fact that at low levels of stringency, adjustment occurs through quantity of labour 
rather than prices – this effect is positive but decreasing until the “employment 
protection legislation index” value of around 2.6 
In recent years, several authors have stressed the role of relative strictness of 
employment protection legislation between regular and temporary contracts to 
better understand the impact on labour market duality (see Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2007). According to this reasoning, the key determinant of labour market duality 
is the gap between the stringency of labour legislation for regular and for temporary 
4. For more details, see Cazes et al. (forthcoming). 
5. Bassanini and Duval (2006) find no impact of employment protection legislation on male 
employment but a negative impact on female employment. Meanwhile, they identify a positive 
relationship between employment protection legislation and the employment of older workers (male 
and female) but a negative or zero impact for younger workers. For a review of these effects, see Cazes 
and Tonin, 2010. 
6.  For a more theoretical analysis, see Cazes and Nesporova (2007). 
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Figure 2.5 “Employment protection legislation index” and aggregate employment rates:
 Standard assumption versus evidence-based relationship
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workers. Indeed, simulations presented in Figure 2.6 show that, when considering 
a linear relationship, which is the classic assumption in the literature, as the gap 
in stringency increases, the share of temporary employment in total employment 
also rises (see also box 2.1). However, when considering a non-linear relationship, 
this positive association holds only for the extremes – that is, when the difference 
in stringency is very high. For the intermediate gaps (say, between –1.5 and 1.5), 
Box 2.1  Employment protection legislation and labour market duality 
during the crisis: Issues and considerations
Within the flexibility debate, the question of the structure of employment protection legis-
lation and its possible impact on labour market duality (defined as the share of temporary 
employment out of total employment) has increasingly been attracting interest, in particular 
in Southern European countries, such as Italy, Portugal and Spain. Although the crisis of 
2008–09 brought the duality in OECD labour markets into sharp focus, it is by no means 
a new phenomenon. As discussed by Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and Eichhorst and Marx 
(2010), there has been growing duality in European labour markets over some decades as 
a consequence of partial (or two-tier) labour market reforms. Indeed, the share of temp-
orary employees increased on average in the European Union (EU) from 9.0 per cent in 
1987 to 15.1 per cent in 2006, before the crisis hit these workers, with a resultant fall in 
the share (to 13.6 per cent in 2009). Given the different treatment meted out to different 
groups of workers, the effects of those partial reforms in employment protection legis-
lation have been disproportionately felt by new entrants (young, women and immigrants) 
as well as low-skilled and less experienced workers (Khan, 2007; Dolado et al. 2007).
Determining whether this duality intensified or not during the jobs crisis of 2008 is not a 
straightforward matter. First, the relationship between employment protection legislation 
and duality in the labour markets would need to be further investigated, both theoreti-
cally 1 and empirically, given the various effects (direct, substitution) that the structure of 
labour legislation may ultimately have on labour market segmentation. Second, in times 
of crisis, the (few) firms which hire may tend to use mostly fixed-term contracts due to 
high degrees of uncertainty in demand patterns. At the same time, the (many) firms 
which reduce their labour force may disproportionately affect non-standard forms of 
employment, in particular fixed-terms contracts.2 This contractual duality has created an 
objective increase in instability (as measured by shorter tenure) among youth (see Cazes 
and Tonin, 2010), which may have contributed to an overall feeling of insecurity and dis-
satisfaction within this group.
1 There are fewer studies that model reforms in the context of dualism between permanent and temporary 
contracts, one exception being Boeri (2010), which is based on a Mortensen-Pissarides type model. 
2 For more detail see Cazes and Tonin (forthcoming). 
Source: Cazes et al. (forthcoming).
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Figure 2.6 Relative strictness of labour legislation for regular contracts with respect
 to temporary contracts and incidence of temporary employment:
 Standard assumption versus evidence-based relationship
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the employment rate has a variability of around 1 percentage point and more than 
80 per cent of the observations fall within this range. This shows that the assump-
tion that decreasing the stringency of employment protection legislation will lead 
to a reduction in labour market duality is simply not correct. Therefore, when the 
gap is at an intermediate level, implementing stricter or less strict legislation will 
not be adequate to address labour market duality. 
… and some recent changes in employment regulations may 
be counterproductive in terms of employment levels ... 
To assess the recent changes in employment protection legislation on labour market 
outcomes, a cross-country analysis was conducted for a range of OECD countries, 
comparing pre-crisis (2007) and post-crisis (2010) situations (see Appendix A for 
more details and methodological considerations). More specifically, the change7 
that occurred in various labour market outcomes between 2007 and 2010 is 
regressed on the change in GDP that occurred in the same period and on the 
level of employment protection as measured by the OECD indicator for 2008.8 In 
particular, aggregate unemployment rates (both for the whole workforce and for 
youth), employment to population ratio, and the share of permanent employment 
among employees are used as dependent variables to test how employment protec-
tion legislation is related to the labour market response to the crisis. For instance, 
whether, for a given drop in GDP, unemployment responded more or less strongly 
in countries that entered the crisis with a higher level of “employment protection 
legislation index”. Since the structure of labour legislation may be expected to play 
an important role in determining labour market outcomes, the impact of both 
the overall “employment protection legislation index” and the three sub-indices on 
regular and temporary contracts and on collective dismissal is also considered in 
the analysis. As a robustness check, some specifications also include control vari-
ables, such as the trade union density in 2007 and the degree of coordination of 
wage bargaining in 2007. 
Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between “employment protection legis-
lation index” and the absolute change in the dependent variable after netting out 
the effect of GDP changes (significant at the 5 per cent level). The figure shows 
that there is some evidence to suggest a positive impact of the overall index on 
the employment rate. However, the relationship is not significant (p-value: 11 per 
cent) when controlling variables, such as trade union density or coordination, are 
introduced. This is not surprising, given the lack of robustness of such cross-coun-
tries studies. Nevertheless, it is an interesting finding given the evidence presented 
above, which challenges the existence of a systematic negative effect of employ-
ment protection legislation on employment.
With regard to employment structure, there seems to be no significant rela-
tionship between the change in the share of permanent employment among 
employees and employment protection legislation, as indicated by the small and 
non-significant value of the coefficient. This is not surprising, given the complex 
7. The importance of considering changes instead of levels is that any time-invariant differences 
across countries are cancelled out. 
8. The reason for using the “OECD indicator” for 2008 rather than the updated “indicator” is due to 
the fact that indicators of labour market outcomes (such as employment/unemployment rates) are not 
yet available for 2011, while most of the legislative reforms took place in 2010–2011, some of them 
being announced but not actually implemented. Therefore, the effects of employment protection 
legislation cannot be expected to be detected in 2010 figures.
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relationship between legislation and labour market duality, as discussed above. It 
confirms that some cautious recommendations should be made in the debate on 
the role played by employment protection on increasing labour market duality. As 
mentioned above, assessing causality between employment protection legislation 
and dual labour markets is a not straightforward exercise. 
… and private-sector investment.
It is difficult to tease out the relationship between employment protection and 
GDP growth and therefore it is not surprising that most studies find no, or an 
insignificant, relationship between the two variables. In this chapter, a novel 
approach is employed by looking at the link between “employment protection 
legislation index” and private business investment (namely, private sector gross 
fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP). The impact on investment stems 
from the fact that decisions regarding allocation of capital, besides labour, are also 
dependent on labour market regulation (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of invest-
ment trends and drivers). 
From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of labour legislation on invest-
ment could be either positive or negative. On the one hand, strictness of legis-
lation might discourage businesses from expanding production, resulting in lower 
aggregate investment. Similarly, in industries where labour and capital are com-
plementary factors of production, the impact of legislation on employment and 
investment would be in the same direction (either positive or negative depending 
on the employment intensity). On the other hand, a relatively strict labour legis-
lation might discourage the use of labour and encourage firms to adopt capital-
intensive technologies, therefore increasing aggregate investment. 
Indeed, there is a hump-shaped relationship between private sector invest-
ment and strictness of employment protection legislation. There is a positive rela-
tionship between the two variables until the “employment protection legislation 
index” score of 2.7, which is slightly above the average level of strictness among 
the OECD countries. Beyond 2.7, the relationship between the two is negative. 
This is consistent with the relationship between labour legislation and employ-
ment rate considered earlier (see Figure 2.5). Meanwhile, in the case of developing 
and emerging countries, there are not enough data points to carry out simulations 
but simple correlations show that there is a positive relationship between employ-
ment protection legislation and private sector investment. 
Note: The y-axis shows the 
residual of a regression on 
GDP change and the x-axis 
shows the change in 
employment to population 
ratio between 2007 and 
2010. For a list of country 
codes, please see 
Appendix A of chapter 1. 
Source: ILO estimates (see 
Appendix A for details).–6
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The empirical linkages between collective bargaining  
and employment levels are also complex.
The premise that higher levels of coverage and a more centralized level of bar-
gaining have a negative impact on aggregate employment is not straightforward. 
In fact, simulations following the same guidelines as before show that the level 
of coordination over wage-setting is non-linear (Figure 2.8). The lowest employ-
ment rate is associated with a coordination value of 1, which stands for not only 
full decentralization but also fragmentation (that is, disorganized decentral-
ization, meaning that negotiations over wages are not only at firm level but also 
without any coordination). For coordination values of 2 to 5, there is a U-shaped 
relationship between employment and bargaining. In other words, the highest 
employment rates occur in a fully decentralized but organized bargaining system 
(score of 2) and in a totally centralized bargaining system (score of 5). Meanwhile, 
within the intermediate level of coordination, there are relatively lower levels of 
employment. To sum up, disorganized decentralization has a negative impact on 
employment and is associated with even worse results than intermediate levels of 
coordination. 
C. Policy considerations
As shown in the preceding section, poorly designed reforms of employment regu-
lations and collective bargaining can have adverse consequences on employment 
and investment, which can be difficult to rectify. This, combined with lacklustre 
reform of the financial system (where the global crisis originated), may also fuel 
perceptions that the policy response is unfair. 
Instead, in the past few years, the countries that have achieved the best labour 
market and macroeconomic results have been those that opted for a coherent 
approach which reinforces labour market institutions and incorporate the need 
to adjust to macroeconomic shocks. This requires both proper design of the regu-
lations and a comprehensive approach which considers the broader set of labour 
market institutions and social protection, with a view to enhancing overall employ-
ment security. 
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Note: Simulations are based on ﬁxed-effects 
estimations using data for 34 countries. 
Source IILS estimates (see Appendix A for details). 
Figure 2.8 Coordination of wage bargaining and employment rate
Wage coordination 
(1 denotes completely fragmented while 5 denotes completely centralized)
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c In Australia, the global crisis interrupted a long period of sustained economic 
growth. In a deteriorating macroeconomic context, the social partners and the 
national Government decided to structurally reform the system of industrial 
relations with the approval of the Fair Work Act in 2009. The overall objective 
of the reform was to achieve an industrial relations framework that is “fair to 
the employees and flexible for business”. Under the new legislation, employers 
are legally required to conclude firm-level agreements if the majority of workers 
ask them to do so. Moreover, if the national industrial relations institution 
believes that bargaining at the firm level is not adequately developed, then 
those firms are required to participate in multi-employer bargaining. Further-
more, if one employee in the company belongs to a trade union, the union has 
the right to be involved in the negotiations. While it is difficult to judge the 
efficacy of the Fair Work Act, Australia is widely regarded as a success story in 
terms of its economic and labour market recovery following the global crisis. 
c Even through the global crisis, Austria has done remarkably well in terms of 
macroeconomic and employment performance, while maintaining the balance 
between employment security and ability to respond to shocks. For example, in 
2008, the Government increased severance payments and tightened the regula-
tion on gender-related discrimination. Moreover, in 2003, Austria’s severance 
payment system underwent a number of modifications; primarily the introduc-
tion of a new system of individual savings accounts, under which the employer 
is required to contribute 1.54 per cent of each employee’s salary every month 
to a corresponding severance fund. Payment begins on the employee’s second 
month of work and is untaxed. These measures have allowed workers to accu-
mulate severance pay uninterrupted by job changes, thus helping to encourage 
job mobility. In addition, the contributions are intended to act as a supplemen-
tary pillar to the pension system.
c During the decade preceding the global crisis, Denmark represented an example 
of successful reconciliation between employment security and flexibility. How-
ever, this model has come under severe strain in recent years, mainly as a result 
of the global crisis. In order to respond to the crisis, the Government and 
the social partners decided to reinforce employment protection. For example, 
 severance pay was included for the first time in a national agreement in the 
 sectors covered by LO (Danish Confederations of Trade Unions) and the Con-
federation of Danish Employers (LO). The 2010 national collective agreement 
in the manufacturing industry extended the right to severance payments to 
hourly employees with a minimum of 3 years of service. The joint actions 
undertaken by the Government and the social partners avoided the disman-
tling of the Danish system of employment protection and prevented workers 
from having to bear the consequences of the recession disproportionately. 
c In 2009, the Government of Jordan decided to implement a series of meas-
ures aimed at avoiding the worsening of the economic situation and deterio-
ration of employment security. Consultations with the social partners in the 
newly instituted tripartite forum “Economic and Social Council” favoured 
the implementation of such an approach and all the three pillars of employ-
ment protection legislation (permanent employment, temporary employment 
and collective dismissal) have been reformed. First, in cases of unjustified and 
unfair individual dismissal of permanent employees, labour courts may now 
impose either the reinstatement of the employee or the payment of financial 
compensation linked to seniority. Second, in order to narrow the gap between 
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permanent and temporary workers, the right to severance payments has been 
extended to fixed-term employees. As a consequence, Jordan has emerged from 
the crisis in a stronger position than its neighbours in the region. 
c In Latin America, several countries have moved towards a more inclusive labour 
market. For example, in Argentina, labour market institutions and collective 
bargaining continued to work together in response to the global crisis. All the 
main anti-crisis measures have been approved after extensive consultations with 
the social partners and have aimed at increasing the coverage of employment 
protection legislation and social security. Employment has recovered and the 
incidence of informality has declined. Similarly, in Brazil, the crisis interrupted 
a strong period of economic growth as GDP declined in 2009 for the first time 
in almost 20 years. A consultative council in 2008 presented a series of recom-
mendations, including increasing employment protection and raising public 
investment, that were later included in the anti-crisis measures approved by the 
Government. Furthermore, in 2009 a tripartite council approved the extension 
of unemployment benefits and adopted a programme which allowed employers 
to temporarily lay off workers, provided that vocational training was offered 
during the period. Unemployment has now returned to pre-crisis levels. 
c South Africa provides an important example of a country that brought together 
social partners to design and implement policy responses to the global crisis. 
Following the long-standing national tradition of tripartite policy-making, the 
Government and the social partners decided to develop a coordinated response 
to the crisis. The consultation process began in October 2008 and resulted 
in the “Framework for South Africa’s response to the international economic 
crisis” in February 2009. This national framework agreement identified six 
priorities for developing the response to the crisis: investment in public infra-
structure, macroeconomic policy, industrial and trade policy, employment and 
social measures, global coordination and social partnership. 
c In 2009, Viet Nam introduced a scheme to help workers who were laid off 
during the global crisis – by providing loans for job training and self-employ-
ment. Furthermore, the Government reinforced workers’ rights of association 
and strengthened employment protection in cases of unfair dismissal. Viet 
Nam provides an example of a country that managed to respond to the macro-
economic shock of the global crisis while strengthening and augmenting the 
institutions for employment protection and industrial relations. 
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Appendix A
Empirical analysis 
This appendix provides the background to the empirical analysis used in section 
B of this chapter. First, it is important to note that the regressions are used to 
understand how employment protection legislation and collective bargaining are 
associated with employment and macroeconomic performance. Table A1 provides 
the list of countries included for the empirical analysis (note that for section A, 
a broader selection of countries is used as the analysis relies largely on qualitative 
data). In terms of estimation, the chapter uses a model with fixed effects, where 
fixed effects correspond to countries. According to the standard specification with 
country-specific effects, the relationship between labour market performance and 
labour market institutions can be written as (Lazear, 1990; Addison and Teixeira, 
2003b; Bassanini and Duval, 2006):
yit = αt + βt + ∑ j Xi j t bj + ei t
where y denotes the dependent variable (employment rate, temporary employ-
ment rate and investment to GDP ratio), X is the set of explanatory and control 
variables, and a and β are time- and country-specific fixed effects. All regressions 
are shown in table A2. For the purposes of the chapter, regressions were run on 
the dependent variables employing several different specifications and table A2 
shows the results using the simplest models. The results are generally robust and 
the model allows for non-linearity for both employment protection legislation and 
wage-bargaining indicators. For regressions using dummies for wage-bargaining 
coordination, the results were similar. 
Table 2A1. Summary of variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable Definition No. of countries Years* Source
Employment  
rate 
Share of employment with respect 
to the population 
43 1980–2010 LFS** or other 
comparable surveys
Temporary 
employment  
rate
Proportion of temporary 
employment with respect to total 
employment
43 1980–2010 LFS or other 
comparable surveys
Employment 
protection 
legislation
This is the synthetic indicator 
provided by the OECD on 
employment protection strictness. 
The rank goes from 0 to 6, 
where 0 denotes the least strict 
employment protection and 6 the 
strictest one.
43 1985–2008 OECD
Wage coordination 
of collective 
bargaining 
Collective bargaining systems 
according to the coordination: 
ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 
denotes fragmented bargaining 
mostly at company level and 5 
denotes economy-wide bargaining
43 1980–2010 ICTWSS***
Investment Private sector gross fixed capital 
formation as a share of GDP
146 1980–2009 UN national accounts
Social well-being Aggregate subjective variable 
provided by the Gallup World Poll 
194 2006–2011 Gallup World Poll 
* Not all years are available for all countries, depending on the variables. ** Denotes labour force surveys. *** ICTWSS stands 
for Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts.
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Table 2A2.  Empirical analysis of employment and investment  
(regression models with fixed-term country effects)*
Employment rate Temporary employment 
rate
Investment rate**
emprotleg –0.0170 0.3110 15.5150 16.5134
emprotleg 2 –0.1189 –5.8905 –6.4328
emprotleg 3 0.0134 0.7394 0.8274
WageCoord 0.1377
WageCoord 2 –0.0495
WateCoord 3 0.0054
emprotleg dif 0.0060 –0.0054
emprotleg dif 2 0.0035
emprotleg dif 3 0.0022
Constant 0.6258 0.3734 0.4722 0.0965 0.0938 6.0420 5.2334
σu 0.1053 0.1249 0.1003 0.0477 0.0483 3.2179 3.1661
σe 0.0271 0.0254 0.0277 0.0219 0.0212 1.9388 1.9532
ρ 0.9378 0.9604 0.9290 0.8257 0.8380 0.7337 0.7243
N observations 554 554 731 439 439 452 494
n groups 34 34 37 30 30 23 29
* All coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. ** The first column refers only to 
advanced economies while the second column refers to all countries. 
Appendix B
Recent changes in labour legislation  
and collective bargaining – selected  
country examples 9
The purpose of this appendix is to provide some country examples and a more 
detailed examination of recent changes in employment protection legislation and 
collective bargaining that have taken place in the past 5 years (2008–2012). It 
is important to bear in mind the fact that the changes introduced depend to a 
significant extent on country-specific conditions, notably the degree of severity 
of the crisis, the nature of labour market institutions and the external pressures. 
Finally, this information is provided for illustrative purposes only and, as such, it 
does not entail a value judgement of the desirability or relevance of the reforms. 
Neither does this information give any indication of the enforcement of the new 
rules and regulations.
9. This section was prepared by Clemente Pignatti Morano (IILS) with significant contributions 
from Michel Binon, Mélanie Jeanroy, Angelika Muller and Corinne Vargha (ILO Dialogue). 
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1. High-income countries 10
Social dialogue and collective bargaining
Out of the 43 high-income countries with available information, 20 have reformed 
regulations relating to industrial relations and 11 regulations relating to workers’ 
representation. In the majority of cases, reforms have gone in the direction of 
decentralization of collective bargaining. For example: 
c Greece: Law 3899 (2010) allows for companies of any size that experience 
adverse financial and economic conditions to conclude collective agreements 
containing less favourable conditions than those agreed in the relevant sectoral 
agreements. 
c Hungary: In 2011, a reform of the labour code compromised the role of social 
dialogue at the national level by rendering the tripartite council “National 
Interest Reconciliation Council” a purely consultative rather than decision-
making institution. The reform also limited the possible motivations for strikes 
and protests and raised the level of essential public services that should be guar-
anteed during a strike. 
c Italy: Law 138 (2011) allows for company-level agreements to deviate from sec-
toral agreements. 
c Slovakia: In December 2010, Parliament modified measures regulating the exten-
sion of collective agreements to non-signatory parties and requiring the consent 
of the employer as a preliminary condition. In July 2011, Parliament approved an 
amendment to the Labour Code regarding the formation of trade unions (which 
must now represent at least 30 per cent of the workforce in the firm). 
c Spain: The new legislation introduced in February 2012 established that, in 
cases of contradictory measures between bargaining levels, firm-level agree-
ments take precedence over sectoral or regional agreements.
In two high-income countries, labour market reforms aimed to reinforce indus-
trial relations:
c Australia: The Fair Work Act 2009 reinforced the role of trade unions at the 
company level and the coordinating function of industry-wide agreements. 
Employers are now legally required to conclude company-level agreements if 
required by the majority of workers. Moreover, if the national industrial rela-
tions institution believes that bargaining at the firm level is not adequately 
developed, then those firms are required to participate in multi-employer bar-
gaining. Furthermore, if one employee in the company belongs to a trade union, 
the union has the right to be involved in the negotiations.
c Republic of Korea: Following the amendments to the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Adjustment Act in 2010, more than one union may be established in 
each firm. However, firms are required to engage in collective bargaining with 
only one union being selected as the bargaining representative organization in 
the company. 
10. For operational and analytical purposes, economies are divided among income groups according 
to 2010 gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
The groups are: low income, US$1,005 or less; middle income, US$1,006–12,275; and high income, 
US$12,276 or more.
52
World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
Employment protection legislation 
Out of the 43  countries with available information, 19  modified legislation 
regarding employment protection for permanent contracts, 12 regarding fixed-
term contracts and 11 countries regarding collective dismissals for economic rea-
sons. For example:
c Estonia: Severance payments in cases of individual dismissals for economic rea-
sons have been reduced from 2–4 months to 1 month, the grounds for justi-
fied dismissal have been broadened and in cases of unjustified dismissal there 
is no longer the possibility of reinstatement. In addition, the authorization by 
the labour inspectorate of collective dismissals for economic reasons has been 
abolished. Finally, the principle of priority for rehiring in cases of collectively 
dismissed workers has been removed.
c Greece: Law 3863 (2010) reduced the length of notice period for individual 
dismissals from 5 to 3 months, reduced severance payments for white-collar 
workers and allowed employers to pay individuals in instalments. The new 
legislation also changed the definition of collective dismissals from four to six 
employees for companies with fewer than 20 employees and from 2 to 5 per 
cent of the workforce in companies with more than 150 employees. Finally, the 
time limit after which a fixed-term employment contract is automatically con-
sidered to be of indefinite duration has been raised from 2 to 3 years. 
c Hungary: New legislation allows for the regularization (rather than the revo-
cation) of an individual dismissal made by an unauthorized person. In add-
ition, compensation in case of unfair dismissals is reduced from no limit to a 
maximum of 12 months’ salary.
c New Zealand: The new justification test for individual dismissal provides for 
the administration and the judicial authorities to have less control. Addition-
ally, in cases of unlawful dismissal reinstatement is no longer considered as the 
first solution. 
c Portugal: For contracts from 1 November 2011, redundancy pay in the case 
of collective and individual dismissals for economic reason and for individual 
dismissals based on a worker’s unsuitability has been reduced to 20 days’ wages 
(from 30 days prior to the reform). In addition, the time limit for consultations 
in cases of collective dismissals has been reduced. 
c Slovakia: The period of application for rehiring in cases of collectively dis-
missed workers has been shortened. 
c Spain: The 2010 and 2012 labour market reforms modified the legislation of 
both individual and collective dismissals. For individual dismissals, notice 
periods in cases of dismissals for objective causes have been reduced from 30 
to 15 days. In cases of unfair individual dismissals, the employee is no longer 
entitled to their salary that accrues during the tribunal proceedings if the dis-
missal is contested. Moreover, the employee is now only entitled to 33 days’ 
salary per year of service (compared to 45 previously). Finally, consultations 
between the employer and workers’ representatives in cases of collective dis-
missals have been reduced to a maximum of 30 days in companies with more 
than 50 employees and 15 days in smaller companies.
Some countries have reinforced the protection of workers in the event of indi-
vidual and collective dismissals. For example:
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c Australia: Employers are now required to consider alternatives to collective dis-
missal for economic reasons and a redundancy payment scheme has been intro-
duced in cases of individual and collective dismissals. 
c Belgium: The obligation to notify the labour administration in cases of col-
lective dismissal has been reinforced.
c France: New legislation regarding collective dismissals (for economic reasons) 
has been introduced, which requires the employer to pay the commensurate 
salary when workers are asked to move abroad for the same job. 
c Hungary: There is now a notice period for the dismissal of temporary agency 
workers. In addition, in case of dismissals of permanent employees due to a 
“transfer of business”, the employee is now entitled to a severance payment. 
2. Middle-income economies
Social dialogue and collective bargaining
Among the 67 countries in this group, industrial relations have been reformed 
in 20 countries, while regulations regarding workers’ representation have been 
amended in 26 countries. Some of the changes have resulted in greater decentral-
ization of industrial relations. For example: 
c Lithuania: A reform of labour code in 2009 had temporarily introduced (until 
the end of 2010) the possibility for collective agreements between employers’ 
representatives and employees’ representatives to set less favourable conditions 
(for example, in terms of severance pay and notice period) than those foreseen 
in the labour code. 
c Romania: The Law on Social Dialogue 62 of 2011 abolished collective bar-
gaining at the national level and eliminated the automatic extension of col-
lective agreements to non-signatory parties. The new legislation has also 
increased the minimum number of workers necessary for the formation of a 
trade union, raised the threshold of trade unions’ representation for the conclu-
sion of collective agreements and relaxed the conditions for dismissal of trade 
unions’ representatives.
In contrast to this trend, in many middle-income economies – especially outside 
the European Union –  labour market reforms have been aimed at reinforcing 
industrial relations. For example:
c Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Jordan, Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic: Tripartite national councils were 
instituted (or reinforced) to promote social dialogue on the main economic and 
social issues.
c El Salvador and Republic of Moldova: New guarantees on freedom of associ-
ation for trade unions have been introduced. 
c Senegal: In Senegal, Decree 1413 of 2009 provides practical guidance for 
employees participating in collective bargaining at the enterprise level. 
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Employment protection legislation 
Out of the 67 middle-income economies with available information, employment 
protection legislation for permanent employment has been modified in 15 coun-
tries, legislation of temporary employment in eight countries and the regulation of 
collective dismissals for economic reasons in eight countries. For example: 
c Armenia: Fixed-term contracts can now be renewed an unlimited number of 
times and with no restrictions on their maximum duration.
c Belarus: The obligation to notify third parties in cases of individual dismissals 
of permanent employees for economic reasons has been suppressed.
c Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: The principle of priority for rehiring 
collectively dismissed workers has been removed.
c Gabon: Restrictions on renewing fixed-term contracts of short duration have 
been removed.
c Latvia: Notice periods in cases of collective dismissals have been reduced from 
60 to 45 days and the labour administration may extend this limit only up to 
60 days (rather than 75 as was previously the case).
c Mauritius: The requirement to obtain permission from the labour administra-
tion in cases of collective dismissal has been removed.
c Romania: The maximum length of fixed-term contracts has been extended and 
a collective agreement to allow the use of these contracts for the development 
of a project, programme or works is no longer needed. Moreover, public sector 
employees and workers on fixed-term contracts have been excluded from the 
protection provided in the case of collective dismissals. For workers on per-
manent contracts, the priority for rehiring after a collective dismissal has been 
reduced from 9 months to 45 days.
Meanwhile, some middle-income economies have reinforced employment protec-
tion. For example: 
c Jordan: In the past few years, Jordan has reinforced its employment protection 
legislation. First, in cases of unjustified and unfair individual dismissal of per-
manent employees, labour courts may now impose either the reinstatement of 
the employee or the payment of financial compensation. Second, the right to 
severance payments has been extended to workers on fixed-term arrangements.
c Lithuania: The new legislation impedes the dismissal of workers on permanent 
contracts who intend to have a child.
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3. Low-income economies
Social dialogue and collective bargaining
Changes in industrial relations in low-income countries have occurred in six out of 
the 20 countries with available information. Reforms have mainly focused on the 
creation of new institutions or the clarification of existing provisions. The regula-
tion of workers’ representation has been changed in only two countries out of 20. 
Some examples are as follows: 
c Burkina Faso: Decree No. 806 of 2010 regulates the procedures to be followed 
in case of signature of a collective agreement, while Decree 841 of 2009 modi-
fies the regulations covering the nomination of representatives for the Chamber 
of Trades.
c Mozambique: Decree No. 50 of 2009 approved the regulation of the national 
industrial tribunal. 
c Tajikistan: The Government Decree No. 173 of 2008 adopts the statute of the 
“Tripartite commission on regulation of social and working relations”.
Employment protection legislation 
Six countries out of 20 have modified employment protection legislation of per-
manent contracts; three  countries the requirements for fixed-term contracts; 
and six countries the procedures and the requirements for collective dismissals. 
Overall, the main changes have aimed to relax the regulations over individual and 
collective dismissals. For example: 
c The Central African Republic: The obligation to obtain the authorization from 
the Labour inspection in cases of collective dismissals has been removed.
c Kyrgyzstan: The obligation to notify the public authority in cases of individual 
dismissals for economic reasons has been suppressed.
c Malawi: Severance payments in cases of collective dismissals have been reduced 
from 30 to 25 weeks’ pay for employees with 10 years of service, and from 80 
to 65 weeks’ pay for employees with 20 years of service.
c Rwanda: The obligation to consult workers’ representatives in cases of indi-
vidual and collective dismissals for economic reasons has been eliminated.
c Zimbabwe: Severance payments in cases of individual dismissals have been 
reduced from 4–6 to 2–4 months’ pay.
One low-income country reinforced regulations over individual and collective dis-
missals, namely:
c The Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Ministerial Order now obliges 
employers to report any dismissal to the regional office of the labour inspectorate 
and the regional office of the national employment agency within 48 hours. 
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Main findings
c In the wake of the global crisis prompted by the demise of the financial systems 
of advanced economies, many countries used fiscal policy as an anti-cyclical 
device. Although this step helped to attenuate the crisis, it also led to higher 
fiscal deficits and increased public debt. Between 2007 and 2009, public debt 
as a percentage of GDP increased in over 91 per cent of the 168 countries ana-
lysed in this chapter and has increased further in 2010 in over 71 per cent of 
these countries. On average, in advanced economies, public debt as a percentage 
of GDP increased during this period by almost 24 percentage points, reaching 
95 per cent in 2010. Similarly, in the group of emerging economies, debt ratios 
increased during the period in 71 per cent of the countries analysed, but only 
moderately (by 7.7 percentage points on average), reaching 35.5 per cent of GDP 
in 2010. On the contrary, in the developing countries analysed, public debt 
ratios fell by 5.5 percentage points, on average, to 52 per cent of GDP in 2010.
c In the face of these trends, since public deficits reached their peak in 2009, 
almost 93 per cent of the advanced countries have adopted fiscal consolida-
tion measures. Much of the effort has been focused on spending cuts rather 
than raising revenues. Fiscal spending as a percentage of GDP decreased by 
1.4 percentage points between the third quarters of 2009 and 2011, while the 
share of revenues in GDP increased by 1.2 percentage points during the same 
period. The reduction in government wage bills accounted for 36 per cent of 
the decline in government expenditure, cuts in government investment con-
tributed to almost 30 per cent of the expenditure reductions and cuts in social 
spending to over 22 per cent. The increase in taxes on income and wealth con-
tributed to almost 77 per cent of the increase in government revenues and the 
Fiscal consolidation 
and employment 
growth*
* The authors would like to thank Steven Tobin for valuable contributions and comments in final 
and preliminary versions of the chapter. The contribution of Clemente Pignatti with Box 3.1 is 
also gratefully acknowledged.
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increase in indirect taxes to almost 42 per cent of the increase. In contrast, 
social contributions declined. Budget plans in advanced economies for 2012 
will see continued fiscal consolidation along similar lines, especially in certain 
European countries. 
c In examining the range of policies measures introduced, a slightly different pic-
ture emerges among emerging and developing countries. In fact, only 28 per 
cent of the selected group of emerging and developing countries put in place 
policies aimed directly to reduced social security benefits during the crisis com-
pared to 65 per cent in the case of advanced economies. The range of policies 
introduced varied considerably. In some countries, governments introduced 
pension reforms that either reduced pension entitlements (e.g. Hungary and 
Ireland) or increased retirement age (e.g. Canada, Belgium, France, Greece and 
Spain). Other changes include reductions in unemployment benefits (Czech 
Republic, Netherlands and the Ukraine) and reductions in entitlements for 
sick leave (Estonia). In contrast, a number of developing economies tried to 
extend either the coverage (Chile, India and Uganda) or the benefits (Argen-
tina, Armenia and Cape Verde) of pension schemes. 
c Evidence presented in this chapter shows that the pace and content of fiscal 
consolidation measures are important if countries are to foster fiscal stability 
while simultaneously boosting employment growth. In fact, the current path 
of consolidation will lead to weak employment growth and a worsening of the 
fiscal position in the medium-term. This is mainly because lower public invest-
ment has a negative effect on the economy and jobs which cannot be com-
pensated by higher private investment. In contrast, a fiscally neutral change 
in the composition of expenditures and revenues would create between 1.8 
and 2.1 million jobs in the following year alone, depending on the policy mix 
selected. In the case of emerging and developing countries, efforts should be 
placed on public investment and social protection to reduce poverty, income 
inequality and stimulate aggregate demand. For advanced economies, the focus 
should be on ensuring that unemployed persons, especially youth, receive ad-
equate support to find new jobs.
c Finally, the significant variability in the pace and intensity of fiscal consolida-
tion across regions and countries, highlights the absence of policy coordination. 
Many countries are focusing on cutting their own fiscal deficits quickly, in the 
expectation that other countries will take the lead in boosting global growth. 
Such an approach may appear to be effective in the near-term but could prove 
counterproductive. Indeed, inward-looking policies in the context of a global 
crisis may adversely affect other countries and the global recovery more broadly. 
Introduction
In response to the financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2007/08, govern-
ments mobilized sizable fiscal support to safeguard the financial sector and put 
forth stimulus measures in an effort to stimulate aggregate demand. The increase 
in government spending at the time was seen as a necessary to support the economy 
until private sector demand would recover. Yet, the boost to growth was short-
lived as private sector business activity and investment in the real economy con-
tinued to falter (see also Chapter 4). Government revenues have since dramatically 
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deteriorated principally through shortfalls in tax revenues.1 As a result, public debt 
ratios in the majority of countries analysed have increased significantly and are set 
to continue their upward trend over the coming years.2 Going forward, the key 
question is how to stimulate economic activity against the backdrop of pressures 
on governments to reign in expenses and weak private sector demand. 
With this in mind, this chapter will assess the magnitude and nature of the 
fiscal consolidation challenge. In particular, while fiscal unbalances need to be 
addressed, the challenge is to do so without damaging further recovery prospects 
while safeguarding public finances. In this regard, emphasis will be placed on 
the important employment and social implications of poorly-designed fiscal cuts. 
In particular, section A examines briefly the evolution of fiscal balances and the 
recent build-up of public debt and looks at the recent government efforts to con-
solidate public finances. This section also examines the manner in which govern-
ments intend to raise revenue and how they will attempt to reduce expenditures 
during 2012. Finally, section B assesses the employment and fiscal implications 
of a change in the composition of austerity, highlighting how the two goals can 
be achieved simultaneously and in fact, if properly designed, can be mutually 
reinforcing.
A. Debt dynamics and ongoing fiscal consolidation efforts
Public debt has increased in the majority of countries analysed since  
the start of the global crisis, especially in advanced economies … 
Since the onset of the crisis in 2007, public debt 3 has increased rapidly in advanced 
economies,4,5 driven by a deep recession and a double dip in terms of falling GDP 
in a number of countries. Indeed, between 2007 and 2009 (when deficits reached 
their peak) fiscal deficits worsened in over 93 per cent of the countries analysed, 
increasing by 7.8 percentage points to reach an average deficit of 8.5 per cent 
of GDP in 2009. Meanwhile, public debt as a percentage of GDP increased in 
over 91 per cent of the countries analysed in this group and increased further 
in 2010 in over 71 per cent of the countries analysed (Figure 3.1). On average, 
between 2007 and 2010 the debt ratio increased by almost 24 percentage points, 
reaching 95 per cent of GDP in 2010. According to estimates, debt ratios will 
1. See Chapter 3 of the World of Work Report 2010: From one crisis to the next (IILS, 2010) for an 
analysis of the different channels through which the crisis affected fiscal balances during the crisis.
2. See Cecchetti et al. (2010), Escudero and López (forthcoming) and IMF (2012).
3. Public debt in this chapter is measured as the ratio of general government gross debt to GDP. 
Gross debt consists of “all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by 
the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of 
SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee 
schemes, and other accounts payable” (IMF, 2011b). This definition of debt is consistent with the 
definition given in the Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) and the System of National 
Accounts 2008 (SNA, 2008). 
4. The sample analysed comprises 168 countries, of which 45 are advanced economies, 49 are 
emerging economies and 74 are developing countries. See Appendix A of Chapter 1 for the list of 
countries analysed and their income groups.
5. “Advanced economies” refers to high-income countries, that is, countries with a gross national 
income (GNI) per capita of US$12,276 or more. “Emerging economies” refers to upper-middle 
income countries (GNI between US$3,976 and US$12,275) and “developing economies” to low- 
and lower-middle income countries (GNI of US$3,975 or less).
62
World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
increase further in 2011, despite a contraction of fiscal deficits. There is, however, 
considerable heterogeneity in terms of the worsening of debt levels in advanced 
economies:
c Ireland and Iceland, for example, show the steepest increases  –  at 70 and 
63.3 percentage points, respectively – albeit from relatively low initial levels 
of public debt to GDP. Interestingly, other countries, where debt levels had 
remained relatively low before the crisis, saw significant increases in public debt 
levels, notably Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
c Greece, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Italy, which already had public debt ratios 
of over 100 per cent in 2007, have also seen sharp increases – of 37.3, 32.3 and 
15.4 percentage points, respectively. 
c In contrast, oil-producing Arab countries, such as Kuwait, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia, saw their already low ratios of debt decrease further.
The situation and overall trend in the emerging and developing economies stand in 
stark contrast to those of advanced economies. These countries had accumulated 
fiscal space during the years preceding the crisis, which allowed them to respond 
to the crisis with limited effects on fiscal balances and debt accumulation. In 
emerging economies, for example, fiscal balances deteriorated by 4.7 percentage 
points on average, passing from a surplus of 1 per cent of GDP in 2007 to a 3.7 per 
cent deficit in 2009. This weakening of fiscal positions, combined with low rates of 
economic growth and higher inflation rates, pushed debt ratios upwards, but only 
moderately (i.e. by 7.7 percentage points on average during the crisis). In devel-
oping countries, the increase in fiscal deficits – of 4 percentage points – did not 
translate into an increase in public debt, mainly due to strong economic growth.6 
In fact, between 2007 and 2010, public debt ratios in this group of countries fell by 
5.5 percentage points, on average, to reach 52 per cent of GDP in 2010. Moreover, 
estimates for 2011 show that fiscal deficits and debt ratios declined in both groups 
of countries. Some variation exists, however, among countries:
c In emerging economies, 71.4 per cent showed an increase in the ratio of public 
debt to GDP; however, the magnitude of the changes varied greatly. The highest 
increases in debt levels among emerging economies between 2007 and 2010 
were observed in Latvia (32 percentage points from one of the lowest ratios of 
debt in the group – 7.8 per cent) and Jamaica (29 percentage points from one 
of the highest ratios of debt in the group – 114.2 per cent). In contrast, the 
Seychelles attained a reduction in debt ratio of almost 50 per cent – to 83 per 
cent in 2010. Likewise, Argentina and Gabon saw their levels of debt declining 
by 18 percentage points each, and Ecuador by 12 percentage points.
c In the case of developing countries, there was even more heterogeneity. The 
overall decrease in the debt ratio was the result of declines in 58 per cent of 
the countries analysed. This was particularly true among African countries 
(i.e. Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Togo), 
although Iraq and Liberia also had declining debt ratios. Meanwhile, almost 
42 per cent of the countries analysed experienced an increase in public debt 
ratios, among these Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine. 
6. Between 2007 and 2010, public gross debt in the group increased by 13.6 per cent, while GDP 
grew by almost 24 per cent. 
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… and it is important to adopt a medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy.
Public deficits have increased in 82 per cent of the countries analysed during the 
crisis, that is, in 96 per cent of the advanced economies, in 86 per cent of the 
emerging economies and in 72 per cent of the developing economies.
In advanced economies, the increase in fiscal expenditure was the main 
destabilizing factor  –  4.6  percentage points between 2007 and 2010 (Figure 
3.2). Yet, fiscal revenues also deteriorated, falling by 1.9 percentage points during 
this period. In emerging economies, the increase in public expenditure was even 
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Panel A. Advanced economies
Figure 3.1 Change in public debt* and ﬁscal balance as a percentage of GDP between 2007 and 2010
Panel B. Emerging and developing economies
2007 2010
2007 2010
* General government gross debt. 
Note: The sample analysed comprises 168 countries, of which 45 are advanced economies, 49 are emerging economies and 74 are developing countries.
See Appendix A of Chapter 1 for the list of countries analysed, their income groups and country codes.
Source: IILS calculations based on IMF (2011b).
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higher – 3 percentage points – relative to the average deterioration of fiscal pos-
itions – 3.6 percentage points. In comparison, the increase in fiscal deficit in devel-
oping countries was clearly a response to the 3.3 percentage point decrease in fiscal 
revenues. 
These findings are all the more worrying in advanced economies since fiscal 
balances continue to bear the weight of the sluggish labour market recovery (see 
Chapter 1). In addition, the crisis-related increase in deficits comes at a time 
when many advanced economies are facing significant pressures to improve their 
budget balances in order to stabilize unfunded liabilities arising from their aging 
populations.
Bringing fiscal balances back onto a sustainable track, so that governments 
can start to put in place the necessary structural reforms, is of the utmost im-
portance. Indeed, a number of countries have begun to implement measures to 
consolidate their public finances. The challenge, however, is to find a mix of meas-
ures that will allow for medium-term deficit reduction without endangering the 
incipient economic and labour market recovery. The remainder of this section 
examines the manner in which countries are attempting to reduce expenses and 
increase revenues to achieve fiscal stability. 
A majority of countries have responded by reducing social expenditures 
and limiting public investment ...
It is important to bear in mind that the worsening of fiscal positions has less to 
do with the specific social and labour market measures put in place to address 
the impacts of the crisis and more to do with the bailouts of the financial system, 
general spending increases and losses in tax revenues. Indeed, direct fiscal support 
to safeguard the financial sector has been substantial – accounting for more than 
7 per cent of GDP in advanced G20 countries (and as much as 12 per cent in the 
United Kingdom). 7 Similarly, other measures such as the purchase of toxic assets, 
loan guarantees or direct acquisition of banks, as was the case in Ireland, had im-
portant effects on government deficits and their ability to acquire new financing, 
notably at reasonable rates. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty regarding 
contingent liabilities that will affect fiscal balances in the future.
Yet with public deficits reaching their peak in 2009, almost 93 per cent of 
the countries have adopted fiscal consolidation measures – either by reducing 
7. As detailed in the World of Work Report 2010 (IILS, 2010).
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Source: IILS calculations based on IMF (2011b).
Figure 3.2 Composition of ﬁscal balances by country group (percentages of GDP)
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expenditures, increasing revenues, or both – with important implications for 
employment and social conditions. In fact, since 2009 efforts to consolidate have 
focused on the expenditure side – fiscal spending as a percentage of GDP decreased 
by 1.4 percentage points between the third quarters of 2009 and 2011 – with im-
portant cuts to wages, investment and social spending. In particular, between the 
third quarters of 2009 and 2011 compensation of employees contributed over 
36 per cent of the decline in government expenditure (Figure 3.3, panel A). 
The same situation arose with respect to social spending,8 which accounted 
for 22.4 per cent of the decrease in government expenditure. Importantly, in a 
number of countries the fall in public expenditure on compensation of employees 
and social spending was the result of specific measures put in place by govern-
ments to lessen the burden of public sector wages and social security spending on 
public finances (Box 3.1). Paradoxically, in some of the countries where spending 
on social benefits as a percentage of GDP decreased, such as Hungary, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain, the number of unemployed indi-
viduals continued to rise (by 1.4 million in the third quarter of 2011) compared 
to the same quarter in 2009.
Another important factor in the reduction of government expenditure was 
productive investment, which not only decreased as a percentage of GDP but fell 
in value by 6 per cent during the same period, contributing 29.2 per cent of the 
decrease in total expenditure.9
On the income side, the share of revenues in GDP increased by 1.2 percentage 
points in the two years to Q3 2011. This increase was mainly due to an increase 
in tax revenues despite a reduction in social contributions received (Figure 3.3, 
panel B). More specifically, the increase in taxes on income and wealth contrib-
uted almost 77 per cent of the increase in government revenues and the increase in 
taxes on production and imports accounted for almost 42 per cent of the increase.
8. Social spending includes social benefits and social transfers in kind made through market 
producers, as defined by the System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA, 2008).
9. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed analysis on the evolution and drivers of total investment during 
the crisis.
Note: The sample analysed comprises 28 advanced economies. This sample is smaller than the previous ones due to the lack of up-to-date
quarterly information on National Accounts for a number of countries. 
Country group averages correspond to weighted averages based on 2010 PPP GDP weights.
Source: IILS calculations based on Eurostat and OECD National Accounts databases, national sources and IMF (2011b).
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Figure 3.3 Factors contributing to the reduction of expenditures and growth of revenues
 in advanced economies, Q3 2009–Q3 2011 (percentages)
Panel A. Contribution to the reduction of ﬁscal expenditure Panel B. Contribution to the increase in ﬁscal revenues
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Box 3.1  Public sector wages and social security policies  
as fiscal consolidation measures
Policies directed at public sector wages: In the face of the deepening crisis and the need for fiscal con-
solidation, public sector wage cuts and wage freezes were at the top of the political agenda for a number 
of governments. 
Between 2008 and 2011, the governments of 27 of the 45 countries with available information imple-
mented policies designed to cut or freeze public sector wages. This tendency is more pronounced among 
advanced economies (22 of the 35 countries analysed); although five of the ten emerging and developing 
countries analysed show a similar trend. Governments in the European Union have been the most likely 
to introduce either wage cuts or wage freezes in civil servants’ wages during the crisis, with 80 per cent 
of the countries analysed adopting such measures. 
The sharpest cuts in public sector wages have been registered in economies that are suffering the most 
from the sovereign debt crisis (e.g. Greece, Ireland and Portugal) as well as in countries that have expe-
rienced substantial contractions in GDP (for example, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania). On the 
contrary, countries benefitting from a sustained economic expansion (such as Argentina, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) have raised public sector wages. 
Social security policies: Similarly, since 2008, 31 of the 71 countries with available information have 
introduced cuts in social security benefits, including pensions. As with wage policies, the trend is more 
marked for advanced economies, with 65 per cent of the countries having put in place at least one policy 
aimed at reducing social security benefits during the crisis, compared to 28 per cent in emerging and 
developing countries. The European Union still presents the strongest trend, with 80 per cent of the EU 
members having introduced this type of measure. 
Cuts in social security benefits took different forms. In some countries, national governments introduced 
pension reforms that either reduced pension entitlements (for example, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Macedonia and Moldova) or increased retirement age (such as Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Romania and Spain). Other changes include reductions 
in unemployment benefits (Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, 
Switzerland and Ukraine) and reductions in entitlements for sick leave (Estonia). Meanwhile, a number 
of developing economies tried to extend either the coverage (Chile, India and Uganda) or the benefits 
(Argentina, Armenia and Cape Verde) of pension schemes.
Source: IILS calculations
based on national sources.
EU 27
Advanced
countries
Emerging and
developing
countries
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Yes No
Figure 3.4 Percentage of countries that have introduced cuts
 in social security beneﬁts since 2008
Likewise, emerging European Union countries10 and Turkey have also 
adopted fiscal consolidation measures since 2009. Between the third quarters of 
2009 and 2011, total spending as a percentage of GDP in these countries fell by 
2.5 percentage points, driven mainly by a 1.3 percentage point decrease in social 
benefits and a 1.1 percentage point fall in compensation of employees. On the 
income side, this group of countries experienced a 1.8 percentage point increase in 
total revenues as a percentage of GDP; the main factor behind this rise being the 
1 percentage point increase in the indirect taxes ratio.
10. This analysis includes Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.
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... and the prospects are for further austerity in most advanced economies …
In 2012, fiscal policies in the majority of advanced economies will continue to 
be characterized by austerity. A comparative analysis of the different measures 
planned in the 2012 government budgets shows that countries will continue 
their consolidation efforts in 2012 and will do so mainly through expendi-
ture cuts relative to GDP (Table 3.1). Among the select group of countries 
analysed, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Ireland show the largest cuts in 
public spending – by 2.8, 2.3 and 1.8 percentages points, respectively. In the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, productive investment is bearing the brunt of 
cuts – falling by 2 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively, whereas in Portugal, 
compensation of public sector employees (reduction of 1.6 percentage points) is 
the focus of planned cutbacks.
In France, Spain, the United States and Japan, the focus of government 
expenditure reductions are the result of cuts in social benefits. Only Denmark 
and Finland have plans to increase total expenditures in 2012. Greece also shows 
an increase in total expenditure, but it is a result of an increase in interest pay-
ments on public debt. Meanwhile, Germany is consolidating, but at a slow pace.
On the income side, seven of the 18 countries analysed are planning an 
increase in revenues in 2012 and in all of these countries – with the exception of 
Portugal – the increase will come from increased taxation, especially from per-
sonal income taxes and corporate taxes. For example, in the United States and 
Australia current taxes on income and wealth will rise by 1.7 and 1.4 percentage 
points, respectively. In Portugal, on the other hand, it is the rise in indirect tax-
ation that will drive the increase in public revenues. 
… with little coordination across countries.
There is considerable variation in the intensity with which countries plan to imple-
ment this consolidation process (Escudero and López, forthcoming). In some 
countries, for example Australia and France, the expectation is that the planned 
austerity measures will ensure debt stabilization over a very short period, i.e. less 
than 2 years. In Portugal the plan is to attain debt stabilization over the next 
3 years. Meanwhile, in one-quarter of the countries analysed, despite the wide-
spread adoption of austerity measures, primary fiscal balances that allow for public 
debt stability will not be attained in the medium term – for example, Greece will 
only attain a debt-stabilizing primary balance in ten years and Japan in 12 years. 
There are also countries that have chosen a path of austerity despite having suffi-
cient fiscal space. Indeed, Norway is planning to have a primary surplus of almost 
13 per cent, although a 1 per cent surplus would be adequate. The same principle 
applies in Sweden and Switzerland. Together, these countries saved or cut over 
US$1 trillion that could have been allocated to foster further aggregate demand.
It is critical to bring public finances under control. And the pace of consolida-
tion must take into account country-specific circumstances and outlook. However, 
the significant variability in the intensity of consolidation highlights the absence 
of policy coordination between countries. Countries are attempting to cut their 
own fiscal deficits quickly in the expectation that other countries will take the 
lead in boosting global growth. However, such inward-looking policies must be 
carefully considered in the face of a global crisis as they may adversely affect other 
countries and the global recovery more broadly. The remainder of this chapter will 
consider this, and other policy issues, in greater detail.
68
World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
Table 3.1  Change in fiscal expenditures and revenues as a percentage of GDP  
by category between 2011 and 2012 ( percentage points)
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Australia –0.5  –0.2* 0.1 –0.1 1.3 1.4 –0.1 –0.1
Austria –0.6 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.1 0.0 –0.6 –0.1 0.4 –0.2 –0.1 –0.3
Canada –0.4 0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.1
Denmark 0.9 0.4 –0.3 0.3 0.5 –0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 –0.8
Finland 0.7 1.7
France –0.4 0.3 1.1 –2.4* 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2
Germany** –0.3 0.0 –0.2 0.1 –0.3 –0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1
Greece 0.2 0.1 –0.7 0.4 0.9 –0.4 1.6 1.5 0.2 –0.1
Ireland –1.8 –0.4 –0.5 –0.4 0.9 –1.2 –0.1 –0.4 0.4 –0.3 –0.1 –0.4
Japan –0.8 –0.6 0.0 –0.6   –0.7
Korea, Rep. of –0.6 –0.04 –0.02   –0.4 0.04 –0.1 –0.4 0.0
Norway 0.2 0.2 0.3 –0.1 –0.1 –2.0 0.2 0.1 –2.3
Portugal –2.3 0.0 –1.6 –0.6 0.9 –0.3 –0.8 –0.9 –0.3 –0.5 1.2 0.4
Spain –0.9 –0.1 –1.1 0.1 –0.1 0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.8 –1.4 2.1
Sweden** –1.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.6 –2.3 –1.7 –0.5
Switzerland –0.1 –0.01 0.01 –0.04 –0.02 –0.1 0.03 0.1 0.01 –0.2
United Kingdom –2.8 –0.1 –0.3 –2.0 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –0.1 –0.1 0.2
United States –1.7 –1.0* 0.1 2.2 1.7 0.7 0.2 –0.1
* In the United States, value corresponds to change in spending on social security mandatory programmes. In Australia, it 
corresponds to change in spending on social welfare and health. In France, the change is due to a reduction of special intervention 
social programmes, such as Aid for Social Housing (Aide pour le lodgement (APL)), the Active Solidarity Revenue (Revenu de 
solidarité active (RSA)) or the Disabled Adult Allowance (Allocation pour adulte handicapé (AAH)). ** In Germany, figures 
correspond to the Federal Government budget plan and, in Sweden, to the Central Government budget plan.
Source: IILS estimates based on planned government budgets for 2012, national sources.
B.  Employment effects of fiscal consolidation:  
Austerity versus socially-responsible approaches
Since 2010, there has been an increased tendency among advanced economies to 
focus on austerity measures – mainly centred on continued reductions in social 
spending, downward pressure on wages and cuts in public investment combined 
with raising direct taxation – with the intention of stabilizing fiscal balances 
quickly. The measures have, to a large extent, been counterproductive, not only in 
terms of fiscal stability but also in terms of employment objectives. In particular, 
as Chapter 1 illustrated the labour market recovery in the majority of countries 
remains sluggish: in over 90 per cent of the countries that have implemented aus-
terity measures, unemployment rates are still above their 2007 levels; and in close 
to half of them the unemployment rate had increased further by the end of 2011. 
The problem has been exacerbated by the lack of a coordinated approach.
However, fiscal stability should not be an end in itself but the means to achieve 
a quicker and more equitable economic and labour market recovery. In order to 
foster future fiscal stability while protecting people and promoting jobs, a more 
effective and coordinated approach to fiscal consolidation is required. With this 
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in mind, an econometric analysis has been undertaken for a panel of 33 advanced 
countries with quarterly data on labour and macroeconomic variables to shed light 
on the relationship between austerity and the composition of fiscal balances, and 
employment creation.11 The period of analysis is 2007 to 2011, to enable assess-
ment of the short-term effects of fiscal variables on employment during the crisis.
Fiscal austerity in its current form will affect jobs  
and fiscal positions over the medium term … 
If austerity measures continue in the current form until the first half of 2013, 
employment in the group of advanced countries is expected to grow only moder-
ately – by 0.2 per cent.12 Moreover, once the general equilibrium effect associated 
with rebalancing public deficits is taken into account, fiscal consolidation will not 
be sustainable in the medium term. Indeed, a simulation carried out using the 
IILS’ Global Economic Linkages (GEL) model illustrates that fiscal consolidation 
of this nature would prove ineffective in reducing public debt due to the pervasive 
effects it may have on the economy more broadly (Figure 3.5). More specifically, 
this analysis shows that fiscal consolidation reduces debt in the short-term but in 
2014, debt levels begin to rise again. This occurs through two main transmission 
mechanisms. First, lower public investment has a negative effect on productivity, 
which in turn drives private investment downwards. Second, sluggish employment 
growth puts pressure on fiscal balances. As a result, the current composition of 
fiscal consolidation, e.g. lower investment – especially in times of crisis – have det-
rimental effects on employment and, more widely, on output, but they are also 
ineffective in reducing public debt in the medium term. 
11. The analysis is based on the basic Keynesian principle that government fiscal balance can alter 
the aggregate level of employment in the short term. Keynesian models predict that an increase in 
government expenditure will raise labour demand, through the increase in real wages and output. 
See, for instance, Blinder and Solow (1973); Pappa (2009); Monacelli et al. (2010). See Appendix A 
and Escudero and López (forthcoming) for the methodology of the econometric analysis carried out, 
exact specifications of the different equations and detailed results.
12. This first specification was carried out to capture the effects that changes in particular spending 
and revenue items would have on employment creation – fiscal variables are therefore included in 
the model as a percentage of GDP. The analysis shows that in the short term, and during times of 
crisis, the two types of expenditures that were subject to deeper cuts as part of the consolidation 
efforts – compensation of employees and public investment – have the strongest effect on employment. 
On the revenue side, income taxes also revealed a highly significant relationship to employment.
* Fiscal consolidation depicts a scenario where public 
investment to GDP ratio is cut by 7.8 per cent, while income 
taxes are increased by 3.8 per cent. The cut to the public wage 
ratio was not included due to methodological constraints. 
Policies are assumed to take effect in mid-2012 and the effects 
of these policies are measured until the end of 2015.
Note: For the purposes of this exercise, the GEL model has been 
calibrated for the group of 33 advanced countries analysed in 
this section using estimates attained below. Moreover, public 
investment to GDP ratio has been set at 3 per cent, interest 
payments to GDP at 2.6 per cent, tax revenue to GDP at 22 per 
cent, income tax at 57 per cent of total tax and debt to GDP ratio 
at 80 per cent. 
Source: IILS calculations based on GEL model. See Charpe and 
Kühn (2012) for further detail.
Figure 3.5 Simulation: Debt dynamic following ﬁscal consolidation*, debt to GDP ratio
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… yet, a fiscally neutral re-orientation towards public investment  
and social benefits can boost employment creation …
Mindful of the challenge that countries face in achieving the stability of fiscal 
balances, a second specification was carried out to assess directly the impact of 
changes in the composition of the fiscal balance on employment creation. The 
results – consistent with those of the empirical literature – show that the ratios of 
public wages and public investment to total expenditure have a positive and signif-
icant impact on employment in the short term and during times of crisis.13 Based 
on these relationships, several scenarios were simulated to illustrate the potential 
impact that a fiscally neutral change in the composition of fiscal balances, such 
as a change in the policy mix, while keeping 2011 deficits constant, would have 
on employment creation (Figure 3.6). A number of interesting results arise from 
the analysis:
c An increase in expenditure in public investment and social benefits – by 1 per-
centage point each year – financed by an increase in revenues derived from 
indirect taxation, seems to be the most effective policy mix in terms of employ-
ment creation (Scenario 1). Indeed, 2.1 million jobs would be created by Q2 
2013 with this policy mix, compared to only 0.8 million jobs if countries con-
tinue to implement the austerity policies of 2011. 
c Alternatively, if this scenario is financed in part by a decrease in interest on 
public debt and in part by an increase in the ratio of direct taxes to total rev-
enues, 1.8 million jobs would be created by Q2 2013 (Scenario 2). 
… which, in the case of social benefits, can also help to address poverty 
and inequality while boosting aggregate demand.
In addition to stimulating job creation, social policies can play an important role 
in reducing poverty, income inequality and supporting domestic demand – the 
former two issues being of particular concern (as discussed in Chapter 1). With this 
13. In terms of the revenue composition, the ratio of both indirect and direct taxes to total public 
income has a significant negative relationship with employment in the short term; however, income 
taxes have a more profound effect on employment. For a detailed explanation of the various 
relationships and the economic interpretations of these results, please refer to Appendix A.
*All scenarios simulate changes in the 
composition of ﬁscal balances. They are 
based on the assumption that increases in 
expenditures are either offset by reductions 
in other expenses or ﬁnanced by increases 
in revenues. Expenditure items are 
measured as a percentage of total 
expenditures and revenue items as a 
percentage of total revenues.
**The “continued policy mix” corresponds 
to austerity in its current form.
Source: IILS calculations based on OECD 
and national sources.
Continued policy mix**
Scenario 2
 Public investment
and social beneﬁts,
ﬁnanced by  interest on
debt and  in direct taxes
Scenario 1
 Public investment and
social beneﬁts, ﬁnanced
by  in indirect taxes
Figure 3.6 Simulations: number of jobs that would be created between Q2 2012 and Q2 2013
 depending on different policy mix scenarios,* advanced economies (millions of jobs)
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in mind, emerging and developing economies can leverage existing fiscal space to 
improve and enhance social protection. Some progress is being made. For instance, 
China has embarked on a vast programme to extend social protection, including 
old age pension and universal health insurance for rural areas. India is planning 
to launch its universal health coverage based on the existing Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bima Yojna (RSBY) for the poor. Further efforts of this nature can also support 
the recovery process and boost domestic demand, notably in surplus countries. 
For example in China, an increase of 1 percentage point of GDP in public social 
expenditures (education, health, and pensions) would translate into an increase of 
household consumption by 1.25 percentage points of GDP.14 
Moreover, in the context of a fiscally-neutral shift in austerity, programmes 
can be effective in reducing poverty and income inequality, without eroding public 
finances. For example, in Uruguay, the government introduced in 2007 the Plan 
for Social Equity to reduce poverty and inequality. The reforms were designed to 
be revenue neutral and contributed to the decline in the national poverty rate from 
18 per cent in 2007 to 8 per cent in 2010. In addition, income inequality as meas-
ured by the Gini index also fell over the same period from 47.6 to 45.3. Similarly, 
the comprehensive Poverty Eradication Action Plan of 1997-2008 in Uganda con-
tributed significantly to reverse the upward trend in poverty (poverty rates fell by 
6 percentage points between 2005 and 2009).
In advanced economies, efforts are needed to ensure that the unemployed 
workers continue to receive adequate income support while being encouraged to 
transition to areas where new jobs are being created. This means placing emphasis 
on skills training and upgrading through active labour market programmes – with 
a focus on youth for whom skills erosion is a particular challenge. In a number of 
countries, e.g. Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, new training programmes 
have tried to favour the school-to work-transition and to ensure youths remain 
attached to the labour market. Here, the successful delivery of these programmes 
will hinge on an effective employment service. Indeed, training provisions and 
active labour market programmes more generally have a greater likelihood of suc-
cess if delivered through an efficient employment services. 
A sustainable and global recovery will only be possible through  
improved coordination.
Choosing the correct combination of expenditure and revenue when imple-
menting austerity measures and consolidating public finances at the right pace, 
crucial though they are, will not be enough to achieve a sustainable recovery, 
notably for jobs and incomes. International policy coordination is also needed. 
There is a growing risk that so many countries moving in the same direction will 
trigger a wage or tax competition that will lead to a combined race-to-the-bottom 
strategy. Yet, historical evidence from the Great Depression of the 1930s and the 
deep recessions of the 1970s and 1980s,15 and more recent empirical evidence16 has 
suggested that the gains for coordinated policy efforts are substantial:
14. Barnett and Brooks (2010).
15. Oudiz et al. (1984).
16. A number of theoretical and empirical analyses, based on a variety of approaches, have argued 
about the significant gains from coordination. See, for example: Canzoneri et al. (2005), Cooley and 
Quadrini (2002), Kollmann (2002), Pappa (2002), Sutherland (2002) and Tchakarov (2002).
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c Coordinated responses boost aggregate demand: Advantageous coordination in 
the fiscal sphere has the potential to allow all countries to reach a higher level 
of economic growth.17 One of the channels through which this occurs is that 
a fiscal stimulus in a country increases its aggregate demand, which results in 
an increase in aggregate demand of partner countries through increased trade 
(with the effects being more significant when countries have stronger links in 
commodity and financial markets).18 In 2011, with almost 64 per cent of all 
EU 27 exports remaining within the EU 27, it is clear that there are consid-
erable potential gains to be made from policy coordination.19 Additionally, 
expansionary fiscal policies may raise output while pushing inflation down-
wards due to a domestic exchange rate appreciation.20
c Uncoordinated response leads to more uncertainty and volatility: As the current 
economic crisis has proved, lack of political will to coordinate policy responses 
creates an environment of uncertainty that has detrimental consequences for 
economic and employment growth. The current uncertainty, for example, has 
had an especially adverse effect on banks and bank lending, with particularly 
adverse consequences for small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, as 
Chapter 4 shows, uncertainty and volatility give firms an incentive to delay 
investment and employment decisions. 
c Other gains from policy coordination: Closer policy coordination has more 
benefits than purely macroeconomic ones. For example, in general, countries 
have imperfect knowledge of the actions taken in other countries. Thus, there 
are informational gains to be made from closer harmonization of macroeco-
nomic policies. Moreover, there is an important potential for strengthening 
political ties that comes from closer policy coordination. A virtuous cycle of 
closer policy coordination can be established; one that enhances macroeco-
nomic and social gains, which in turn further reinforces the harmonization of 
policies, and so on.
17. Oudiz et al. (1984).
18. As early as the 1980s, Oudiz et al. (1984) had found that the direct demand effects on German 
output of a fiscal stimulus in the United States was 0.02 per cent, which could be tripled or 
quadrupled if US imports from the rest of Europe were taken into account
19. ITC (International Trade Centre), Trade Map database.
20. Naturally, the degree of international asset substitutability and the extent of wage indexation in 
each economy play an important role in the size of the effects.
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Appendix A
Fiscal policy, expenditure and revenue 
composition and the effect on employment: 
An empirical analysis
Section C provided additional insights for policy-making through several simula-
tions that illustrated the effects that different fiscal policies (in terms of continued 
fiscal consolidation, but mainly regarding changes in the composition of fiscal bal-
ances) could have on employment. This appendix explains how the model was con-
structed and provides the quantitative basis for simulating the policy scenarios 
presented in section C. The analysis draws on a cross-sectional time-series econo-
metric model based on a panel of 32 countries21 with quarterly data during the 
period 2007 to 2011. The results of the exercise (estimated coefficients and levels 
of significance of variables) are presented in table 3A.2. For a more detailed explan-
ation of the economic interpretations of these results, please refer to  Escudero and 
López (forthcoming) and the body of section C.
The analysis is based on the fundamental Keynesian principle that govern-
ment fiscal balance can alter the aggregate level of employment in the short term.22 
With the aim of assessing the impact of fiscal balance variables on employment, a 
semi-simultaneous equation model was estimated. The model includes two equa-
tions with real GDP and employment as dependent variables. 
Based on the economic theory that describes the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and fiscal policy,23 the following model was estimated:
 
(1)
Where:
GDP, represents real gross domestic product; privategkf, private investment; trade, 
terms of trade; labour, labour force; primary, primary enrolment rate; secondary, 
secondary enrolment rate; and FISCAL, a vector of independent fiscal variables.
The second equation of our model is a standard labour demand equation 
where employment is derived from output level, labour costs and capital input:24
 (2)
Where:
employment represents the total employed population; wages, compensation 
of employees of the overall economy; gkf, gross capital formation of the overall 
economy; and GDP, real gross domestic product.
With the aim of shedding light on the potential effect that fiscal variables have 
on employment, the GDP parameter of equation (2) is substituted by equation (1). 
21. The 32 economies included in this analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
22. See Blinder and Solow (1973); Pappa (2009); and Monacelli et al. (2010).
23. See Gupta et al. (2005).
24. See, for example, Layard and Nickell (1986).
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This results in a new equation (3), which allows for an estimation of the relation-
ships between fiscal balance composition variables and employment:25
 (3)
Based on this employment definition, two different specifications were established 
for assessing, first, the effects of changes in particular expenditure and revenue 
items on employment creation and, second, the impact of changes in expenditure 
and revenue composition on employment creation. 
Model A.  Impact of particular fiscal balance  
components on employment
The first specification (4) was carried out to capture the effects of changes in par-
ticular spending and revenue items on employment creation. Fiscal variables are 
therefore included in the model as a percentage of GDP, with no additional fiscal 
balance. Model A is formulated as follows:
 
(4)
Where:
pubwages_ gdp represents public expenditure on wages and salaries; interest_
gdp, interest payments on public debt; benefits_gdp, public expenditure on social 
benefits; publicgkf _gdp, public investment; indtaxes_gdp, indirect taxes received; 
and incometaxes_gdp, income taxes received.
Model B.  Impact of changes in expenditure  
and revenue composition on employment 
Mindful of the challenge that countries face in achieving the stability of fiscal bal-
ances without damaging an incipient economic recovery and hurting the labour 
market further, a second specification (5) of the employment model was carried 
out. In this second model, fiscal variables are measured in relation to total expen-
ditures or total revenues, in order to assess directly the impact of changes in the 
composition of expenditure and revenue on employment creation. Model B is for-
mulated as follows:
 
(5)
Where:
pubwages_exp represents public expenditure on wages and salaries (as a percentage 
of total expenditure); interest_exp, interest payments on public debt (as a percentage 
25. This extended employment equation does not include some of the variables included in the 
economic growth model described in equation (1). The variables terms of trade, primary and 
secondary enrollment rates and labour force were excluded from equation (3) because the level of 
significance of these variables was not sufficiently high to be meaningful for the model.
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of total expenditure); benefits_exp, public expenditure on social benefits (as a per-
centage of total expenditure); publicgkf _exp, public investment (as a percentage of 
total expenditure); indtaxes_rev, indirect taxes received (as a percentage of total 
revenues); incometaxes_rev, income taxes received (as a percentage of total reve-
nues); and contribut_rev, social contributions (as a percentage of total revenues).
Estimation of the models
Both models were estimated first using time fixed effects following the results in 
favour of this estimator by the Hausman test. Both models were estimated with 
controls for unobservable time-specific effects in order to remove time-related 
shocks from the errors and prevent “contemporaneous correlation”, which is the 
most likely form of cross-individual correlation. 
Fixed individual effects were also used when estimating the models, given 
that unobserved country-specific effects is a common problem encountered when 
working with panel data. Excluding unobserved country-specific effects could lead 
to serious biases in the coefficient estimated, particularly when these effects are 
correlated with the other covariates.26 
Models were also controlled for multicollinearity, following the VIF regress 
command, and for heteroskedasticity using the robust option available. However, 
both models failed to pass the latter with this first fixed effects estimator.
It is important to note that fixed effects estimators are based on the assump-
tion of strict exogeneity, which is a very strong assumption, and frequently unre-
alistic, especially when dealing with fiscal policy variables (a common issue with 
fiscal policy specifications is the likely presence of endogeneity or reverse causality) 
26. Gupta et al. (2005).
Table 3A.1 Definitions and sources of variables used in the regression analysis
Variable Definition Source
Employment Employed persons aged 15-64 OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Real GDP Gross domestic product in real terms OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Private investment Gross capital formation of private sector OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Public wages  
and salaries
Compensation of employees of General Government OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Interest payments Interest payments on public debt OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Social benefits Social benefits other than social transfers in kind OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Social transfers 
in kind
Expenditure on products supplied to households  
via market producers
OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Public investment Gross capital formation of General Government OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Indirect taxes Taxes on production and imports OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Income taxes Current taxes on income, wealth etc. OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
Social contributions Social contributions receivable  
by General Government
OECD. Stat; Eurostat 
and National sources
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and when using dynamic specifications (that is, the presence of intertemporal endo-
geneity). Under these circumstances, it has been widely demonstrated that coeffi-
cients estimated through fixed effects might be inconsistent and downward biased. 
To address the abovementioned specification problem, a final robustness test 
was carried out, by running both models through a generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator, using as instruments the lagged values of the dependent var-
iable. Model A has been estimated by differenced-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), and model B has been estimated by System-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 
1997). GMM estimators have the potential to address both endogeneity and serial 
correlation problems arising from the dynamic specification of the model. Both 
models showed robust results in the tests for the validity of instruments (Hansen 
test) and the presence of serial correlation (Arellano and Bond test for serial cor-
relation in the errors).
Finally, in model B, the two-step option of the system GMM was used given 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and the serial correlation arising from the 
dynamic form of the models. Indeed, this option uses a consistent estimate of the 
weighting matrix (taking the residuals from the one-step estimate) in the absence 
of homoscedasticity, which is asymptotically more efficient. It has been demon-
strated that this specification has the downside of making standard errors severely 
downward biased; which is why the Windmeijer finite-sample correction to the 
two-step covariance matrix was used to solve this problem.27
Results of the models
Results from the baseline regressions are consistent with the empirical literature28 
and are highly significant. These results are detailed in table 3A.2.
Model A: The analysis shows that, in the short term and during times of 
crisis, public spending on compensation of employees and public investment have 
a strong effect on employment – a 1 per cent decrease (increase) in each of these 
expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) would lead, respectively, to a 0.08 and 
0.05 per cent decrease (increase) in employment. On the revenue side, income 
taxes also revealed a positive and highly significant relationship with employment.
Model B: The findings of the analysis show that the ratios of public invest-
ment and public wages to total expenditure have a positive and significant impact 
on employment in the short term and during times of crisis. A 1 percentage point 
increase in each of these two ratios would raise employment by 0.43 and 0.3 per 
cent, respectively.29 An increase in the debt burden, on the other hand, tends to 
be harmful for employment (since an increase in the ratio of interest payments to 
total expenditures by 1 percentage point reduces employment by 0.22 per cent). 
27. Windmeijer (2005).
28. The effect of expansionary fiscal policy on growth and employment in the short term remains a 
subject of intense debate. However, a significant number of studies (mainly carried out in a sample 
of advanced economies) have drawn the conclusion that positive changes in government spending 
stimulate economy and employment growth. See Ardagna (2001); Baxter and King (1993); Fatás 
and Mihov (2001); Dalsgaard et al. (2001); Hemming et al. (2002); and Ludvigson (1996) for 
examples of these analyses. Gupta et al. (2005), in particular, show that budget composition plays a 
role in explaining the effect of fiscal policy on growth – which occurs mainly through private sector 
responses to fiscal policy.
29. These figures correspond to the value of their effect (public investment and public wages) given 
their coefficients (6.3 per cent and 5.2 per cent, respectively) multiplied by the part of the change in 
employment each variable explains (6.8 per cent and 5.6 per cent, respectively).
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In terms of the revenue composition, the ratio of taxes – both indirect and direct 
taxes – to total public income has a negative and significant relationship with 
employment in the short term. However, a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio 
of income taxes (i.e. direct taxes) to total revenues has a more marked effect on 
employment (-0.49 per cent) than the indirect tax ratio (–0.11 per cent). 
Table 3A.2 Regression results
Ln of employment
Model A Model B
Lag of ln of Real GDP 0.093 0.296
(6.08)*** (2.02)**
Ln of private investment 0.072 0.288
(4.13)*** (1.85)*
Ln of public wages and salaries (% of GDP) 0.081
(3.20)***
Ln of interest payments (% of GDP) –0.042
(–8.94)***
Ln of social benefits (% of GDP) 0.109
(4.23)***
Ln of public investment (% of GDP) 0.045
(8.09)***
Ln of indirect taxes (% of GDP) –0.034
(–1.87)*
Ln of income taxes (% of GDP) 0.057
(2.21)**
Ln of social contributions (% of GDP) –0.011
(3.35)***
Public wages and salaries (% of total expenditure) 0.052
(2.88)***
Interest payments (% of total expenditure) –0.045
(–1.83)*
Social benefits (% of total expenditure) 0.036
(2.04)**
Social transfers in kind (%of total expenditure) 0.137
(2.41)**
Public investment (% of total expenditure) 0.063
(3.14)***
Indirect taxes (% of total revenues) –0.032
(–1.85)*
Income taxes (% of total revenues) –0.068
(–3.15)***
Social contributions (% of total revenues) –0.054
(–3.04)***
Constant 3.27
(2.67)***
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * at 10 per cent; ** at 5 per cent;  
*** at 1 per cent.
All variables were tested for non-stationarity through the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron 
test. In all cases the tests rejected the null hypotheses of non-stationarity at 1 and 5 per cent levels. 
Both models were tested for first and second order serial correlation in the errors. Models showed, as 
expected, first order but not second order correlation. Finally, all instruments were found to be valid 
according to the Hansen test.
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Main findings
c World investment as a share of GDP fell to its lowest level on record during 
the global crisis and, at 19.8 per cent of GDP in 2010, remains 3.1 percentage 
points lower than the historical average. These developments mask a pro-
nounced downward trend in advanced economies and an increase in the share 
of investment in GDP in emerging and developing countries. However, the 
chapter finds that a common trend in all regions is that investment in small 
firms has been impacted disproportionately by the global crisis. This is crucial 
since small firms are key engines of job creation. 
c Those countries that experienced fewer investment losses during the global 
crisis also tended to have the fewest employment losses. And stagnant invest-
ment seems to act as a constraint on job recovery. Further analysis in this 
chapter shows that a direct increase of real investment to pre-crisis levels would 
have a significant impact on employment and reduce unemployment levels by 
almost 9 per cent.
c Importantly, investment has become more volatile, consequently affecting the 
predictability of the production and employment horizon. Global investment vol-
atility increased by roughly 170 per cent between the pre- and post-crisis periods, 
with volatility of investment increasing more markedly in advanced economies. 
More volatile investment not only robs the economy of the stimulus necessary to 
increase job creation, but limits the overall quality of the jobs created. Increased 
investment volatility has gone hand-in-hand with the trend rise in the incidence 
of temporary and part-time employment (described in Chapter 1). 
c It is therefore crucial to address both investment levels and volatility. This 
requires, first, improving demand prospects so as to encourage firms to invest 
their cash assets – which, according to the chapter, have reached unprecedented 
Investing 
in a sustainable  
recovery *
* Excellent research assistance was provided by Florian Hartmann and Laurie Barnier.
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levels especially in advanced economies and Asia. Second, it is urgent to improve 
access to finance among small firms. Targeted tax deductions for investment by 
these firms may help as well. Third, the chapter shows that well-designed public 
investment could play a crucial role in improving the overall investment cli-
mate while “crowding in” private investment. 
Introduction
As Chapter 1 has shown, given the current economic growth environment, the 
prospects for an employment recovery are muted. The purpose of this chapter is to 
(i) assess the extent to which higher investment would help to promote recovery pro-
spects, and (ii) examine policies and factors that would trigger higher investment. 
It is a fact that global investment activity has weakened since the start of the 
global crisis. This was, of course, to be expected, as investment is typically more 
volatile than other demand components. However, the issue arises of whether the 
slowdown in investment has undermined productive capacity to the point that it 
represents a constraint on a sustainable growth and employment recovery. 
Given the current economic context, private investment may be more influ-
enced by policies that improve overall security for firms and households (economic, 
political and social) and reduce uncertainty than by more accommodative policies 
that influence the cost of capital. In this regard, maintaining aggregate demand via 
wage policies as well as by more direct public investment initiatives, and improved 
access to finance for small firms can have immediate short-term impacts on invest-
ment and employment while also improving long-term growth prospects. 
In section A, the chapter reviews pre- and post-crisis trends in investment and 
critically analyses the extent to which lack of investment acts as a constraint on 
increased, and better, job prospects. Section B examines the traditional drivers of 
investment, such as the cost of capital, but also introduces other factors that could 
be more important to the current economic climate, such as the degree of uncer-
tainty facing enterprises and income distribution. Finally, section C discusses the 
policy implications of the findings and highlights good practices based on country 
experiences of addressing investment challenges.
A. Global investment and employment trends 
This section discusses pre- and post-crisis trends in investment in advanced and 
developing countries.1 It also looks at the crucial link between investment and 
employment and the extent to which investment has been a driver of employment 
in previous crisis periods.
Globally, investment has still not returned to pre-crisis levels …
Worldwide investment, measured as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) to GDP, declined considerably in the wake of the global crisis and in 2010 
was still about 3 percentage points below its pre-crisis level (Figure 4.1). Although 
1. See Appendix A of Chapter 1 for a list of countries by income groupings.
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a slight rebound in investment has recently been observable, the global annual 
average growth rate between 2009 and 2010 was only 4 per cent. If growth con-
tinues to follow this trend, pre-crisis levels will not be reached until 2014 on a 
global scale and until 2016 in advanced economies. 
The global trends are principally driven by the advanced economies, which 
represent over 50 per cent of worldwide investment. Advanced countries suffered 
sharp declines in capital formation during the crisis, while emerging and devel-
oping economies suffered a much milder downturn and have already returned to 
pre-crisis levels of investment.
… and investment volatility has increased …
The severity of the downturn in investment activity since the start of the global 
crisis can be further revealed by comparing post-crisis figures with pre-crisis his-
torical trends. Table 4.1 summarizes short- and long-term investment trends across 
regions and in selected economies. The first column presents the historical average 
of investment to GDP ratios from 1970 to 2010; while column 2 presents histor-
ical averages for the pre-crisis period, 1970–2006. Column 7 is the standard devia-
tion of the time series from 1970 to 2006, which gives an indication of how much 
investment shares vary around their averages during normal times (i.e. the vola-
tility of investment); while column 8 indicates in percentage terms how far below 
(or above) the historical average the investment share is in 2010.
In 2009, world investment as a share of GDP fell to its lowest level at 19 per 
cent. This trend was heavily influenced by developments in advanced economies 
where investment as a share GDP was also at a low point of 17.2 per cent. Although 
the investment share increased in 2010, in advanced economies it was still more 
than 20 per cent below its long-term average investment share (column 8). This is 
all the more striking since the volatility of the investment share during the entire 
pre-crisis period was only 7.6 per cent. 
In emerging and developing countries, the investment share in 2010 was 
above its long-term average. In emerging economies it was 12.4 per cent above its 
long-term average, while in developing regions it was as much as 25 per cent higher 
in East Asia and the Pacific, but only 2.9 per cent higher in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In East Asia, most of the increase in investment can be attributed to 
China, where the investment ratio in 2010 was 32.5 per cent above its long-term 
average, indicative of the country’s mobilization of resources for investment since 
the financial crisis. 
World
Emerging and developing economies
Advanced economies
Note: The chart presents 
gross ﬁxed capital formation 
as a percentage of GDP, 
both at current prices. 
Source: IILS estimates based 
on World Development 
Indicators, 2012.15
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Figure 4.1 Investment to GDP ratio, 2000–2010
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Additionally, the long-term volatility of the investment share is considerably 
higher in developing regions than in the emerging or advanced economies. For 
example, in East Asia and the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa volatility is par-
ticularly high, at 11.8 and 17.2 per cent respectively. This high historical invest-
ment volatility in developing economies is due to a number of factors, including 
increased trade and capital market opening, frequency and depth of economic 
recessions since the 1970s, and increased “financialization” (UNDESA, 2008). 
Since the global crisis, the volatility of investment has increased more in 
advanced and emerging economies than in developing economies. Global invest-
ment volatility increased by roughly 170 per cent between the pre- and post-crisis 
period, with volatility of investment increasing by 193 per cent in advanced econ-
omies and by 10 per cent in emerging economies (Figure 4.2). In developing econ-
omies, investment volatility decreased by 32 per cent. The weaker growth prospects 
in advanced economies, along with heightened perceptions of risk and uncertainty, 
mar the stable economic environment that firms and entrepreneurs need in order 
to make investment decisions, particularly those decisions regarding productive 
investment. Indeed, perceptions of risk tend to have a more profound negative 
impact on corporate investment and employment during economic recessions than 
during economic expansions (Bhagat and Obreja, 2011). 
… thereby affecting job quality. 
The combination of increased macroeconomic uncertainty and lower (in the case 
of advanced economies) and more volatile investment not only robs the economy 
of the stimulus necessary to increase job creation, but limits the overall quality of 
the jobs created – particularly as there is an increasing demand on the part of firms 
Table 4.1 Investment to GDP ratios, 1970-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) 15) (6) (7) (8)
Region/country Historical 
weighted 
average
Pre-crisis 
historical 
weighted 
average
2007 2008 2009 2010 Volatility 
(%)
Current
deviation
(%)
World 22.9 23.1 22.5 22.0 19.0 19.8 5.9 –14.4
Advanced economies 22.3 22.7 21.3 20.5 17.2 17.9 7.6 –21.0
Emerging economies 26.5 26.2 28.4 29.7 28.0 29.5 5.8 12.4
Developing regions
East Asia and the Pacific 33.8 33.2 36.5 38.5 40.7 41.5 11.8 24.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 21.2 21.1 22.3 23.5 20.1 21.7 10.2 2.9
Middle East and North Africa 26.4 26.3 28.3 n/a n/a n/a 10.6 n/a
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.6 20.4 21.1 22.0 20.8 23.7 17.2 15.8
China 37.0 36.1 41.7 44.0 48.2 47.8 13.0 32.5
Japan 29.0 29.7 23.7 23.6 20.2 20.2 14.4 –31.9
European Union 21.7 21.9 21.6 21.0 17.9 18.5 9.9 –15.8
United States 19.0 19.3 19.1 17.4 13.9 15.1 7.3 –22.0
Note: The historical period covers 1970 to 2010; the pre-crisis historical average is the period 1970 until 2006. Volatility is defined 
as the standard deviation of the time series from 1970 to 2006. Current deviation is defined as the deviation of the investment 
share in 2010 to the pre-crisis average, with the sign indicating whether the deviation is positive or negative.
Source: IILS estimates based on IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database and World Development Indicators.
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for more flexible hiring and firing practices as a buffer against large and unexpected 
swings in the overall level of economic activity (see Chapter 2 and UNDESA, 
2008). This deteriorating labour market trend is reflected in the increasing share 
of temporary and part-time employment, which has been closely correlated with 
increased investment volatility since the crisis (Figure 4.3).
In previous crises, investment recovery tended to lead employment recovery …
In previous crises, investment and employment followed strikingly similar pat-
terns, with employment growth lagging slightly behind the recovery in investment. 
During the United States’ Great Depression from 1929 to 1940, it took invest-
ment 12 years to return to pre-crisis levels, and employment 14 years (Figure 4.4, 
panel A). Since Japan’s asset bubble crash (from 1990), two decades have passed 
and investment and employment have still not returned to their pre-crisis levels 
(Figure 4.4, panel B). 
It is worth noting that in both the United States’ Great Depression and 
Japan’s asset bubble crash, an initial turning point in investment and employment 
was reached at the 5- or 6-year period; however, the duration of the recovery was 
impacted by the magnitude of the stimulus programme and the time it took before 
Note: The change in volatility is measured as the percentage change in standard deviations between the two periods. 
Source: IILS estimates based on World Development Indicators, 2012.
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austerity measures were implemented (Box 4.1). Currently, in this second phase 
of the global crisis, the decline in investment rates in OECD economies, though 
severe, is certainly less than at the same 5-year juncture in the Great Depression. 
But, it is somewhat similar to that of Japan’s asset bubble crash, which should serve 
as a reminder that even though investment is on the mend, premature austerity 
could thwart the recovery and lead to a slow downward spiral (Figure 4.4, panel C).
… which is consistent with investment–employment patterns  
during the current crisis 
Figure 4.5 compares the loss in investment with that of employment in selected 
economies during the period 2007–2010. In general, the figure shows that the 
countries with smaller declines in investment as a share of GDP have the best out-
comes in terms of employment. 
In the Eastern European economies, where there have been considerable invest-
ment declines, these declines have been accompanied by increases in unemployment. 
In contrast, Brazil, China and the Philippines all performed relatively well during 
the global crisis in terms of employment and also managed to improve their invest-
ment to GDP ratio. Between 2007 and 2010, Brazil’s investment to GDP ratio 
increased by 0.9 percentage points, China’s by 6.4 percentage points and the Philip-
pines by 3.6 percentage points; while the unemployment rate fell by 2.6 percentage 
points in Brazil and remained virtually flat in China and the Philippines. In all 
cases, public infrastructure investment has been an important component of total 
Source: IILS estimates based on NBER Macro History Database, World 
Bank World Development Indicators, UNSD National Accounts Ofﬁcial 
Country Data and OECD.Stat Database.
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Figure 4.4 Years to investment and employment recovery in previous crises
Panel A. Great Depression in the United States (1929) 
Panel C. Global crisis, OECD economies (2007)
Panel B. Asset bubble burst in Japan (1990)
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investment. For example, Brazil allocated (and spent) R$657.4 billion (US$396 bil-
lion) between 2007 and 2010 to public infrastructure development, and in China 
and the Philippines one of the driving forces for growth prior to the crisis was public 
investment (Brooks and Go, 2011; Chuan, 2007; Son and San Andres, 2009).
Policy simulations further suggest that increasing investment to pre-crisis 
levels in high-income economies would lead to substantial job gains (Appendix A). 
In the previous section, it was shown that the average increase of real investment 
that high-income countries would need in order to return to pre-crisis investment 
levels is 20 per cent. Taking the example of the United States (where an exogenous 
Box 4.1 A tale of two crises
During the Great Depression, unemployment increased from 4 per cent in 1929 to its peak of 25 per cent 
in 1933. A Keynesian-style economic stimulus, in the form of the “New Deal”, led to an initial increase 
in demand for investment and employment between 1932 and 1937. The programmes implemented, 
which included public works for the unemployed, subsidies for farmers, numerous business regulations 
and increased government spending and entitlements under the Social Security Act, pushed govern-
ment spending from about 12 per cent of GDP in the 1920s to 20 per cent in the 1930s. In an effort to 
balance the budget during the nascent recovery contractionary policies were implemented, which were 
accompanied by steep declines in both employment and investment (DeLong, 2008). It was not until the 
economic expansion associated with the Second World War that growth finally recovered and investment 
and employment achieved pre-crisis levels. 
In Japan, after the burst of the asset bubble in 1990, the economy fell into a long and still ongoing “growth 
recession”, during which growth was not strong enough to increase the use of idle resources, such as 
labour and capital. A series of small stimulus packages in the 1990s, which included public investment 
in roads and bridges, helped to stem the deceleration in private investment and also employment losses 
(Krugman, 2008) (Figure 4.4, panel B). However, the introduction of tax increases in 1997 to address 
the growing deficit killed off the recovery before it had gained an adequate foothold. 
Although, the government implemented a major public works programme in 1998, amounting to 6.7 tril-
lion yen (US$58.2 billion) the impact was short-lived. It was not until 2003 that investment and employ-
ment stabilized (owing to a rebound in exports to the United States, China and other emerging economies). 
The global economic crisis halted this improvement in activity, and investment and employment are again 
on a downward slide. In essence, the investment share and the employment rate have still not recovered 
to 1990 pre-crisis levels and changing demographics and lower productivity have made policy responses 
particularly difficult.
10
5
–5
–10
–15
La
tv
ia
E
st
on
ia
Ic
el
an
d
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Ir
el
an
d
B
ul
ga
ria
U
kr
ai
ne
B
ol
iv
. R
ep
. o
f V
en
ez
ue
la
Sp
ai
n
G
re
ec
e
R
us
si
an
 F
ed
er
at
io
n
Vi
et
 N
am
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
P
ol
an
d
Ja
pa
n
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
Fr
an
ce
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a
G
er
m
an
y
It
al
y
M
ex
ic
o
C
an
ad
a
Tu
rk
ey
Th
ai
la
nd
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f K
or
ea
A
rg
en
tin
a
Ta
iw
an
, C
hi
na
B
ra
zi
l
Ec
ua
do
r
P
er
u
S
au
di
 A
ra
bi
a
Tu
ni
si
a
M
or
oc
co
Si
ng
ap
or
e
H
on
g 
K
on
g,
 S
A
R
 C
hi
na
P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s
C
hi
le
C
hi
na
In
do
ne
si
a
A
lg
er
ia
Unemployment Investment/GDP
Note: The Figure shows the 
per cent change in 
investment as a share of GDP 
and the unemployment rate 
over the period 2007 and 
2010. Figures above the axis 
represent gains in investment 
and employment, while those 
below represent losses. 
Source: IILS estimates based 
on IMF WEO database–20
15
Figure 4.5 Employment and investment changes during 2007–2010, in per cent, selected economies
0
88
World of Work Report 2012: Better jobs for a better economy
increase of real investment by about 17.8 per cent is needed to achieve pre-crisis 
levels), the effect on unemployment is computed. The simulation shows that a 
direct increase of real investment would have a significant impact on employment 
and reduce current unemployment levels by 8.9 per cent. 
B. Drivers of investment 
Investment in small firms has been particularly hard hit by the crisis.
Investment in listed small and medium-sized firms grew at a higher average annual 
rate than investment in large companies during the pre-crisis period.2 Between 
2001 and 2006, small firms’ investment grew at least twice as much annually 
as larger firms’ investment in the United States, the Eurozone and Asia, while 
medium-sized enterprises’ investment growth was about 40 per cent greater than 
investment in large firms in the United States and the Eurozone (Figure 4.6). The 
strong investment growth in small firms is a complement to their job-creating 
ability – since in many economies small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rep-
resent the bulk of employment. For example, in the United States, about two-thirds 
2. Small firms are categorized as the lowest tertile of firms by number of employees (in the sample), 
large firms the upper tertile and medium sized firms the remainder. The calculations are regionally 
based, thus absolute firm size differs by region.
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of the jobs created are among enterprises with fewer than 5,000 employees (US 
Census Bureau, 2012).
However, since the onset of the global crisis (2007–2010) smaller firms have 
been much harder hit in terms of investment declines than larger firms (Figure 4.7) 
In particular, smaller firms in Europe faced declines in investment growth of 
about 16 per cent on average per year compared to an increase of 0.3 per cent for 
large firms between 2007 and 2010. In the United States, smaller firms suffered 
investment declines of almost 6 per cent annually, while investment in large firms 
declined by 3.2 per cent during the same period.
SMEs were also more adversely impacted in Asia and Latin America in terms 
of investment during the crisis. Growth decelerated by close to 20 per cent in 
small firms in Asia and Latin America, almost treble that of larger firms – from 
a 22.0 per cent annual average increase pre-crisis, to 3.4 per cent after the crisis in 
Asia. In Latin American, growth slowed from 22.5 per cent to 2.8 per cent. Larger 
firms were considerably more resilient during the crisis, with growth slowing by 
about 7 per cent in both Asia and Latin America.
Firms’ cash holdings have reached their highest value on record.
Firms’ reluctance to take on additional investment risk is evidenced by their siz-
able liquid asset holdings, which have reached unprecedented global levels. In gen-
eral, studies have found that finance-constrained firms tend to hold excess cash to 
ensure their long-term survival in adverse economic periods and during periods of 
uncertainty in terms of access to external financing (Baum et al., 2004). The result 
of such behaviour is that firms forgo investments that could conceivably yield a 
higher return.
The situation is particularly acute for smaller firms, which are younger, riskier 
and tend to face more restricted access to external financing than larger firms 
((Bigelli and Sànchez-Vidal (2011) and Han and Qiu, 2007)). In general, larger 
firms tend to hold more liquid assets as a share of total assets than medium-sized 
firms in the United States and Asia (Figure 4.8). Cash holdings increased mark-
edly in Asia following the global crisis, accompanied by a considerable fall-off in 
investment across firms of all sizes. In the United States, the share of cash holdings 
in total assets in medium-sized firms increased from around 5.2 per cent to around 
6.2 per cent after the crisis; while in larger firms it rose from about 4.2 per cent in 
2006 to 5.3 per cent in 2010. Additionally, there is an inverse relationship between 
investment and cash holdings, with the increase in cash holdings impacting invest-
ment more severely in the case of smaller firms than in larger firms. This lends sup-
port to the argument that smaller firms finance more of their investment out of 
cash holdings, and less from external financing (Beck et al., 2008). Nevertheless, 
large firms, which tend to have better access to external finance, have also increased 
their cash holdings considerably.
In European and Latin American firms cash holdings as a share of total assets 
are roughly equivalent across firm size (Figure 4.9). In Europe, in particular, cash 
holdings of larger firms have increased at a faster pace since 2008 than medium-
sized firms, although investment in large firms (as a share of total assets) still 
remains higher.
In Latin America, where cash holdings are particularly low, investment pat-
terns are much more erratic and suggest greater use of external financing for 
investment. Nevertheless, medium-sized firms have considerably less investment 
as a share of total assets than large firms.
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Figure 4.8 Cash holdings and investment as a percentage of total assets by ﬁrm size, 2001–2010 
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Figure 4.9 Cash holdings and investment as a percentage of total assets by ﬁrm size, 2001–2010 
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In general, lower cost of capital boosts investment … 
In theory, investment is characterized as a present sacrifice of resources for future 
benefits: investment today cannot be paid out as dividends by firms or consumed 
by households. Hence, on an economy-wide scale, investment is the counterpart to 
macroeconomic saving, with interest rates acting as a possible equalizer between 
the two variables. For the household, high interest rates create an incentive to 
increase savings, while low interest rates have the opposite effect. 
For the firm, the market interest rate represents a cost of capital. In this 
respect, the market interest rate can be used to discount the value of future income 
streams and to determine if an investment project has a positive net present value 
(NPV). Firms undertake those projects that have a positive NPV. Increasing the 
interest rate leads to a decline in NPV, and thus to fewer investment projects being 
undertaken. Lower interest rates provoke the opposite effect since they raise NPV. 
Therefore, the interest rate is the classical instrument which policy-makers use in 
an attempt to stimulate private investment. 
However, the mechanism by which investment can be stimulated through 
interest rate cuts is complex. Costs of capital are determined through long-term 
real interest rates. Central banks can only influence nominal short-term interest 
rates. Although large central banks like the United States Federal Reserve System 
and the European Central Bank have succeeded in lowering short-term interest 
rates through expansive monetary policies, the term structure of the interest rates 
can only be marginally controlled and reacts to other factors, such as expected 
inflation rates or risk considerations of market participants.
Additionally, other factors such as tax rates and tax policies, in the form of 
depreciation rates, marginal personal income tax rates or marginal corporate tax 
rates, and tax credits also impact on the cost of capital.
… but reducing capital cost is not sufficient to solve the current crisis. 
In the current economic environment, the classical drivers of investment seem in-
adequate to explain the massive drop in investment that has occurred, particularly 
in advanced economies. Nominal interest rates have fallen to historical lows in a 
number of countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, and, as 
the World of Work Report 2011 has shown, the tax burden on investors and capital 
owners has been declining in most countries over the past decades. 
Thus, since the drop in investment during the crisis has not been caused by an 
increase in the cost of capital, the extent to which a decrease in the same factors 
can reverse low investment activity is questionable. Additionally, since short-term 
nominal interest rates are already close to zero, the possibilities for conventional 
monetary policy are exhausted. Indeed, studies such as McCulley and Pozsar 
(2012) suggest that much of the developed world is in a “liquidity trap”, a situation 
which typically arises after the burst of a debt-fuelled asset-price bubble. Although 
the presence of a liquidity trap is still somewhat controversial, many other promi-
nent economists agree with this view.3
In such a situation, tax and interest rate policies have a limited potential and 
can only play a complementary role in a policy approach that supports a recovery 
of investment. Other factors, such as income distribution and uncertainty, may 
have a more prominent role.
3. See, for example, Evans (2010); Krugman (2011) and Delong (2012).
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A shifting income distribution can lead to investment constrained growth. 
An important consideration in better understanding why investment has not yet 
recovered lies in the possible mismatch between saving and investment decisions. 
Household saving is not automatically channelled into productive investment by 
firms. Investment decisions are made by firms (or entrepreneurs) and saving deci-
sions are made by a large number of heterogeneous households. These decisions 
made by different actors in the economy are influenced by the income distribu-
tion (Kalecki, 1971). 
Growing income inequalities can lead to an inveterate excess of planned sav-
ings over investment, creating the need to constantly find sources of additional 
aggregate demand.4 If the willingness of governments and households to save is 
higher than the willingness of firms and entrepreneurs to invest, economies can 
be caught in a situation of “investment constrained growth”. Higher saving and 
higher income growth can only be achieved if investment increases at the same 
time, otherwise the mismatch between desired higher saving and constrained 
investment is inevitably resolved through a contraction of output. Therefore, pri-
vate households and governments cannot attempt to increase saving at the same 
time, especially not in all countries simultaneously.
The conjunction between income distribution and economic growth has long 
been recognized by the economics literature in the Keynesian tradition. The func-
tional income distribution (that is, the distribution of income between labour and 
capital) can become a key determinant of investment, employment and overall 
4. Creating additional domestic investment demand is one option to close this gap. Other 
possibilities are net exports or additional debt-financed consumption of low-income households. The 
latter has been identified as one of the sources of the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
Box 4.2 Growth and distribution
In underemployed economies – when capital and labour are not fully utilized – an increase 
of the wage share can have ambiguous effects on economic activity. Depending on how 
saving and investment decisions react in response to a (policy-induced) change of the 
wage share, aggregate demand on the goods market can either increase or decline. At 
the same time, any changes in aggregate demand feed back into an economy’s income 
distribution and affect the wage share, depending on labour’s bargaining power and the 
distribution of productivity gains. After these adjustment processes to the goods market 
and income distribution have taken place, the economy arrives at a new equilibrium for 
output and the wage share. 
If (equilibrium) output has expanded in response to an initial reduction of the wage share, 
the economy is referred to as “profit-led”, while in the case of a contraction of output 
the economy is referred to as “wage-led” (see Bhaduri and Marglin (1990)). Belser and 
Lee (2011) emphasize that wage-led growth hinges critically on the question of whether 
investment is wage-led. Investment, being part of aggregate demand, is wage-led if an 
increase of the wage share results in an expansion of investment. The authors men-
tion two important channels that explain how investment could be wage-led. First, if 
demand is strongly wage-led via the standard accelerator effect in the investment func-
tion. Second, if productivity is wage-led and investment reacts to productivity growth, 
then investment increases in response to wage increases.
Different constellations of aggregate demand, capacity utilization and the distributive 
schedule result in different responses of the economy to a policy-induced change in 
income distribution. Economies tend to be wage-led if capacity utilization is low and 
cyclical movements of the wage share result in a non-linear distribution schedule (see 
Nikiforos and Foley (2011)).
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aggregate performance. In fact, increasing wages can lead to an expansion of 
output and eventually to an increase in the growth of capital through increased 
investment. However, as the World of Work Report 2011 demonstrated, profit 
shares have been increasing while their counterpart, the wage share, has declined 
over the past decades in most countries, thus shifting the distribution of income 
from labour to capital. The impact of the wage share on economic growth has 
mainly been discussed in the context of so-called wage-led and profit-led econ-
omies (Box 4.2).
Global economic uncertainty can inhibit investment and employment … 
Another essential factor that can impede investment activity is economic and 
political uncertainty, which can have important implications for employment.5 
For instance, Baker et al. (2012) show that for the United States an increase in 
the level of policy uncertainty foreshadows a drop in private investment of about 
16 per cent within one quarter and leads to reductions of aggregate employment 
of 2.3 million jobs within two years. 
A high level of uncertainty gives firms an incentive to delay investment and 
employment decisions. If many firms postpone making investments or hiring 
employees, the economy as a whole contracts, generating a recession or trapping 
the economy in a recessive state. On the contrary, once uncertainty is reduced, 
firms start hiring and investing again to address pent-up demand. The mechanisms 
through which uncertainty depresses economic activity can be manifold (see Leahy 
and Whited (1996)). Gilchrist and Williams (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 
(2011) and Pastor and Veronesi (2011) find that uncertainty pushes up the cost 
of finance; Panousi and Papanikolaou (forthcoming) identify an increasing man-
agerial risk-aversion, and DeMarzo and Uuliy (2006) and Narita (2011) find an 
intensification of agency problems that reduces the value of both new and existing 
employment and business and financial relationships. 
As previous chapters have shown, investors face high degrees of uncertainty 
in a number of areas, including job growth, labour regulations and fiscal austerity. 
As the previous section illustrated, investment rates have continued to struggle, 
despite significant interest rate cuts and other efforts to revive private investment. 
Indeed, the degree of uncertainty has increased considerably over the past decades, 
and particularly during the crisis. One general measure of uncertainty is the Vola-
tility Index (VIX), produced by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
(Box 4.3).
Figure 4.10 illustrates the average VIX over a 21-year period from 1990 to 
2011. In general, not only did the average value of the index increase during the 
two decades, but the variability increased as well. Between 1990 and 2000, the 
average value of the index was 18.9, indicating that investors were anticipating that 
asset prices would fluctuate by about 19 per cent annually. This investor sentiment 
varied on average by 5 percentage points over the same time period. From 2001 to 
2011 the average index increased to 22.3, with a variability of 9.2 percentage points. 
Much of the increase in the average is owing to the core crisis period (2008–2010), 
during which perceived uncertainty increased to an average index value of 29.0, 
with the variability of the index increasing to a high of 11.6 percentage points. 
5. See, for example, Bloom (2009), who shows how uncertainty shocks drive the dynamics of 
investment and hiring behaviour.
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… while decreasing uncertainty boosts investment and reduces unemployment. 
In order to assess the impact of uncertainty on investment and employment, an 
econometric model in the form of a vector autoregression (VAR) model, quanti-
fies how employment and investment react to changes in the level of uncertainty 
(see Appendix A). 
In a first policy experiment, it is shown how real investment growth and un-
employment would respond to exogenously decreasing uncertainty to a pre-crisis 
(2002–2007) VIX level of 19. Such a rollback would entail a reduction of uncer-
tainty by 37 per cent from current levels, which would boost real investment by 
approximately 23 per cent within two to three quarters. Current unemployment 
levels would react with a short time lag and fall by approximately 9.5 per cent 
within two to six quarters after the initial reduction in uncertainty. Based on un-
employment numbers of advanced countries in the fourth quarter of 2011, a reduc-
tion in global uncertainty would translate into a reduction in unemployment in 
Box 4.3 Uncertainty measures and the VIX
The Volatility Index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) is a measure of 
the near-term implied volatility of Standard and Poor’s 500 index options. In other words, 
this index – quoted in percentage points – calculates and provides on a daily basis a 
general indication of the expected level of volatility as perceived by market participants 
(or “implied volatility”). The index describes the expected annualized deviation of asset 
prices in per cent. For example, a VIX of 15 means that investors expect asset prices in 
the next 30 days to fluctuate by about 15 per cent on an annualized basis. The VIX is today 
considered to be the most important barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility 
in the world. Financial market participants also refer to VIX as the “fear index”. The index 
spiked considerably during the global economic crisis, reaching a peak of 60 per cent.
Identifying and measuring specific sources of uncertainty can be very difficult. Using 
implied volatility from options prices, the VIX has the advantage of being an operational, 
quantifiable measure of ex ante uncertainty as perceived by financial market investors. 
A disadvantage of the VIX is that it not only captures anticipated uncertainty in the real 
economy (for example, pure business risk) but also anticipated fluctuations in financial 
markets that could be caused by bubbles or fads. Furthermore, financial market investors 
may have a different perception of uncertainty than entrepreneurs. Other measures of 
economic uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty have been suggested by Baker 
et al. (2012), who focus on policy-related uncertainty, or by Bachmann et al. (2011) who 
construct several measures of uncertainty based on business survey data from Germany 
and the United States.
Note: Investment uncertainty is expressed as 
implied volatility. Average uncertainty is measured 
as the mean of the daily volatility index (VIX) of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange. The variability of 
uncertainty, i.e. how strongly investors’ sentiment 
has been changing during the period under 
consideration, has been measured as the standard 
deviation of quarterly data.
Source: IILS estimates based on Chicago Board 
Options Exchange. 
Figure 4.10 Investment uncertainty, averages and standard deviation, 1990–2011
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advanced countries by 3.7 million people within 18 months.6 The jobs gap (about 
49.5 million people globally, see Chapter 1) could therefore be closed by about 
7.5 per cent (Figure 4.11). Concrete steps that policy-makers can take in order to 
reduce uncertainty are discussed in section C. 
C. Policy considerations 
As shown in sections A and B, there is currently a high degree of uncertainty 
driving private sector investment decisions and, consequently, many firms (partic-
ularly in developed economies) prefer to hold cash in an attempt to build up their 
balance sheets. In circumstances where there is a high degree of uncertainty about 
future growth in product demand (and labour costs), the cost of overcoming the 
preference for liquidity may be rather excessive 
In a situation where investment fails to respond to monetary stimuli, other 
measures such as improving access to loans for finance-constrained firms, pro-
viding incentives for business investment and supporting policies to increase pri-
vate domestic consumption have been shown to encourage private investment. 
Additionally, direct government investment, particularly in the form of infrastruc-
ture development, has been shown to have a particularly strong and long-lasting 
impact on private investment. Thus, the productivity and employment impacts of 
such options would justify the additional fiscal spending. 
Encouraging job-rich investment requires, first, better financing 
conditions for SMEs… 
From the investors’ perspective, economic uncertainty stems mainly from the 
financing conditions of investment. The opportunities for debt financing of 
investment have deteriorated during the crisis, especially for SMEs, and section 
A has demonstrated that SMEs’ investment activities have suffered disproportion-
ally in comparison to larger firms, which tend to have better access to external 
6. Approximately 39 million people were unemployed in advanced economies during the fourth 
quarter of 2011. The following 27 advanced countries constitute the group: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the cumulative reaction of 
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of dynamic equations, which is estimated through 
a second-order vector autoregression (see 
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subsequently subjected to an exogenous shock 
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to pre-crisis levels). Cumulative impulse response 
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Source: IILS estimates.–40
30
Figure 4.11 Investment and employment impact of a reduction in uncertainty
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financing. Therefore, providing SMEs with sufficient financing options is crucial 
to improving investment. Many central banks have already injected considerable 
liquidity into private banks over recent years, but this liquidity is building up in 
terms of excess reserves as opposed to loans to the private sector. In general, banks 
have increased their financing of government debt, but obtaining credit for SMEs 
is still difficult in countries that have been hit hard by the crisis. Direct financing 
of businesses through public banks or partnerships can be considered as an option 
in a situation of credit rationing by private business banks.7 
… second, tackling excessive income inequalities especially  
in surplus economies… 
Uncertainty about future employment and labour income substitutes can depress 
consumer confidence and lead to increased precautionary saving by households, 
which inevitably leads to higher business uncertainty with regard to firms’ invest-
ments. Some deficit-reduction policies can be counterintuitive in this respect. 
As a large number of countries dealing with high levels of government debt (see 
Chapter 3) and negative external balances try to reduce internal and external def-
icits simultaneously within a very short period of time – through policies such as 
across-the-board wage cuts – this decreases the future income security of house-
holds and future government consumption, which will inevitably lead to higher 
uncertainty among firms. Thus, the challenge for governments is to implement 
a more careful approach that provides a more visible path to recovery and also 
encourages investment. This will also help to reduce the risk of social unrest, which 
has increased in many countries over recent years (see Chapter 1). Uncertainty 
about the social cohesion feeds back into economic uncertainty. Policy-makers can 
reduce the risk of social unrest by implementing policies that promote employ-
ment creation and address rising inequality.
… and well-designed public investment which helps to “crowd in” 
 private investment and support more and better jobs… 
The importance of public investment for stimulating growth during previous 
crises, such as the Great Depression in the United States and Japan’s asset bubble 
crash, has been discussed in section A of this chapter. In both cases, a recovery 
was jumpstarted through large fiscal stimuli, but thwarted prematurely owing to 
concern over the growing deficit situation. Although the debt situation in Europe 
has left a number of economies with limited options for financing additional fiscal 
spending, the low cost of public borrowing has also created more space in some 
economies for additional deficit-financed spending. 
The “J-curve” approach to fiscal spending has been used to suggest that those 
economies with access to low financing costs in capital markets have room to 
either maintain or enhance deficit-financed fiscal stimuli.8 The term “J” refers to 
the shape of the fiscal balance curve, which under deficit-financed spending would 
initially worsen before improving strongly thereafter. In this approach, after 2 or 
3 years of a widening deficit, government revenues would increase owing to the 
7. Successful examples of such government initiatives exist in the Industrial and Commercial 
Finance Corporation (ICFC), which was set up in 1945 by the Bank of England to plug a financial 
gap that the banks were unable to fill, as well as the loan programme launched by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) for financing investments in SMEs.
8. See UNDESA (2012).
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growth in employment and GDP. Once the recovery has gained an adequate foot-
hold, austerity measures could then be implemented to more gradually reduce the 
public debt to GDP ratio. 
Infrastructure spending has the greatest impact on stimulating private invest-
ment, since its effectiveness is independent of business cycle conditions. Simula-
tions with the IILS Global Economic Linkages (GEL) model show the impact of 
public investment (in the form of infrastructure investment) on private investment 
in Figure 4.12. The existence of a large stock of public capital provides a positive 
external influence on firms’ production, as public investment acts as a free input 
for firms, which is productivity enhancing. A 1 percentage point increase in the 
public investment to GDP ratio leads to a 0.5 percentage point increase in private 
investment by the third quarter of 2012, and peaks at a one for one gain by the 
second quarter of 2013. Thereafter, private investment spending decelerates until 
the end of 2015.
Similarly, an investment subsidy can also stimulate private investment by low-
ering the cost of capital accumulation. The benefit of such a subsidy is that it dir-
ectly affects investment decisions. Following a 2 per cent increase in the subsidy, 
private investment increases by 0.5 percentage points at peak.
The benefits of public investment, however are that projects in this domain 
can also be labour-intensive and have long term benefits, such as broadband tele-
communication networks, which can help to alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks. 
Additionally, in developing economies where the rural economy represents a large 
share of the economy, agriculture investment has been shown to have an effect on 
improving productivity, wages and employment.
… as illustrated by public investment in ICT infrastructure …
Improving telecommunications networks plays a crucial role in infrastructure 
development and overall economic growth. Consequently, a number of devel-
oped economies included initiatives to improve telecommunications infrastruc-
ture in their initial stimulus packages in 2008/09. In Australia, for example, this 
represented 10 per cent of the total economic cost of the packages (Qiang, 2010). 
Although this type of telecommunications investment (which is geared towards 
building faster fixed lines and wireless next-generation networks) is an important 
part of long-term development and growth strategies in both developed and devel-
oping economies, and in the short term has the capacity to create quality jobs, as 
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Figure 4.12 Public spending ‘crowds in’ private investment
Note: This ﬁgure displays the reaction of 
private investment under two scenarios. In a 
ﬁrst scenario, public intervention takes the 
form of an increase in public investment to 
GDP ratio by 1 percentage point. In a 
second scenario, public intervention takes 
the form of an increase in investment 
subsidy by 2 per cent of private investment 
to GDP ratio. The policies are assumed to 
take effect in mid-2012 and the effects are 
measured until the end of 2015.
Source: IILS GEL model. 
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well as increase productivity and investment in other sectors of the economy. The 
strategy is also cost effective as much of the investment can ultimately be financed 
by the private sector (ibid.).
Estimates from the United States show that a US$5 billion public investment 
stimulus in broadband infrastructure would lead to 100,000 direct jobs and 2.5 
million indirect jobs, owing to the network effects (Communication Workers of 
America, 2008). 
In terms of financing, broadband infrastructure investment comes close 
to being self-financed in the sense that governments may provide initial seed 
money or a line of credit to private operators. In Australia and the Republic of 
Korea, for example, the government financed 11 per cent and 4 per cent of the 
total investment cost respectively, with the private sector contributing the rest 
(Qiang, 2010). In addition, for developing economies it also represents a major 
source of foreign direct investment (FDI), with developing and emerging econ-
omies attracting US$108 billion of FDI for broadband investment from around 
the world (UNCTAD, 2008).
… and in agriculture and rural areas.
Public investment in agriculture has been shown to have an effect on improving 
productivity, wages and employment. It is also labour intensive and can have 
spillover impacts on non-rural sectors of the economy by raising aggregate 
demand and increasing consumption of durable goods, which stimulates invest-
ment demand. 
In rural India, for example, where per capita incomes have grown by 12 per 
cent in recent years, owing to improved agricultural incomes demand for durable 
goods has nearly doubled – from 2.6 per cent in 2005 to 4.8 per cent in 2010 
(Fontanella-Khan and Lamont, 2012). Similarly, a study by Citigroup (2011) in 
the Indian province of Uttar Pradesh shows that sales of durable goods by major 
producers have increased more than 50 per cent since 2006, and tractor sales by 
as much as 30 per cent.
The following experiences provide examples of public investment policy meas-
ures that can lead to increased productivity and wages and which have contributed 
to growth in the agricultural sector:
c Public investments in infrastructure: Investments in infrastructure (irrigation, 
roads, harbours) contribute to increasing productivity and/or access to mar-
kets for producers and to reducing production prices. From 2000, Madagascar 
launched a new agricultural policy with the aim of increasing the domestic 
supply of local agriculture and regulating urban supply thanks to imports. The 
policy to increase local production consisted of providing support to local pro-
ducers by the development of transport and irrigation infrastructures, improved 
governance of decision-makers and reinforced coordination between private 
stakeholders and the state (Gérard et al., 2011). Positive results were observed 
as early as 2002, with a strong increase in paddy production of 83 per cent 
between 2002 and 2010. 
c Improving access to credit: Impact analysis of credit schemes to smallholder 
farmers in developing countries generally shows that the availability of credit 
to poor farmers increases investment and helps to improve productivity. For 
example, a study conducted in the province of Razavi Kharasan in Iran involving 
177 farmers compares the level of investments of farmers depending on their 
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access to credit and confirms the positive effect of credit availability on invest-
ments (Kohansal et al, 2008). Some programmes to increase access to credit 
have involved titling programmes to secure land rights, thus providing farmers 
with the opportunity to use their property as collateral. However, such policies 
need to be part of an integrated strategy to ensure their success. In Peru, for 
example, the land titling programme launched in the 1990s did not facilitate 
access to credit for rural households as land titles were not deemed sufficient to 
use as collateral to guarantee a loan (Kerekes and Williamson, 2010). 
c Public investments in human capital: The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) demonstrates the positive impact of the introduction of water-harvesting 
techniques in sub-Saharan countries on yields and farmers’ revenues, and under-
lines the importance of disseminating knowledge and building farmers’ capaci-
ties. In Niger, for example, millet yield was doubled or tripled thanks to various 
water-harvesting techniques (“Projet de Développement rural de Tahoua”) that 
have led to an increase in net profit compared with areas where they were not 
applied. Furthermore, the investments for water harvesting, which are proven 
to be successful at the farm level, are both capital extensive and labour inten-
sive (FAO, 2001). 
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Appendix A
Empirical analysis of investment dynamics
The economic simulations in sections A and B of this chapter are based on a four-
dimensional vector autrogressive (VAR) model. The economic dynamic is cap-
tured by the following equation system:
xt = c + A1 xt–1 + A2 xt–2 + εt
The column vector xt contains the log differences of the column vector Vt with 
VtT = (∑t It Yt Ut ), whereby ∑ denotes uncertainty, I, real investment, Y, real GDP 
and U symbolizes the unemployment level. The small letter t is a time index 
denoting the end of a time period and ∆t equals one-quarter of a year. T denotes 
the transpose of a matrix or a vector. Log differences are denoted by small letters 
so that, for example, σt –= ln∑t – ln∑t–1 and xtT = (σt it yt ut ). εt is a four-dimensional 
white noise process with E(εt) = 0, E(εt εtT ) = Ω and E(εt εsT ) = 0 for s ≠ t. The vari-
ance–covariance matrix Ω is assumed to be non-singular.
Data have been available for all variables since Q1 1990. ∑ is implied stock 
market volatility as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index, VIX (see Box 4.3). The daily observations of the VIX have been 
transformed into monthly averages in order to be matched with quarterly data on 
investment, GDP and unemployment. This smoothing of the original VIX series 
leads to a reduction of the original sample volatility by about 7 per cent. 
The vector of constants, c, and the two coefficient matrices, A1 and A2, are 
estimated by multivariate least squares estimation, yielding: 
Bˆ = X ZT (Z ZT )–1
with  B = (c A1 A2), (4 × 9); X = (x1, …, x86), (4 × 86); ZtT = (1 xtT xTt–1), (1 × 9); and 
Z = (Z1, …, Z86), (9 × 86), . Numbers in brackets denote the dimensions of the re-
spective matrices.
The following table comprises the entries of matrix Bˆ :
–0.0182 –0.0869 –0.1499 –0.8043 –0.0393 –0.1947 0.3324 1.3004 0.197
–0.0342 –0.122 –0.0158 3.015 0.3306 –0.1634 0.025 0.0183 –0.1537
0.0094 –0.0248 0.0039 0.4795 0.0593 –0.0056 0.009 0.1191 –0.0246
0.049 0.0786 –0.0195 –1.1771 –0.5961 0.0852 –0.1134 –0.1942 0.1701
All z satisfying the condition, det (I4 – Â1 z – Â2  z 2 ) = 0, lie outside the unit circle 
and the estimated system is therefore stable. I4 denotes the identity matrix in this 
context. Satisfaction of the stability condition implies that the estimated VAR 
process is covariance stationary.
The impact of an exogenous shock to the system can be analysed with the 
help of impulse response functions (IRF). These IRF show the impact of an innov-
ation of each of the four variables on itself and on each of the other three variables. 
Since innovations of the VAR are generally not contemporaneously independent 
of one another orthogonal innovations are constructed which are uncorrelated and 
have unit variance. The following chart depicts the IRF of such innovations for a 
period of twenty quarters. The ordering corresponds to the ordering chosen for the 
elements of vector xt , thus i  j shows the response of the i-th variable in xt due to 
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a unit impulse to structural shock j. As can be seen from the charts, most of the 
effects die out within about five quarters. 
For the policy simulations, the cumulative responses of the system have been 
computed for innovations of uncertainty and real investment. For example, an 
exogenous increase of real investment by 17.8 per cent leads to a response of un-
employment levels over the next four years to a decline of 8.9 per cent (section A).
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